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ABSTRACT
This study had two thrusts aimed at identifying areas of improvement
for the federal laboratory technology transfer efforts.
One purpose of this study was to determine if federal laboratory
researchers were prepared and/or interested in performing technology
transfer to the private sector. Researchers at federal laboratories are typically
promoted on the basis of publications. Recently federal legislation and federal
agencies have called for a more active technology transfer role for federal
laboratories. Most of the directives have established funding levels and
policies have consequently resulted in the creation of organizational
structures specifically established for the purpose of transferring federal
laboratory's technologies to the private sector. Yet there has been little change
in the role of the researchers. The aim of this study was to identify if a
cultural barrier existed between the researchers and this new directive.
Specifically, the researchers were surveyed to determine their attitude,
awareness and perception toward technology transfer.
One hundred researchers at NASA Langley Research Center were
surveyed to determine their attitude, awareness, and perceptions toward
performing technology transfer. Prior to the survey, the survey instrument
was refined through a focus group, a pilot study and a review by the Director
iv
of the Technology Applications Group. The survey consisted of 19 questions
aimed at assessing the researchers' awareness of the current technology
transfer mechanisms and policies, their attitude toward the policies and their
personal involvement, and their perception of the policies.
The second thrust of this research was to find appropriate metrics for
technology transfer from federal laboratories to the private sector. Although
many recommendations have been made regarding metrics, there have been
few studies to verify those metrics. In this study, a new approach to
identifying metrics was undertaken. Successful technology transfer cases
were identified as those that satisfied previously defined successful outcome
metrics (commercial sales, production savings, etc.). These cases were tracked
backward through their history to identify the key critical elements that lead
to success. The cases studies were constructed from interviews with
principals and historical documents. The three cases represented a spectrum
of economic impacts ($100M/Yr., $10M/Yr., $1M/Yr.).
The results of the survey showed that researchers were not
prepared/educated to perform technology transfer and personally did not
want to be responsible for it. The researchers were uninformed on the
mechanisms for technology transfer. A negative relationship was found
between researcher's attitudes toward performing technology transfer and
increasing accountability and responsibility for technology transfer.
VIn the three case studies, four key critical elements were identified that
contributed to success: champions (internal and external), early government
funding of research, equivalent technology, and licensing. Of the four key
elements, licensing is the only quantitative metric that can be used by the
federal laboratory for intermediate measures. The other three key elements
indicate areas in which future policies should be directed. Federal
laboratories should concentrate on identifying external champions,
developing and identifying internal champions, working with their
technology transfer partners to bring technology to an appropriate level for
transfer, and investing research funds in market-failure situations.
Additionally, the concern is raised that there exists a chasm between the
results of the survey and the case studies. The case studies indicate the need
for internal championing while the survey results show a lack of interest in
participation.
v±
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
The issue of technology transfer between federal laboratories and the
private sector has become a focus for public and congressional debate. In times
of increased global economic competition, there is increased legislative and
public interest to better utilize the US taxpayer investment in government
research. In support of the surrounding debates, many studies have been
performed to evaluate the economic impact of technology transfer from the
government to the private sector and often commissions and reports have
put forward recommendations for improved technology transfer
implementation. Within the few quantitative studies performed (Bozeman
and Papadakis 1995; Roessner 1993; Chapman et al. 1986; Mathematica 1976)
there is indication that the benefits of technology transfer make it
worthwhile. Yet there remain ample opportunities for improvement in the
cooperative efforts between federal laboratories and the private sector.
One of the most prominent Federal agencies involved in technology
transfer is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This
agency includes 10 field centers located throughout the United States. NASA,
long viewed as a leader in technology transfer, fared only average in terms of
royalties when compared with US universities' technology transfer efforts
(See Chapter II, analysis of NASA data). A startling finding is that the entire
NASA system received $162,000 in royalties based on 27 licenses in 1993,
while in that same year, 81 universities had more in royalties and 32
universities had more licenses than NASA (AUTM 1994). More revealing is
that NASA's average revenue per licenses generating revenue in that same
year was one order of magnitude less than universities and Canadian
institutes and two orders of magnitudes less than US hospitals & research
institutes and patent management firms, as surveyed. These comparisons
may be unfair, since most universities and patent management firms are
multi-disciplinary and, along with hospitals and research institutes see
licensing as an important part of their mission. NASA has a narrower focus,
with a primary mission toward the aerospace community that limits the
scope of commercialization. In addition, revenue generation is not a thrust
of Federal agencies like NASA. Still, there appears to be adequate opportunity
to create a culture at federal laboratories, or more specifically NASA, more
responsive to technology transfer issues.
This dissertation study does not attempt to add to the wealth of
preexisting economic impact or policy studies linking the government with
the private sector or add to the already extensive debate on the benefits of
technology transfer. Rather, it addresses the role of the federal laboratory
researcher as a key component in the process, and attempts to find useful
3metrics to help guide federal laboratories policies toward technology transfer.
In order to find useful metrics, a proposal is made to find those practices that
are common to successful transfers through a reverse engineering process.
The process is to select an economically successful technology transfer and
backtrack the procedures through the adopting company, the technology
transfer agent, and the researcher to find the key elements that contribute to
the economic success. In addition, federal laboratory researchers are surveyed
to identify the awareness and attitudes that compose the culture of technology
transfer in federal laboratories. The results of the culture survey and the
metrics study will be compared to search for overlaps and disconnects.
Most existing studies addressing the improvement of the technology
transfer process from federal government to the private sector focus on the
needs of the end customer, private industry. It is natural and necessary to
focus on the customer. Yet there has been little attention or recognition
given to measuring the culture internal to the federal laboratories to support
technology transfer (Technology Transfer, Barriers Limit Royalty Sharing's
Effectiveness 1992). There have been many studies performed to identify the
appropriate organization and procedures for technology transfer, but these
refer to those professionals working in support of technology transfer and not
the researchers (Bagur and Guissinger 1988; Brockman 1986; Greenberg 1995;
Horsham 1992; Lionberger and Guin 1991; Mock et al. 1993; Mogavero and
Shane 1982; Palmintera 1993; Reck 1994; Rose 1990; Shama 1992; Souder et al.
1990).
US federal laboratories and the scientific and technical community
have, since the end of WW II, been operating under a reward system based
almost entirely on the peer-reviewed publication (Shapley and Roy 1985;
Raymond 1966). However, it is commonly recognized that technology
transfer occurs best through active communication methods and not the
passive approaches characteristic of publications and their uses. As a measure
of technology transfer, publications are weak and inefficient (Schulte-Hillen
et al. 1976). Even as a measure of scientific work, bibliometrics have many
pitfalls and shortcomings (Melkers 1990). Now there is a call by both private
industry (Industry as a Customer of the Federal Laboratories 1992) and the
Congress for federal laboratories to become more active in technology
transfer. Researchers operating under the existing paradigm of "publish or no
promotion" have little to no reason to support technology transfer efforts.
Although recent legislation (e.g., Stevenson-Wydler Act 1980; Federal
Technology Transfer and Commercialization Act 1986) has allowed for
improved monetary rewards through royalties and performance evaluations,
little has changed in the system. A recent Government Accounting Office
(GAO) study found that the monetary rewards attached with royalties are
usually not significant enough to change behavior (Technology Transfer,
Barriers Limit Royalty Sharing's Effectiveness 1992). The study found that
there was no improvement in the invention rate at 14 of 21 federal agencies
after the introduction of the Federal Technology Transfer Act's revenue
sharing legislation. Real improvement of six of the remaining seven of the
other agencies was not necessarily due to the legislation, but was attributed to
the effects of scientific, legal, or other legislation on patenting activity that
preceded or coincided with the Federal Technology Transfer Act rather than
to the implementation of royalty sharing.
Within this same GAO study, comments from a focus group of federal
scientists were collected to help define their culture. The scientists believed
in obtaining patents for reasons other than obtaining financial results, valued
peer recognition of research achievements, and were wary of any restriction
or delay in publishing or discussing research results with peers such as
reporting inventions. Scientists also believed that collaboration on research
between federal and private-sector scientists is difficult because of
incompatibilities in the two groups' research objectives and time frames to
achieve results. Another GAO report (Diffusing Innovations: Implementing
the Technology Transfer Act of 1986 1991) found that less than 40% of the
Laboratory Directors were aware of the legislation that supports the use of
performance evaluations for researchers. Another survey of federal
technology managers shows that 44% believe the current reward and
incentive system needs to be changed, while 9% disagree and 47% are neutral
(Lesko & Irish 1995). Improved communications between government
6laboratories and the private sector will require that a technology transfer
culture be instilled into the laboratory researchers.
A number of studies have identified metrics for technology transfer
(Spann, Adams and Souder 1993; Creedon et al. 1992). Most metrics studies
categorize the metrics according to phases of the transfer process (Figure 1.1).
Find Common Elements
Track Success Backwards
Input Metrics
• Technology Transfer Budget
• Number of Full Time
Employees
• Time spent
• Requests for Help
Interm ediate Metrics
• Number of Patents
• Number of Licenses
• Tech Papers
Published/Requested
• Technical Problems Solved
Outcom e Metrics
Return on Investment
Cost Savings
Productivity Gains
Royalties
User Satisfaction
Figure 1.1: Categories of Technology Transfer Metrics
7These studies, in general, divide metrics into three categories including:
input, intermediate, and outcome. The input and intermediate metrics may
be easily obtained but do not necessarily correlate with the outcome metrics,
which are the true measures of success (economic impacts). However, the
outcome metrics are difficult to obtain and nearly impossible to utilize as a
guiding measure, since the temporal attributes are out of proportion to the
actions occurring within the input and intermediate frames. As a result of
these issues, federal agencies have had difficulty in measuring the level of
achievement of their investment in technology transfer.
Descriptive Title of Project
Analysis of Technology Transfer at NASA.
Statement of the Problem
This research sets out to identify metrics for effective technology
transfer and to measure the contemporary attitude, awareness, and
perceptions of federal laboratory researchers with respect to technology
transfer. Specifically, the research:
(a) identifies the common, key critical elements that contribute to an
economically successful technology transfer from a federal laboratory to
the commercial sector.
(b) investigates the current culture (attitudes, awareness, and
perceptions) of the researchers of one Federal laboratory (NASA
Langley Research Center) with respect to technology transfer, to
determine if its culture is consistent with current legislation and
management expectations.
One of the two primary purposes of this research is to determine those
activities that contribute to successful technology transfer and to identify
appropriate metrics for evaluating technology transfer activities. The other
primary purpose is to determine the attitude, awareness, and perceptions of
federal laboratory researchers toward the technology transfer process.
Hypotheses
This research combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches.
The qualitative approach will be used in studying and analyzing successful
technology transfer metrics case studies and in assessing open-ended
questions contained in the researcher culture survey questions. Open ended
questions and cultural issues are expected to lead to other, as yet undefined
9hypotheses or conclusions. As a starting point, the basic hypotheses are posed
below.
H(1) n_ Technology transfer as a component of the performance plan
and performance appraisal was widespread at NASA Langley Research
Center.
H(1) Technology transfer as a component of the performance plan
and performance appraisal was minimal at NASA Langley Research
Center.
H(2)nuu Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are aware of the
technology transfer policies of the agency and the Center.
H(2) Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are not aware of
technology transfer policies of the agency and the Center.
i
H(3) nuu Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are aware of the
technology transfer points of contact and technology transfer
mechanisms.
H(3) Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are minimally
Lware of the technology transfer points of contact and technology
ransfer mechanisms.
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H(4),uuResearchers at NASA Langley Research Center want to be
responsible or accountable for technology transfer.
H(4) Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center do not want to be
responsible or accountable for technology transfer.
H(5)nu. Researcher awareness of technology transfer is not linked to
educational level.
H(5) Researcher awareness of technology transfer is linked to
educational level.
H(6)nun Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is not linked
to their educational level.
H(6) Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is linked to
their educational level.
H(7)nu. Researcher attitudes about technology transfer are not linked to
itheir educational level.
H(7) Researcher attitudes about technology transfer are linked to their
._ducational level.
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H(8)nu.Researcher awareness about technology transfer is not linked to
age.
H(8) Researcher awareness about technology transfer is linked to age.
H(9)nuu Researcher attitudes about technology transfer is not linked to
age.
H(9) Researcher attitudes about technology transfer is linked to age.
H(10)_n Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is not linked
to age.
H(10) Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is linked to
age.
I
H(ll)_L 1 Success in technology transfer activities is not dependent upon
individuals who take responsibility for the process and act as
champions. (The presence of a "champion" in the technology transfer
process does not supersede other quantitative elements in terms of
success.)
H(ll) Success in technology transfer activities is dependent upon
individuals who take responsibility for the process and act as
champions. (The presence of a "champion" in the technology transfer
_rocess supersedes other quantitative elements in terms of success.)
12
H(12)nunSuccessful technology transfer activities (i.e., positive economic
impacts) are not linked with input metrics ($ spent, etc.) and
intermediate metrics (activities).
H(12) Successful technology transfer activities (i.e., positive economic
impacts) are linked with input metrics ($ spent, etc.) and intermediate
metrics (activities) through some as yet unidentified common
elements.
Definition of Terms
AUTM: Association of University Technology Managers
Champion: An individual who takes a leadership role in commandeering a
project to fruition in spite of the bureaucratic, organizational, technical,
financial, and other hurdles.
Culture: Awareness, attitudes, and perceptions of researchers toward
technology transfer.
Division: Second highest organizational structure at NASA Langley Research
Center
FTE: Full time employees
GAO: Government Accounting Office
Group: Highest organizational structure at NASA Langley Research Center
LGR: Licenses generating revenue
Metrics: Measures of technology transfer success
13
• Input Metrics: Elements that represent inputs into the technology transfer
process such as budgets, expenditures, and expended time.
• Intermediate Metrics: Elements that represent activities such as technical
papers published and licenses granted.
• Outcome Metrics: Sometimes referred to as long-term metrics, these
represent the true goals of technology transfer such as, productivity gains,
cost savings and competitive advantage gains.
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA Langley Research Center: A NASA research center located in
Hampton, Virginia with approximately 2,300 civil servants with a focus on
aeronautics, atmospherics, materials, sensor, space and systems research.
R&D: research and development
Researcher: Individual classified as performing research (science,
engineering) by the Human Resources Division at NASA Langley Research
Center.
Royalties: Funds collected by the holder of a patent from the licensee of the
patent for the exclusive or non-exclusive use of the patent.
Technology Transfer: The active participation by NASA to transfer research
results to private industry and universities via formal or informal
cooperative partnerships with the intention of improving (the) economy and
quality of life. Although we practice technology transfer with our traditional
customers in aerospace, for this study we are interested only in non-aerospace
technology transfer.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The study of technology transfer from federal laboratories to the
private sector is a broad subject comprising a massive amount of information.
The review of literature is divided into four sections in an effort to simplify
and organize the relevant studies of information. Some of the studies are
mentioned more than once since it may address different sections. The four
sections are: (1) technology transfer culture, (2) measures of technology
transfer, (3) analysis of NASA technology transfer data, and (4) analysis of
AUTM technology transfer data. In addition, there is an addendum to the
review of literature entitled "Historical Perspective of Technology Transfer
Policy and Culture Within the US" (Appendix B.1).
Sections (1) and (2) constitute a direct correlation to the hypotheses
posed in this dissertation. Sections (3) and (4) constitute supporting data to
the hypotheses. The appendix serves to establish the broad perspective and
background on which technology transfer is based.
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(1)Technology Transfer Culture
For an organization to be effective at a prescribed mission or goal, it
must have an appropriate capability and support culture. In this section, the
culture to support technology transfer is reviewed. In particular, the culture
of interest is that of the researchers at the federal laboratories. Federal
laboratory researchers have operated under much the same guidelines and
principles since World War II. After World War II, researchers' activities and
reward systems came to closely resemble those of academics, with the
exception of the teaching aspect. Publications have become the predominant
and primary measurement tool for rewards and promotions. Researchers
attain funding for research with the end goal being a publication. Under this
model, a culture was created in which researchers became disassociated from
the practical or economic relevance of their own creations. The goal for
researchers was no longer development of a socially useful product, but the
satisfying of a publication requirement.
Today, however, researchers are being challenged to readjust their
culture to fit new expectations. Among these new expectations, federal
laboratories are being asked to justify their research funding and show its
relevance to the private sector. The shift in public and legislative thinking
towards issues of global economic competition is forcing a new paradigm on
the laboratories and, therefore, on the researchers.
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The collapse of the cold war translated into a strategic change from
guns to butter for federal laboratories. According to Shama, the emphasis
moved from matching the Soviets in weapons strength to doing economic
battle with Germany and Japan (Shama 1992). This change brought about
fundamental philosophical changes in the mission, objectives, strategy,
culture, skill mix, structure, and leadership at federal laboratories. These
changes are challenging the current culture of the researchers at federal
laboratories, and can be summarized as in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Technology Transfer Strategy Shifts in National Laboratories in
Recent Years (Shama 1992)
Area of Chanse
Mission
Objectives
Strateb_p /
Culture
Skill Mix
Structure
Leadership
From
Physical Security
Produce physical deterrents
Guns R&D
Closed, rigid, DOE-oriented
Science and engineering
Top-down
Scientific
To
Economic Security
Produce economic growth
Butter R&D
Open, flexible, customer oriented
Science, engineering & business
Top-down, bottom-up
Managerial, entrepreneurial
Legislation
The relatively recent shift in legislative focus on technology transfer is
reflected in recent legislation drafted by Congress. In 1980, the Stevenson-
Wydler Act became law (P.L. 96-480). The spirit of the law is captured in the
following excerpt:
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It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal government to ensure
the full use of the results of the nation's Federal investment in
research and development. To this end the Federal government shall
strive where appropriate to transfer Federally owned or originated
technology to state and local governments and to the private sector.
(Technology Innovation 1994, page 29)
The Stevenson-Wydler Act, the first of several acts aimed at technology
innovation, called for and required an active role in technical cooperation by
the federal laboratories. Section 3710 (a) of the Stevenson-Wydler Act further
specified the role of federal laboratory managers and researchers:
Technology transfer, consistent with mission responsibilities, is a
responsibility of each laboratory science and engineering professional
and that: Each laboratory director shall ensure that efforts to transfer
technology are considered positively in laboratory job description,
employee promotion policies, and evaluation of the job performance
of scientists and engineers in the laboratory. (Technology Innovation
1994, page 30)
A new reward system for the researchers and royalty distributions were
also addressed in the Stevenson-Wydler Act. Section 3710b required the head
of each Federal agency making expenditures at a rate of more than $50,000,000
per fiscal year for research and development to propose and implement a cash
awards program for exemplary technology transfer and commercialization
activities. Section 3710c required that at least fifteen percent (15%) of royalties
be paid to federal laboratory inventors with royalties not to exceed $100,000 in
one calendar year (P.L. 96-480, Bagur and Guissinger 1988). Although the
mandate is clear, the legislation had only a minimal impact on the federal
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laboratory rewards and promotions system and did little to change the culture
of the researchers.
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-502) took an even
stronger stance than the Stevenson-Wydler Act. The Federal Technology
Transfer Act was specific in regards to the responsibility of federal laboratory
managers and researchers. The Federal Technology Transfer Act included the
following mandates:
• Made technology transfer a responsibility of all federal laboratory
scientists and engineers.
• Mandated that technology transfer responsibility be considered in
laboratory employee performance evaluations.
• Established principle of royalty sharing for federal inventors (15%
minimum) and set up a reward system for other innovators.
• Provided specific requirements, incentives and authorities for the
federal laboratories.
The executive branch also supported this change in technology
transfer. In the addendum to the National Performance Review led by Vice-
President Gore, the NASA Accompanying Report included two key
recommendations regarding technology transfer (Gore 1993):
1. NASA field centers should provide technology transfer training for
all its employees
2. NASA should devote ten percent (10%) to twenty percent (20%) of
its budget to R&D partnerships with industry
In fact, Executive Order 12591 signed by President Bush had already
directly addressed the lack of activity in technology transfer. The order acted
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to ensure that federal agenciesand laboratories assist universities and the
private sector in broadening the US technology base by transferring new
knowledge from the research labs into the development of new products and
processes (Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders
1989).
Recent Measurements of Cultural Change
A study by the GAO in 1992 found that there was no improvement in
the invention rate at 14 of 21 federal agencies after the introduction of the
Federal Technology Transfer Act's revenue sharing legislation (Technology
Transfer, Barriers Limit Royalty Sharing's Effectiveness 1992). Real
improvement with six of the remaining seven agencies was not necessarily
due to the legislation, but was attributed to the effects of scientific, legal, or
other legislation on patenting activity that preceded or coincided with the
Federal Technology Transfer Act and not to the implementation of royalty
sharing.
Through the same GAO study, comments from a focus group of federal
scientists helped define a culture that believes in obtaining patents for reasons
other than obtaining financial results. Researchers were found to value peer
recognition of research achievements, and were wary of any restriction or
delay in publishing or discussing research results with peers. This wariness
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included concern over invention reporting. Further, scientists believed that
collaboration on research between federal and private-sector scientists is
difficult because of incompatibilities in the two groups' research objectives
and time frames to achieve results.
In a study of 297 federal laboratories only forty-four percent (44%) of the
directors were authorized by their parent agency to negotiate Cooperate
Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and only about fifty
percent (50%) had royalty sharing programs. This study came nine years after
the enactment of the Stevenson-Wydler Act and three years after the Federal
Technology Transfer Act (Diffusing Innovations: Implementing the
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 1991).
Studies to date indicate that the Stevenson-Wydler Act and the Federal
Technology Transfer Act have not been implemented on a wide scale by the
federal agencies or their laboratories. A sample of technology transfer culture
at federal laboratories studies and outcomes of those studies follows.
Studies of Technology Transfer Culture
The following studies include some perspectives on the culture present
among the researchers or in the organizations at federal laboratories.
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Bozeman Study
In a 1991survey of federal laboratory directors, Bozeman found that the
perceived benefit of technology transfer back to scientists or the laboratory was
very minimal (Bozeman 1991).
Chapman Research Group Study
Interviews of NASA researchers uncovered a general attitude toward
technology transfer as not being a career advancing tool. Although most
researchers saw technology transfer as the right thing to do, a common
comment was "transfer activities will not get anyone promoted" (Chapman
Research Group 1991).
Denver Research Institute Study
Chapman, Hirst, and Bayton (1986) reported on scientists and
researchers who serve as either principal investigators (internal R&D) or
technical monitors (oversight of external R&D) on new technology
development programs. Approximately seventy percent (70%) of the
principal investigators responded yes to the following question: "Is
technology transfer part of your job?" Of those that answered no, forty-four
percent (44%) said there was no opportunity or inapplicable due to nature of
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work; thirty-one percent (31%)said it was not in their job description; and the
remaining twenty-five percent (25%) considered publications, presentations,
and fallout from regular tasks to be adequate.
The results of the study show that researchers believe the agency
emphasizes technology transfer greater than the work units. Reasons given
for little or no emphasis in the work unit included:
• forty-three percent (43%) said it was due to the nature of the work;
• thirty percent (30%) said technology transfer was not encouraged,
was de-emphasized, had a low priority, had to be done on one's own
time, or management was resistant; and
• twenty-seven percent (27%) said there was little or no knowledge of
the system.
Researchers were asked: "What would prevent you from taking a very
active role in technology transfer activities?" Answers cited most often were
lack of time, followed by lack of management support, and lack of incentive
or personal interest.
Creedon, Abbot, Ault, et al. Study
This NASA team recommended that each NASA field center should
provide technology transfer training for all employees and assess, promote
and reward employees according to metrics/contributions (Creedon et al.
1992).
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Doctors Study
Doctors found that entrepreneurial activity, mobility of technical
personnel and social networks seemed to be superior mechanisms for
horizontal transfer as opposed to the NASA orientation towards
dissemination of printed material (Doctors 1971).
Gibson and Smilor Study
This study suggeststhat four variables are central to technology transfer
processeswithin and between organizations. The four variables are: (a)
communication interactivity, (b) cultural and geographical distance, (c)
technology equivocality, and (d) personal motivation. A survey using Likert
scaleswas completed by 147respondents at the Microelectronics and
Computer Technology Consortium. One of the four hypotheses developed
and supported by the results of this study was:
Successfulproduct/process application is more likely to occur when
research and user organizations support and reward those involved in
the transfer process (Gibson and Smilor 1991).
Kengor Study
Kengor identifies impediments in NASA's technology transfer process
as bureaucratic delays in information flows, difficulty in responding to
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industry's technical queries, and poor employee incentives. The emphasis in
of this study was the poor incentives for researchers to spend time on
technology transfer (Kengor 1994).
(2) Measures of Technology Transfer
In the 1990s, technology transfer from federal laboratories to the private
sector has became a popular issue. Perceived economic threat from other
nation-states and a feeling of reduced economic welfare have caused a re-
examination of our federal laboratory system. Technology transfer, as a field
of study, benefited from this renewed interest. Policy analysts and researchers
attempted to measure the most effective methods for achieving economic
success. Studies by analysts and researchers resulted in a wealth of reports
that, in most part, were inconclusive in their search for the measures of
effectiveness. Most analysts, while being unable to identify effective
measures, identified what despite differences in naming conventions, can
generally be placed into the three categories as in Table 2.1. Through the
compartmentalization of measures into these categories, a better
understanding of the technology transfer issue arises.
Short-term measures, or measures of input, are exemplified by
resources expended to perform technology transfer (money invested, number
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Three Categories of
Technology Transfer Metrics
1. Input or Short-term
2. Intermediate or Activities
3. Outcome or Long-term
Figure 2.1: Three Categories of Technology Transfer Metrics
of personnel, human-years, etc.). Intermediate term, or measures of activity,
are exemplified by the quantity of activity performed through utilization of
the resources (e.g., number of patent disclosures, number of licenses, number
of cooperative agreements). Long-term measures or outcomes are
exemplified by the positive outcomes of the activities (e.g., royalties, profits,
return on investment).
Technology transfer between federal laboratories and the private sector
for economic strengthening is a relatively recent phenomenon, being traced
back to the early 1950s and the science interest of that time. Science and
technology were touted as solutions to many societal ills and the "spin-off"
idea was born. More recently, in the 1980s, global economic competition with
other nation-states in high technology fields brought the field of technology
transfer to the forefront of Congressional debates and public concern.
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Recent interest in technology transfer has led to academic studies of the
phenomenon and an attempt to measure the effectiveness of technology
transfer. Quantitative studies have been limited, not only by the relatively
recent interest, but also by the nature of the subject. Technology
commercialization typically has a long life cycle and, therefore, the
measurement of technology cooperation is complicated. Time from
laboratory to market is estimated to take, on average, seven to 20 years or
more (Mansfield 1971). Many of the quantitative studies to date have
concentrated on more short-term, measurable issues in an attempt to draw
some conclusions.
The technology transfer studies presented and discussed here are
outlined in two sections. The first examines those measurements and
categories of measurements that have been identified and recommended for
technology transfer; the second reviews those measurements that have been
made and draws from them for some conclusions on technology transfer
metrics.
Metrics Definitions
There have been a myriad of studies attempting to identify the
measurement standard or categories of measurements. Most studies have
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similar findings in terms of measurement standards or categories, with
perhaps just a change in semantics.
Spann, Adams, and Souder Study
Spann and her colleagues created standards and categories as displayed
in Table 2.2 (Spann et al. 1993). Spann's categorization is presented first, since
it serves as a good framework for discussion of other definitions. Spann's
model contains three categories, including input measures, intermediate
outcomes, and long-term outcomes. The input measures are characterized by
resources and expenditures. The intermediate outcomes are characterized by
activities. The long-term outcomes are characterized by results.
Bozeman Study
Bozeman categorized effectiveness into "out-the-door" measures and
"market impact" measures (Bozeman 1991). Out-the-door measures are
symbolized by the number of licenses, while market impact measures are
symbolized by the commercial impact, the pecuniary benefit back to the
laboratory, and the benefit to the researchers and scientists. Bozeman's out-
the-door category is analogous with Spann's intermediate outcomes and his
market impact is analogous with Spann's long-term outcomes (Table 2.3).
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Table 2.2: Technology Transfer Measurement Standards and Categories
Input Measures
Transfer Expenditures
Transfer Budgets
Time Spent
Requests for Help
Number of Site Visits
I
Immediate Outcomes
Tech Briefs/Papers Published
Tech Briefs/Papers Requested
Technical Presentations
Technical Problems Solved
Licenses Granted
Success Stories Published
Long-Term Outcomes
• ROI
• Cost Savings
• Productivity Gains
• Royalties
• Competitive Advantage Gains
• Market Share Gains
• New Commercial Sales
• Number of New Products
• New Commercial Customers
• User Satisfaction
• New Business Started
• Jobs Created
Bozeman and Coker Study
Bozeman and Coker postulated that future studies should include an
opportunities cost model (Bozeman and Coker 1991). This model recognizes
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that money diverted to one technology transfer effort reduces the resources of
another effort.
Table 2.3: Comparison of Bozeman and Spann Technology Transfer Metric
Models
Bozema_n_n
Out-the-Door Model
Market-Impact Model
Input Measures
Intermediate Outcomes
•-_ Long-Term Outcomes
Carr Study, Part 2
Carr analyzes the three technology transfer models created by Sandelin,
including the legal model, the administrative model, and the marketing
model (Carr, Part 2, 1992). Most of the leading technology transfer
universities utilize some variant of the marketing model, and Carr believes
that the low transfer rates of federal laboratories can be attributed to a lack of
understanding and utilization of the marketing model. The marketing
model actively markets technologies available for licensing, with the
objective of finding an appropriate licensee and concluding a license
agreement expeditiously. In the marketing model, entrepreneurial staffs
have experience in marketing as well as in specific technology areas. Offices
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employing the marketing model do not usually employ formal advertising of
available technologies in order to limit curious inquiries and conserve staff
time for the most promising prospects.
Carr points out that commercial successes may depend on a
combination of factors, of which the transfer of federal technology is only one.
Also, technology transfer measurements/evaluations are often carried out to
justify existing federal research programs.
Carr categorizes quantitative metrics into four models: the out-the-
door model, the market-impact model, the political model, and the
opportunity-cost model. Carr has added one model to those also suggested by
Bozeman. Characteristics of the four models are contained in Table 2.4.
Again, these models can easily be correlated with Spann's (Table 2.5).
The Political Model corresponds to the input measures; the out-the-door
model corresponds with the intermediate outcomes; and the market-impact
model corresponds with the long-term outcomes. The opportunity-cost
model is a new addition and offers a more realistic monetary accounting for
long-term outcomes.
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Table 2.4: Carr's Technology Transfer Measurement Standards and Models
Out-the-Door Model
Standard: Licenses, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
(CRADA's), etc.
Advantage: Ease
Disadvantage: Quality and ma_nitude of event counted is masked
Market Impact Model
Standard: Royalty income
Advantage: Gets directly to the heart of matter, economic impact
Disadvantage: Royalties tend to lag by many years from licensing
Political Model
Standard: Ability to spend authorized funding and bureaucratic successes
Advantage: Measures are short term
Disadvantage: No relationship to the real goals
Opportunity-Cost Model
Standard: compares results with other opportunities for the money
Advantage: Can compare competing technology transfer programs
Disadvantage: No measure towards end goal
Table 2.5: Comparison of Carr and Spann Technology Transfer Metric Models
Cart
Political Model
Out-the-Door Model
S__an n
_Input Measures
Intermediate Outcomes
Market-Impact Model
Model'____._,. Long-Term Outcomes
Opportuni_-Cost
32
Federal Laboratory Consortium Study
A study by the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) suggests that
measures should be placed in three categories including: (a) output, (b)
activities and (c) intermediate indicators of cultural change (Technology
Transfer in a Time of Transition 1994). The output and activities measures
match well with the long-term outcomes and intermediate outcomes
respectively (Table 2.6). The intermediate indicators of cultural change are
characterized by measures such as the percentage of a researchers time spent
on technology transfer. This corresponds well with the input measures of the
Spann model.
Table 2.6: Comparison of FLC and Spann Technology Transfer Metric Models
FLC
Activities --
Intermediate Indicators_f'
of Cultural Change
Output
._12ann
•-_ Inpv ut Measures
L
"" Intermediate Outcomes
•_ Long-Term Outcomes
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NASA Langley Research Center Study
A Quality Action Team at NASA Langley Research Center selected five
measures for success after studying the technology transfer measurement
issue (Technology Transfer Metrics, Final Report 1995). The five
measurements included:
• number of new patent license agreements
• income generated from patent royalties and software sales
• number of inquiries resulting from marketing and information
dissemination
• estimated degree of industry participation in cooperative activities
(formal and informal)
• number of documented uses of NASA Langley Research Center
funded technologies by the partners
Four of these measures can be considered to fall within the
intermediate category of Spann as activity related (Table 2.7). While only one
of the measurements can be placed in the long-term category.
NASA Institutional Team Study
In a 1992 report to the NASA Administrator, the NASA Institutional
Team on Technology Transfer recommended that technology transfer metrics
for primary targeted customers include six factors:
• proportion of program endorsed by the customer
• length of time from development to use
• number of citations
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Table 2.7: Comparison of NASA Langley and Spann Technology Transfer
Metric Models
NASA Lan_ey
•_.., Input Measures
Number of Patent Licenses
Number of Inquiries --
Estimated Degree of """"""'_'I
In du stry Participation
Number of Documented Uses
of Technology by Partner
Intermediate Outcom es
Patent Royalties and
Software Sales
Lo g-Te Out•-- n rm comes
• number of acknowledged uses
• number of spin-off companies
• revenue from patent licenses
The Team also created five metrics for secondary technology transfer:
• number of secondary targeted application negotiations
• number of successfully completed activities as evidenced by a joint
paper, joint patent, or process improvement initiated
• dollars reimbursed by recipient
• acknowledged benefit of consultation, and
• revenue from patent licenses
The Team believed that a marketing model for technology transfer has
greater potential for success; that technology transfer is inseparable from the
35
technology development process; and that effectiveness metrics are better
than activity metrics. With about half of the metrics characterized as long-
term outcomes and half as intermediate outcomes, this team was aggressive
in its recommendations to NASA. The Team recommended that each NASA
Field Center should provide technology transfer training for all employees
and assess, promote and reward employees according to
metrics / contributions.
Council on Competitiveness Study
The Council on Competitiveness, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
organization of chief executives from business, and representatives from
higher education and organized labor, made a strong recommendation that
industry and government work together to develop meaningful technology
transfer metrics (Industry as a Customer of the Federal Laboratories 1992). In
the Councils report, "Industry as a Customer of the Federal Laboratories," one
of the nine recommendations clearly states:
Industry and the Federal labs should jointly establish metrics to
determine how well the technology transfer process is working and
review progress after 3-5 years. If insufficient progress has been made,
both industry and the labs should reevaluate their involvement, and
funds should be redirected to consortia, universities, non-profit
research groups and other organizations that can work more effectively
with industry for results.
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Spann, Adams, and Souder Study
In the Spann study, adopters, developers and sponsors of technology
transfer were surveyed. A disconnect was found between each partner's
measure of success (Span_n, Adams, and Souder 1993). This discrepancy made
overall success difficult, as each partner had different goals and agendas.
Spann found that developers were interested in new commercial sales,
technical briefs and papers published. In contrast, the adopters were
interested in productivity gains, competitive advantage gains, and number of
new products. The sponsors of technology transfer were interested in the
number of technical problems solved and the number of new products. The
difference between the developers and adopters raised the greatest concern.
Developers were interested in market-impact numbers such as new
commercial sales, while the adopters may not necessarily want or need new
sales to improve profits (Table 2.8). The adopters typically had interest in
improved productivity and competitive advantages.
Roessner Study
Roessner's survey found that private industry had the most interest in
long-term, intangible aspects of technology transfer, such as laboratory visits,
technical consultation, workshops, seminars, and cooperative agreements, in
that order (Roessner 1993). Roessner sampled chief technical officers (CTO)
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Table 2.8: Comparison of Measures of Success for Adopters and Developers in
Technology Transfer Efforts
Technical Briefs and
Papers Published
Commercial Sales
Adopters
Productivity Gains
Corn petitiv e Adv an tage
Gains
Number of New Products
and laboratory directors of the private industry, to determine what forms
collaboration should take, what expectations are realistic, and what metrics
should be used. A subset of 68 members of the Industrial Research Institute
(IRI) members was surveyed. The IRI, with 270 members, accounts for 85% of
the industrial R&D in the US.
The CTOs and research directors ranked external sources of technology
transfer in terms of significance to their company (Table 2.9).
The dominant positive influence a CTO or division director had for
interacting with a federal laboratory was "access to unique technical
resources." Expectations of commercial payoff had only a slightly positive
influence.
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Table 2.9: Significance Ratings of Technology Transfer Sources by US CTOs
External Source
Other US Companies
Significant
Universities
Foreign Companies
Moderate Significance
Databases
Federal Laboratories
Somewhat Significant
Gov ernm en t Databases
Approximately 43% of the respondents said their labs had interacted
"rarely" or "not at all" with federal laboratories. Informal interactions such as
information dissemination, lab visits, seminars, and technical consultation
occurred most frequently. Technology licensing and employee exchange were
the least frequent means of cooperation.
Those respondents who reported at least "moderate" levels of
interaction with federal labs ranked ten types of interactions in terms of
"overall value to the division or lab." Contract research received the most
first-place votes, by far. Licensing and employee exchange ranked very low.
When asked what form of payoff occurred most frequently, responses fell into
three broad categories: profit potential or business opportunity, the leveraging
of R&D and sharing the risks of research, and access to expertise and new
knowledge.
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Roessner concludes that companies tend to interact with federal labs
for reasons that have far more to do with long-term, less tangible payoffs than
with expectations of short-term business opportunities or technology
commercialization (Roessner 1993).
Roessner feels that Federal labs should make it a priority to ensure
industry has intimate knowledge of the labs expertise, facility capabilities, and
research portfolios. Roessner also feels that interactions between companies
and laboratories should emphasize idea transfer rather than technology
transfer (Roessner 1993).
Roessner believes that number of licenses and royalty payments will
substantially underestimate the value of the federal lab and intermediate
outcomes are more appropriate measures. The intermediate outcomes could
include the number of technical papers authored jointly with industry,
company patents and invention disclosures directly attributable to
collaborative work, new development projects at companies that can be
attributed directly to interactions with federal labs, and technical problems
solved as a result of information obtained from the lab (Roessner 1993).
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Doctors; Melkers; Schulte-Hillen, et al. Studies
Several studies have examined the use of publications as a means of
technology transfer and found it to be an inadequate measure for technology
transfer success (Doctors 1971; Melkers 1990; Schulte-Hillen et al. 1976). The
distribution of publications fits into the category of input measure in the
Spann model.
Carr Study, Part I
Carr believes that quantitative measures do not capture a true picture
of technology transfer and he suggests the use of qualitative measures such as:
• surveys of technology recipients
• collections of testimonials and positive anecdotal data
• case studies of spectacular successes
Cart thinks it unlikely that any magical formula for technology transfer
evaluation will be uncovered (Carr, Part 1, 1992).
The discrepancy between the agendas of the technology transfer
partners and a need by federal agencies to measure their performance,
typically leads to poor measures.
Signing of R&D agreements and transfers of intellectual property are
among the few elements of technology transfer that lend themselves
to measurement, thus they tend to be measured. Though they may be
seen as the engine of technology transfer, personal contacts are the
lubricant that allow the engine to run. Furthermore, nonpatented
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know-how, ideas, and suggestions often constitute information of
considerable value, however difficult it is to measure and evaluate this
sort of technology transfer (Carr, Part 1, p. 9, 1992).
Metric Definition Conclusions
Most of the studies of technology transfer metrics have identified three
basic categories of measures:
1. Input/Expenditure/Resources
2. Intermediate/Activities/Cultural Changes
3. Outcomes/Long-Term/Economic Impacts
Each category has been recognized as distinct from the others, and no attempt
has been made to find the connection between them. It is also clear that the
partners in a technology transfer each have a different preferred measure
depending on their particular position (e.g., transferor, transferee, etc.). If
federal agencies have a goal of demonstrating economic impact and private
sector relevance, it would make sense for them to be more interested in
attaining success in the outcome category. Yet it is recognized by most of the
studies that outcome measures are difficult to collect and even more difficult
to utilize as a guiding tool due to their temporal aspect.
The solution to this dilemma, as is stated in the Introduction Chapter,
is to try and link the outcome, intermediate and input measures through case
studies of successful technology transfers.
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Technology Transfer Metrics Studies
In the community of technology transfer practitioners in the US there
is an upswelling of voices calling for metrics, debating the merits of each
metric, and a general sense of urgency regarding metrics of technology
transfer. There have been many studies lamenting the lack of metrics,
proclaiming the importance of metrics, and suggesting effective metrics.
Ironically, there have been few studies that include actual measurements
utilizing the metrics. These studies are reviewed here, along with the
conclusions derived from their results.
Bozeman Study
Bozeman performed a survey of 189 federal laboratory directors in
order to evaluate laboratory effectiveness in technology transfer (Bozeman
1991). Bozeman found that laboratories, on average, report 6.28% of their
budget as technology transfer expenditures with a standard deviation of
11.48%. The perceived benefit back to researchers or the laboratory was very
minimal. Most importantly, the evaluation of market impact by laboratory
directors is questionable. A more accurate measurement would be gleaned
from the estimate performed by the recipients or customers of the technology
transfer. The perception of technology transfer as a minimal benefit to
researchers is an important finding in Bozeman's study since researchers play
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a key or critical role in the technology transfer process. With little or no
incentive, researchers are likely to be unwilling participants.
Bozeman and Papadakis
Another study performed a few years later by Bozeman and Papadakis
focused on the recipients of the technology transfer (Bozeman and Papadakis
1995). Bozeman and Papadakis performed a survey of directors and
administrative heads of 219 firms that had cooperative experiences with
federal laboratories. The total number of federal government laboratories
cited was 27. Similar to Roessner's study, the Bozeman and Papadakis
findings pointed to access to expertise, as opposed to job creation, as a key
objective of companies. The decision to work with laboratories related to the
skills and knowledge of laboratories scientists and researchers. Sixty-one
percent (61%) of respondents cited this as the number one objective. The
number two objective, to establish strategic pre-commercial research, was
cited by fifty-one percent (51%) of respondents. The third ranked objective,
cited by forty-five percent (45%) of the respondents, was access to unique
resources of laboratory. Prior experience in cooperation with a lab and the
desire to develop new products or services were equally ranked fourth by
study respondents.
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Vast differences in the outcomes of the cooperative efforts were found.
Approximately 49% of the cooperative efforts resulted in some net positive
benefits, 18% resulted in a zero net benefit, and 33% resulted in net costs. The
average net benefit was found to be $1,087,500. Without looking at the entire
data set, this value is a bit misleading since a few largely successful ventures
skewed the results.
The Bozeman and Papadakis study also supports the idea that small,
new, aggressive firms are more likely to create new products. In their study
those companies that had already developed products as a result of the
cooperation had three general characteristics:
1. The companies were smaller than average for all companies in the
database (12,000 vs. 25,000).
2. The companies had high levels of R&D intensity as measured by
R&D employees as percentage of all employees.
3. The companies were established more recently (average 27 years vs.
45 years for all other firms).
With more than ninety percent (90%) of the projects not resulting in a
single new hire, job creation was the single criterion by which the laboratory-
industry interactions were not considered particularly successful.
Another revealing finding in the report came from dissatisfied
companies. Those companies that reported they were dissatisfied with the
cooperative effort were more likely to have purchased a license, to have
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reduced personnel as a result of the interaction, and to have failed to market a
product.
Mathematica Study
Expert opinion was used to determine the proportion of NASA R&D
responsible for commercial success of four selected technologies
(Mathematica 1976). It was assumed that the innovation stream would have
occurred regardless of NASA participation, but that participation had an
impact in accelerating the process. The four technologies involved were
• cryogenic multilayer insulation materials,
• integrated circuits,
• gas turbines in electric power generation, and
• computer programs for structural analysis (NASTRAN).
The savings calculated in the study are shown in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Estimated Acceleration and Benefits Attributed to NASA
Participation (Mathematica 1976)
Technology
Gas Turbines
Cryogenics
Integrated
Circuits
NASTRAN
Total
Interval of
benefits
estimate
Estimated probable
NASA acceleration
(years)
1969-1982 1.0
1960-1983 5.0 $1054
1963-1982 2.0 $5080
1971-1984 4.0
Probable benefits
attributed to NASA
(millions)
$111
$701
$6946
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A total of $7 Billion in savings to the private industry were attributed
to the technology development and transfer efforts of NASA. These numbers
are significant since the NASA budget was approximately half this figure at
the time of the study.
Tilton Study
Between 1962 and 1968 sales figures indicated that, at a minimum,
federal space and defense funding subsidized the development and
production of the integrated circuit until it became affordable for the private
industry (Tilton 1971, Hook 1990). In 1962, 100% of the integrated circuit
market was attributed to Defense and Space, the cost per circuit was $50 and
the total market was $4M (Table 2.11). A short six years later, the price of the
circuits had dropped by a factor of 20 times, the market had increased by a
Table 2.11: US Integrated Circuit Production and Prices and Importance of the
Space and Defense Market, 1962-68 (Tilton 1971, Hook 1990)
Year Total Production
(millions of dollars)
1962 4
1963 16
1964 41
1965 79
1966 148
1967 228
1968 312
Average price per
integrated circuit
(dollars)
50.00
31.60
18.50
8.33
5.05
3.32
2.33
Defense & Space
Production
(% of total production)
100
94
85
72
53
43
37
factor of 78 and the private industry was able to start buying the integrated
circuits (63% of the market).
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Bozeman and Coker Study
One hundred fifty federal laboratory directors were surveyed. The
results suggested that multi-faceted, multi-mission laboratories are likely to
enjoy the most success in technology transfer, especially if they have low
levels of bureaucratization, and either ties to industry or a commercial
orientation in the selection of projects (Bozeman and Coker 1991).
Bozeman and Crow Study
An environmental dependence model of technology transfer activity
was presented in this study. The model suggested that the influence of
political authority was a major determinant of technology transfer activity.
Results were based on a survey of 900 laboratories, focusing on a sub-sample
of 134 government laboratories and 139 university laboratories. Findings
included:
• Laboratories with larger total budgets and larger numbers of
scientific personnel are more likely to be engaged in technology
transfer.
• Laboratories with a more diverse mission are more likely to be
engaged in technology transfer.
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Wyden Study
The total royalties from technology transfer patent licenses of the 700
US federal laboratories was calculated in the Wyden study to be less than $4
million (Wyden 1990).
Chapman, Lohman and Chapman Study
Chapman et al. studied the benefits resulting from the application of
those technologies that have been highlighted in the NASA magazine
Spinoffs (259 cases) (Chapman, Lohman and Chapman 1989). Through
extensive telephone interviews, a cadre of case studies was developed.
Sixteen avenues of technology transfer from NASA to other sectors were
identified with seven major categories:
• The direct use of NASA technology
• NASA helps to "make a market"
• NASA testing or use speeds commercialization
• Assistance through NASA-sponsored Industrial Applications
Centers
• The spinoff of NASA employees
• Spinoff to other public agencies, and
• Spinoff from regular NASA activity
Four hundred forty-one (441) Spinoff cases were identified in the study.
Three hundred sixty-eight of the 441 spinoff cases were acknowledged as
having sales or savings, but only 259 could be accounted for. These 259 cases
49
resulted in an estimated $21,331,190,000in salesand $315,749,000 in savings
for an average benefit of -$84,000,000 per case.
Interviews revealed 67 instances in which a process, product or
company would not have come into existence had it not been for NASA-
furnished technology. These 67 instances represented 15% of all the spinoff
cases.
The number of new jobs created was estimated by using the economic
impact for each Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code sector and other
survey data as multipliers, as shown below. This analysis for was performed
for all appropriate SIC codes and the study concluded 352,694 new jobs.
New Jobs = [revenues* x (payroll/business receipts)*] /current average wage**
*from 1985 County Business Patterns. US Summary
**from Emplqym_nt and Earnings. First Quarter 1986 derived as the
annual average pay by SIC code for the annualized weekly earnings
Wessel Study
Wessel collated R&D spending figures, numbers of patents, and patent
royalty figures for NASA and its Field Centers from 1981 to 1990. The Centers
were compared by numbers of patents, royalties per R&D dollars and average
cost per patent and other similar measures. This approach was one of the few
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that gave rather undebatable quantifiable data on technology transfer, yet
would not likely be utilized as a metric by the agency since the results do not
include the qualitative issues and are discouraging. Table 2.12 shows that the
average cost for each patent, as measured by the number of patents divided by
the total R&D budget, is relatively large. The averages are compared for
NASA's three research centers: Langley Research Center (LaRC), Lewis
Research Center (LeRC), and Ames Research Center (ARC).
Table 2.12: NASA R&D Centers' Cost Effectiveness Summary for Fiscal Years
1981-1990 (Wessel 1993)
Center
LaRC
LeRC
ARC
Annual avg cost
($M)/disclosure
1.40
3.25
4.61
Annual avg cost
($M)/application
4.72
22.55
26.44
Annual avg cost
($M)/patent
6.46
29.55
21.62
The total amount of royalties paid to NASA for its licenses in the
period of 1981 to 1990 was $651,000. Extrapolating that figure out to account
for the real impact on the private industry (royalties are typically about 5% of
the sales) results in $13M in sales.
Wessel closed by suggesting was that laboratories establish goals and
recommended measuring contributions by using a quotient of royalty per
R&D budget (Wessel 1993).
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Johnston and Kokus Study
Johnston and Kokus calculated positive returns as a benefit to cost ratio
in their study of NASA technology transfer returns. They conducted
interviews and cost estimates to construct the costs and net benefits of a
technology transfer. The benefits stemming from technology transfer effort
were discounted by 10% as a method of accounting for lost opportunities.
Results indicated a 6:1 payback for technology transfer efforts (Table 2.13).
Table 2.13: Benefits Stemming from NASA Technology Transfer (Johnston
and Kokus 1977)
Program element
Publication program
Industrial Application Centers
COSMIC
Application program
Total
Costs
($M)
10.9
17.0
1.7
32.3
61.9
Net Benefits
($M)
Benefit/Cost
Ratio
135.6-151.8 12:1 to 14:1
44.4 - 52.2 2.5:1 to 3:1
43.5 26:1
133.6 4:1
357.1 - 381.1 5.8:1 to 6.2:1
The Marshall Space Flight Center Technology Transfer Office
Surveys were mailed to 809 of NASA MSFC's 1241 Industrial
Assistance Program partners and 283 questionnaires were returned. Surveys
were mailed to 18 of their 56 Space Act Agreement partners and 16 responses
were received (Technology Transfer Metrics, NASA, The Marshall Space
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Flight Center Technology Transfer Office, September, 1994). Although a high
percentage of those who responded agreed that the cooperation was helpful
and they would welcome assistance again, the results may be misleading due
to nonresponse bias. A nonresponse rate of 61% combined with a non-
random sample brings serious concern to the extrapolation of the results to
the sample population.
Utilizing a Department of Commerce economic model and the
collected data, MSFC determined that a $358M impact on society, 182 new
products and 5344 jobs were created as a result of their technology transfer
efforts. This translates into 6.5 jobs per cooperative interaction. This is based
on a $6M investment by the Technology Transfer Office. MSFC is thus
quoting a 60:1 ($358M/$60M) payback from its technology.
These results are questionable since the jobs may not have actually
been "new." One can only account for new jobs when they are not merely a
replacement of existing ones. Additionally, saved jobs do not necessarily
translate into multiplied efforts.
In a follow-on study at MSFC of economic impact, Table 2.14 was
generated. Table 2.14 contains both the direct responses and the US economic
benefit or impact based on multipliers of the direct responses. This data
represents the economic impacts for 1994.
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Table 2.14: Economic Impacts due to NASA Marshall Space Flight Center's
Technology Transfer Efforts ( "Technology Transfer Metrics," NASA, The
Marshall Space Flight Center Technology Transfer Office, May 22, 1995)
Category
Direct
Reported
Responses
US Economic
Benefit/Impact
(after mult. and/or
extrapolation)
8,300
Jobs 1,032 7,400
6,400
Products 118 304
$43,062,000
$35,343,000
Investment
Savings
Sales
Total $185,000,000 $65_000,000
In addition to the sampling issues of this study, there is some question
as to the validity of the multiplying factors.
The Southeast Alliance Study
The Southeast Alliance, composed of a few educational institutions, a
regional technology transfer center and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
as its lead, mailed surveys to 1343 of their 2320 Industrial Assistance Program
partners with 508 questionnaires returned. In addition, surveys were mailed
to 18 of their 80 Space Act Agreement partners and 18 responses were
returned. This study was an update of the information from the Marshall
Space Flight Center study and has the same nonresponse bias flaw as that
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study (Technology Transfer Metrics, NASA, The Southeast Alliance, March,
1995).
Technology Transfer Metric Studies Conclusions
Most technology transfer metric studies have focused on identifying
metrics, yet none have attempted to determine analytically those metrics
which contribute to success as defined by economic impact. Studies that have
gathered measures have either relied on the input or intermediate level
measures, or have extrapolated from gathered data to achieve the long-term
or outcome data. The input and intermediate measures prove little in terms
of economic (long-term) success, while most studies claiming to have long-
term measures are questionable due to their assumptions and extrapolations.
Those few studies that have credible long-term measures reveal nothing
about how the success was achieved, only that it was achieved.
The difficulty in creating effective measurements for technology
transfer are lamented in Griliches' study of R&D and productivity (Griliches
1988). Griliches feels that economists may be seriously underestimating the
true contribution of R&D to economic welfare by trying to measure its effects
on standard productivity indexes. As an example, he considers the and
brokerage houses, and jet engines:
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The fact that one can travel from the east to the west coast in less than
half the time it took two decades ago leaves hardly a trace in the
national productivity accounts. (Griliches p. 18, 1988)
Both quantitative and qualitative studies have been touted as methods
for technology transfer measurements. The quantitative measures receive
more credibility, but are very difficult to achieve with the temporal aspect of
technology transfer. This difficulty may account for the relative lack of
quantitative studies. The qualitative studies, while rich in information, are
criticized as being anecdotal and non-significant.
Perhaps the best approach is not to rely on one or the other but to
assemble a portfolio approach. Portfolio approaches pull together different
measurement techniques to form a coherent group of measures covering the
spectrum from quantitative to qualitative. Measurements that include those
in the Spann model and others models along with case studies could provide
a much better understanding and appreciation for the impacts of technology
transfer.
The measurement models with their three distinct categories display
the shortcomings of utilizing these measures alone.
input measures reveals nothing about the success.
The first category of
The second, intermediate
measures (activities) also reveals nothing about the success. The third
category of outcome measures reveals the success but tells us nothing of how
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that success was achieved. Linking the three categories and supplementing
them with case studies can reveal the level of success as well as the key critical
elements contributing to the success (Figure 2.2).
What creates [
the links ? ]
i
Input Measures
• Transfer Expenditures
• Transfer Budgets
• Time Spent
• Requests for Help
• Number of Site Visits
"V
Immediate Outcomes
Tech Briefs/Papers Published
Tech Briefs/Papers Requested
Technical Presentations
Technical Problems Solved
Licenses Granted
Success Stories Published
,d
wt
Long-Term Outcomes
ROI
Cost Savings
Productivity Gains
Royalties
Competitive Advantage Gains
Market Share Gains
New Commercial Sales
Number of New Products
New Commercial Customers
User Satisfaction
New Business Started
Jobs Created
Figure 2.2: Linking of Metrics Categories
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Input and intermediate measures are relatively easy to obtain but do
not answer the real question of economic impact, while outcome (long-term)
measures are much more difficult to obtain since commercialization takes a
long time to occur (typically between 7-20 years, Mansfield). Perhaps the key
is finding how the input and intermediate measures are linked to the
outcome measures. There is a need to validate the intermediate metrics. In
this study, the approach was to select those technology transfer efforts that
have resulted in successful outcomes and trace backwards through the
categories to obtain the key critical elements. This approach will involve
measuring quantitatively, as well as performing case studies to reveal the
hidden intangibles.
In support of this position, Roessner (1993) concludes that licensing
revenues greatly underestimate returns; and Carr (Part 1, 1992) believes there
is no magic formula to measure technology transfer and that studies should
concentrate on case studies.
(3) Analysis of NASA Data
Since the creation of NASA as a federal agency in 1958 it has boasted of
its impact on the nation's economy and the improvements to quality of life.
Each year the agency publishes a document entitled Spinoffs that highlights
the contributions of NASA to the general public welfare. The Spinoffs
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document serves several agendas including public awareness and, more
importantly, a justification for funding.
Due to the increased pressure placed on Federal agencies in the 1990s to
justify their funding levels, many agency administrators have reemphasized
their outreach, transfer and commercialization efforts. Daniel Goldin,
Administrator of NASA, has lead a renewed emphasis on technology transfer
and commercialization. The agency's emphasis on technology transfer and
commercialization is represented well in the NASA document, Agenda for
Change (Agenda for Change 1994).
In the Agenda for Change document, the agency stated that a
cornerstone of its commercial technology policy is to devote 10% to 20% of its
budge for R&D partnerships with the private sector (Agenda for Change 1994).
NASA field centers have opened new technology transfer offices or expanded
existing ones in recent years. In 1994, NASA Langley created a new
organization for technology transfer and gave it the same authority as the
research groups. The director and the members of this new organization
were selected from the research staff and were tasked with transferring NASA
Langley's technology to the private sector. Two internal memos at NASA
Langley Research Center, with the concurrence of the Center Director, called
for a commitment of 10% of resources towards technology transfer
(Appendices A.1 and A.2).
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NASA has been reluctant to show the quantitative data on technology
transfer issues, instead relying upon case studies, testimonials, and qualitative
studies. Although these are important, the quantitative data must be
evaluated in order to assess current and future positions and create a whole
picture of the technology transfer challenge.
Regardless of the recent emphasis on technology transfer, the
investment into technology transfer as a percentage of net R&D is very small
(Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Data collected from NASA headquarters shows just how
small the investment into technology transfer has been. On an annual basis,
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Figure 2.3: Net R&D Budget for NASA, 1982-1994
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between the years of 1982 and 1992, technology transfer funding exceeded 0.5%
only once while slipping below 0.2% once, and remaining between 0.3% and
0.5% for the other years. This is two orders of magnitude lower than the
current goals for technology transfer.
Fiscal Year
Figure 2.4: Technology Utilization Expenditures as a Percentage of the Net
NASA R&D Budget, 1982-1994
Return-on-investment is small, as measured by royalties as a
percentage of the investment in technology transfer per annum. As
mentioned earlier, a truer return-on-investment figure would need to reflect
the benefits of personnel exchange, information dissemination, and other
tough to measure variables. A return on investment measured purely by the
royalties received and the technology transfer expenditures depicts a dismal
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effort (Figure 2.5). In only two of the most recent years, 1991 and 1994, have
the royalties as a percentage of technology transfer expenditures been above
one percent (1%).
Figure 2.5: Royalties as a Percentage of the Technology Transfer Expenditure
for NASA, 1987-1994
This type of simple analysis can be misleading though, since it misses
the point of technology transfer. Technology transfer is performed not
primarily for the benefit of the return on investment to the laboratory but for
the return on investment to the public good. This would be better calculated
by figuring the private sales from the licenses compared with the technology
transfer expenditure (Figure 2.6). This calculation can only be estimated since
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the royalty figures at NASA include both the upfront royalties (fee paid at
initiation of license agreement, typically $5000) and the running royalties
(percentage of sales). Assuming that all of the royalties are running royalties
(by definition, impossible, but for the hypothetical argument) and
extrapolating those royalties into sales, one has a better picture of the
economic impact. This analysis shows that, at best, the sales in the private
sector account for just above 20% of the expenditures for technology transfer.
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Figure 2.6: Extrapolated Sales Revenues vs. Technology Transfer Budget for
NASA, 1987-1995
Complicating the concern of the effectiveness of NASA technology
transfer efforts is its relative placing when compared with US universities. In
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1993, NASA received $162,451 in royalties which would place it in 82nd place
among 116 US universities. In 1994 those numbers were improved upon
with NASA receiving $314,214 in royalties which would place it in 67th place.
Although NASA increased their royalties again in 1995 to $348,533 they
remained in 67th place.
Evaluations based purely on quantitative analysis are misleading since
many of the benefits derived through technology transfer cannot be measured
through royalties alone (See Chapter IV, Case Studies). Research into other
less tangible parameters lead to the uncovering of software technology
transfers. For years, government researchers were not permitted to copyright
or patent software. This leads to an unfavorable market impact potential,
since public domain products do not entice many companies to expend
efforts, when their competitors have access to the same technology. But in at
least one instance a large dividend was reaped from a NASA-funded and co-
developed software, NASTRAN. Details of the NASTRAN development
and market impact are contained in Chapter IV of this study. Of relevance in
this case is the annual sales figures for the product. NASTRAN had over
$70M in sales per annum (1994) with none of it going to royalties or otherwise
being credited to NASA for it's creation. The annual sales of NASTRAN
dwarf the technology transfer expenditures per annum and is one case of the
immeasurable impacts of technology transfer (Figure 2.7).
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Figure 2.7: NASA Technology Transfer Budget compared with NASA
Extrapolated Royalties Sales and NASTRAN Sales, 1994
As outlined by Mansfield and others, the average time to market can be
on the order of seven to 20 years. Technology transfer from a federal
laboratory to the private sector is similar to new product development with
the additional hurdle of communication across cultural and organizational
lines. Therefore, the recent active approach to technology transfer by NASA
is not expected to show large measurable differences for some years.
However, it is impressive that the royalties received by NASA in the two
most recent years (1994-1995) have shown substantial increases over prior
years (Figure 2.8).
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Figure 2.8: NASA Royalties per Fiscal Year, 1987-1995
In conclusion, the economic returns from NASA investment into
technology transfer is questionable when looking merely at the royalties or
extrapolated sales due to royalties. More accurate economic analysis must
include case studies, like NASTRAN, to find all of the economic impacts.
The NASTRAN case alone demonstrates how just one transfer can have
significant impact. It is not unreasonable for NASA to aim for a ratio of
royalties to technology transfer budget greater than one. The royalty return
figures have already begun to escalate rapidly within just a few years of active
technology transfer efforts.
66
(4)Analysis of AUTM Data
An extensive databaseof technology licensing efforts by US
universities is maintained by the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM). A collection of data of this size is rare in technology
transfer. Federal agencies are not apt to release data on individual
laboratories and private institutions consider their data confidential. The
university data offers an opportunity to analyze and examine for
relationships and significant correlations between the three categories of
metrics (input, intermediate, and outcome).
The AUTM database is compiled annually. The 1994 version (1993
data) contains data from 116 US universities, 26 US hospitals and research
institutes, 12 Canadian institutes, and 3 patent management firms. The
variables of the database include:
• professional full-time employees,
• royalties received,
• licenses generating royalties,
• legal fees expended,
• legal fees reimbursed,
• invention disclosures received,
• US patent applications filed,
• US patents issued,
• total active licenses and options, and
• licenses and options executed.
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The data includes information on expenditures (input), activities
(intermediate-term), and results (long-term). The variables of the database
are categorized as follows in Table 2.15. Correlation coefficients were
calculated between all of the listed parameters. The correlation coefficients
can be seen in the correlation matrix of Table 2.16.
Table 2.15: Categorization of AUTM Database Variables into Technology
Transfer Metric Categories
Input (Expenditures, Resources)
Professional full time employees
Legal fees expended
Legal fees reimbursed
Intermediate (Activities)
Invention disclosures
US patent applications filed
US patents issued
Licenses & options executed
Long-term (Outcomes)
Royalties received
Licenses _eneratin_ royalty
The three shaded boxes represent the interaction between the three
categories. The upper-left hand box contains the correlations between inputs
and intermediates. The lower-left box contains the correlations between the
input and the outcomes. The lower- right box contains the correlations
between the intermediates and the outcomes.
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The correlations in the upper-left box reveal what might be considered
obvious, that activity correlates with the amount of expenditures. Simply,
the more full-time employees and legal fees expended correlates with the
numbers of invention disclosures and patent applications filed and the
patents and licenses issued.
The correlations in the lower-left box are more revealing, implying
that the inputs correlate well with obtaining some measure of success. There
is a reduced correlation of inputs when moving from the intermediate
measures to the more important measure of outcome, royalties. The
investments have less correlation with results (as measured by royalties) than
the activities. The numbers imply that a certain amount of the success is
dependent on the individuals involved. The literature refers to many studies
which also conclude that a key critical item in the technology transfer
effectiveness is the presence of a champion (Carr 1992).
The correlations with royalties (lower-right and lower-left shaded
boxes) reveal even more about the relationship between input, intermediate
and outcomes measurements. The most important quantifiable measure of
success is the royalties. Licensing has the highest correlation with royalties of
any of the measurement variables. This makes perfect sense, since it is the
?0
last step in the process of attaining royalties. In addition, licensing is market
driven, while all other measures are internally driven.
Further observations can be derived from a comparison of the different
institutes: US Universities, US Hospitals & Research Institutes, Canadian
Institutes, and Patent Management Firms. Totals and averages for the four
types of institutes are calculated and presented in Tables 2.17 and 2.18. As
might be expected, the patent management firms expend more resources by a
factor of approximately 5 for full time employees and 2.5 to 7 times the legal
fees expended by the other institutes.
Table 2.17: Input Averages of Institutes from the AUTM Study
Institute
US Universities
US Hospitals & Research Institutes
Canadian Institutes
Patent Management Firms
Prof.
FTE's
1.75
1.31
2.17
10
Legal
Fees
383,035
434,923
161,132
907,390
Legal Fees
Reimbursed
158,416
187,130
54,164
139,195
Total
Legal
Fees
224,619
247,793
106,968
768,195
*FTE - Full Time Employees
Table 2.18: Intermediate Averages for Institutes from the AUTM Study
Institute Invent.
Discl.
Patent
Appl's.
Patents
Issued
US Universities 52 24 10
30 21 7US Hospitals &
Research Institutes
Licenses &
Options
Activated
Total Active
Licenses &
Options
Canadian Institutes 33 8 6 15 41
Patent Management 273 35 17 20 46
Firms
14 56
1 35
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Outcome measures were calculated and compared in Table 2.19. Again,
the small sample for the patent management firms leaves question as to the
validity of the comparisons based on institutes (Royalties/Institute, Licenses
Generating Revenue (LGR)/Institute). The LGR/FTE, Revenues/FTE and the
Revenues/Active Licenses give a good comparison of the success between
types of institutes. Universities appear to pick winners more often as
demonstrated by their large LGR/FTE value. However, patent management
firms clearly are better at picking big winners as evidenced by the
Revenues/FTE and Revenues/Active Licenses. The patent management
firms have a order of magnitude over other institutes in Revenues/Active
Licenses.
Table 2.19: Outcome Averages for Institutes from the AUTM Study
Institute Royalties/ LGR/ LGR/
Institute Institute FTE
US Universities 1,696,808 25.5 14.2
US Hospitals & 2,844,965 15.7 12
Research Institutes
Canadian Institutes 441,625 15.2 7
Patent Management 19,557,998 64.7 6.5
Firms
*LGR - Licenses Generating
Rev/ FTE
893,252
1,984,323
Rev./Act.
License
29,311
75,196
154,457 8,080
1,878,980 405,535
Revenue, FIE- Full Time Employees
A comparison between NASA and these institutes shows NASA
severely lagging in terms of outcome metrics (Table 2.20). NASA lags
Canadian institutes by a factor of three and other US institutes by a factor
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between 10 and 20 in terms of royalties/institute. The revenues/licenses and
LGR/institute help further explain the NASA situation. Although NASA
has a respectable LGR/institute, its revenues/licenses points out its inability
to obtain big winners. In fact, considering that most NASA royalties consist
of upfront (one-time initialization fee) royalties that are on the order of $5,000
to $10,000, the licensing program economic success is questionable.
Table 2.20: Outcome Averages for Institutes from the AUTM Study
Compared with NASA
Institute
US Universities
US Hospitals & Research Institutes
Canadian Institutes
Patent Management Firms
NASA
Royalties/
Institute
1,696,808
2,844,965
441,625
19,557,998
162,450
LGR/
Institute
25.5
15.7
15.2
64.7
27.0
Revenues
/ Licenses
29,311
75,196
8,080
405,535
6,016
CHAFFER III
METHODS
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The methods for performing both the federal laboratory researcher
technology transfer culture survey and the linking of metrics study are
presented in this chapter.
Federal Laboratory Researcher Technology Transfer Culture Survey
The federal laboratory researcher technology transfer culture survey
was designed to measure attitude, awareness, and perceptions of federal
laboratory researchers toward technology transfer. The survey was performed
at the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, with 100
researchers. Availability and accessibility to federal laboratory researchers for
a survey of this type are generally difficult because the managers and directors
of such research laboratories are wary of the possible negative repercussions.
Access to the NASA Langley was granted because of the author's employment
with NASA.
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The NASA Langley Research Center
The NASA Langley Research Center is located in Hampton, Virginia.
NASA Langley, established in 1917, was originally the research center for the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). In 1958, with the
transformation of NACA into NASA, the name was changed from the
NACA Langley Aeronautical Laboratory to the NASA Langley Research
Center.
NASA Langley has a long tradition of world-class aeronautics research
in support of the commercial sector. The Center has won five Collier
Trophies, an annual award for aviation's greatest achievement. Today,
NASA Langley has the NASA lead for high-speed research, and other projects
including composites, integrated wings, and general aviation. The facilities at
NASA Langley cover approximately 788 acres, 221 buildings, with an original
investment value of $687M and a replacement value of approximately $2.06B.
NASA Langley has 24 wind-tunnels covering the entire speed range from 0 to
Mach 25. The staff includes approximately 2300 employees of which 50% are
considered researchers. The NASA Langley budget has hovered about the
$600M mark over the past five years (Economic Impact 1995).
In 1994, NASA Langley was reorganized in order to better align the
Center with its customer-base (funding organizations, research recipients, and
"/5
others). As a result of the reorganization the directorates of Electronics,
Structures, Aeronautics, Space, Flight Systems, Systems Engineering and
Operations, and Management Operations were eliminated and in their place
were formed the groups entitled Aeronautics Program Group (APG), the
Space and Atmospheric Sciences Program Group (SASPG), the Research and
Technology Group (RTG), the Technology Applications Group (TAG), and the
Internal Operations Group (IOG). Reorganization shifted research from
different, mission-focused directorates into one group, the RTG. The
programmatics were left to the APG and SASPG, while the RTG performs the
research. The IOG is a support and services group. The TAG was elevated
from a three-person office to group-level with approximately 30 members and
the responsibility of matching promising NASA Langley research with US
businesses. The organization of NASA Langley prior to restructuring is
represented in Appendix C.1, and the organization of NASA Langley
following the restructuring is presented in Appendix C.2.
In order to accurately represent the missions and goals of the NASA
Langley Research Center, the mission and goals statement is presented below.
NASA Langley Research Center Mission and Goals, 1995
The mission of the NASA Langley Research Center is to increase the
knowledge and capability of the United States in a full range of aeronautics
disciplines and in selected space disciplines, system analysis, and in
atmospheric sciences. The mission will be accomplished by:
76
• Performing innovative research relevant to national needs.
• Transferring technology to users in a timely manner.
• Supporting U.S. government agencies, U.S. industry, other NASA
centers, the educational community and the local community.
Specifically, we will strive to enhance our premier research capability and
contributions in the following disciplines:
• Acoustics • Flight Dynamics
• Aerodynamics • Hypersonic Propulsion
• Aeroelasticity • Systems Analysis
• Aerothermodynaics • Materials
• Airframe/Propulsion • Measurement & Testing
Integration Techniques
• Atmospheric Sciences • Remote Sensing
• Controls & Guidance • Structures
• Electromagnetics
The Center will exploit opportunities for synergistic applications of the above
disciplines in the development of technology for the following aerospace
systems:
• Subsonic and Supersonic Transports
• Military Aircraft and Missiles
• Hypersonic Aircraft
• Space Transportation Systems
• Small Spacecraft
• Instruments
Our success will be measured by the extent to which our research results and
technologies contribute to the design, development, and operation of future
aerospace vehicles and missions and to the overall economic competitivenes_
of U.S. industry.
More broadly, the 1995 NASA Strategic Plan mission statement reads:
It is NASA's mission to research, develop, verify, and transfer
advanced aeronautics, space, and related technologies... We conduct
aeronautics and space research and develop technology in partnership
with industry, academia, and other Federal agencies to keep America
capable and competitive (NASA Strategic Plan February p. 2, 1995).
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The operating principle for technology transfer and commercialization calls
for new ways of doing business that effectively align the agency's assets and
enterprises with US economic security.
We will implement our programs such that they align NASA assets
and Enterprises into an alliance among Program Offices and Field
Centers, creating a collaborative way of educating NASA staff on
commercial applications, marketing our capabilities and establishing
partnerships with industry, evaluating progress, and establishing an
electronic commercial technology network. We will ensure that our
technology-transfer activities and dissemination of information to the
public benefits the national and economic security of the United States
(NASA Strategic Plan p. 22, 1995).
These policies indicate that NASA and its field center, NASA Langley
Research Center, have made a commitment to technology transfer with the
intent of positively impacting the US economy.
Survey Design
A survey was designed to measure the awareness, attitudes, and
perceptions of researchers at the NASA Langley Research Center federal
research laboratory. The survey was intended to gain a deeper understanding
of federal laboratory culture and researcher attitudes toward technology
transfer. A GAO study of 1992 (Technology Transfer, Barriers Limit Royalty
Sharing's Effectiveness 1992) utilized a focus group of federal researchers, but
did not include a quantitative (statistical) analysis of the researcher culture.
This study seeks to add depth to GAO findings by surveying 100 researchers.
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In final form, it consists of 19 content and two demographic questions (age
and education level). Questions were equally divided among measures of
attitude, awareness, and perception (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Breakdown of Survey Questions by Measure
Measure Number of Questions
Awareness 6
Attitude 6
Perception 6
*Note: Question 9 is an objective measure of the performance plan use.
A telephone survey conducted by the author was selected to achieve a
high response rate. Prior surveys and market studies have shown that
personal surveys and telephone surveys have significantly greater response
rates than mail surveys. A mail survey would have incurred significant
printing costs and, possibly, more time, in order to cajole respondents, while
personal (face-to-face) surveys would have incurred significantly more time
than either telephone or mail surveys in travel from office to office.
Therefore, the telephone survey was probably the least expensive approach,
since all calls were local and internal to the Research Center.
Survey design was constrained by the medium. In addition to the
limitations of a telephone conversation, the attention span of the
respondents was factored. Open-ended questions were kept to a minimum.
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Closed-ended questions were composed mostly of ordinal ratings, with
anywhere between two to five category scales. These guidelines aided in
creating a survey that could be performed in less than ten minutes. Ten
minutes was assumed to be the maximum amount of time that a researcher
at NASA Langley would agree to participate. This estimate is based on the
author's intimate, ten-year knowledge of the research staff at NASA Langley
and the input of the focus group used in the course of survey instrument
development.
The relative size of the sample (10% of the sample population)
provides statistical inference validity. The use of a focus group builds a strong
case for construct validity. Internal validity was verified by a demographic
comparison of the random sample and the sample population (see Figures
3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). External validity to other federal laboratories has not
been addressed or proven in this study.
The survey instrument was strengthened through an extensive review
process that included a focus group (2 meetings and follow-up), multiple
reviews by the Deputy Director of the Technology Applications Group, and a
pilot study.
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Focus Group
A focus group of researchers representative of the sample population
was assembled in order to attain a preliminary evaluation of the clarity of the
questions and the survey in general. Focus group review of the survey was
intended to identify questions that may be ambiguous or leading, critical
questions that may be missing, inappropriate response options for questions,
and any other problematic issues with the survey from a respondent's point
of view.
Participants for the focus group were selected to represent a span of
ages, a spectrum of the groups within NASA Langley, and a range of
educational levels and experiences and gender. The participant demographics
are summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Focus Group Demographics
Gender Age Group Highest Education
Level Attained
F 26 RTG BS
M 47 RTG MS
M 62 SASPG B S
F 31 SASPG PhD
Meeting One
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The focus group met for one hour. During this time members were
briefed on the purpose of the survey, asked for their demographic
information, asked to read the survey individually and then participate in an
open discussion on the survey. Members were asked to respond to the survey
questions (Table 3.3) so that they could better evaluate the questions as a
typical respondent. The members of the focus group were encouraged to
make written comments on the survey as they evaluated it. At the
conclusion of the evaluation period, focus group members were asked to
comment on the survey in general and for specific questions and issues.
Suggestions from this group were incorporated into a revised survey.
Table 3.3: Original Survey Form, Prior to Focus Group
NASA Langley Research Center
Technology Transfer Culture Survey
Hello, my name is Lance Bush. I'm an employee of NASA Langley and am
helping conduct a survey of the research staff. Results of this survey will be
used by senior managers to guide policy. Would you take a few moments to
answer a few questions. I assure you that your answers will be kept completely
confidential.
1. Technology Transfer is one of NASA Langley's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
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Strongly Agree
Technology Transfer is one of NASA's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
In addition to my research, technology transfer should be my
responsibility.
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
= Technology transfer has been a component of my performance plan
and/or performance appraisal.
Agree Disagree
. Technology Transfer should be a component of the performance plan &
performance appraisal.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
. Technology Transfer should be a component of only the performance
appraisal.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
°
.
g.
10.
Strongly Agree
If I were rewarded with royalties, I would be more interested in supporting
technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
If it contributed to my promotions, I would be more interested in
supporting technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
If I were rewarded with both royalties and promotions, I would be more
interested in supporting technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
My immediate management supports technology transfer.
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
83
11. My senior management (2-levels up) supports technology transfer.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
12.
13.
NASA Langley has committed what percentage of resources to
technology transfer?
List the methods by which you can commercialize a technology at NASA
Langley.
My technology council member is
What group would you contact for help in transferring technology?
Demographics:
Age
Level of Education Achieved BS MS PhD
Group
Division
On average, members of the focus group took six minutes to review
and answer the questions on the survey. One focus group member took five
minutes, two of the members took six minutes, and one of the members took
nine minutes. It was anticipated that a similar amount of time would be used
by researchers randomly selected to participate in the survey study, even
though the survey questions would be read to them over the phone by the
author.
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The critique of the focus group identified two main points that were
missing from the original survey.
• the group were:
1.
2.
The two additional questions suggested by
Do you believe your research has potential for technology transfer?
Do they (researcher) believe we (NASA LaRC and/or researcher)
should be doing technology transfer?
The group felt that the results of these two questions would be even
more revealing if the respondents also estimated their perceived potential for
technology transfer. The term "technology transfer" had multiple meanings
for the focus group. Members asked that a clear definition be read to each
respondent prior to the survey. Questions concerning management support
were deemed too vague. Rewording for those questions was suggested in
order to differentiate between "lip-service" and tangible management
support. Two other questions suggested by the focus group were:
1. What would help you to prepare for performing technology
transfer?
2. How should researcher be involved in technology transfer?
Finally, the focus group made valuable suggestions concerning survey
logistics. Members suggested that survey respondents be told prior to the
survey that it would take approximately ten minutes of their time. Further,
the focus group identified a flaw in the original sampling strategy. All
members of the focus group thought that stratifying of the sample should be
performed at the branch as opposed to the division level, since researchers
associate with their most immediate organizational structure. Nevertheless,
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after obtaining this recommendation and reviewing the database of
researchers for the study, a stratification by division or branches was decided
against since the sample size (100) would not allow for statistically significant
groupings at those levels.
These changes were incorporated into a new survey. The new survey
(Appendix D.1) was reviewed by the Deputy Director of the Technology
Applications Group to ensure that the results would be of interest to a senior
level administrator of technology transfer. The Deputy Director made a few
suggestions, and the survey took on a new form (Appendix D.2). The Deputy
Director's suggestions focused on the clarification of the questions regarding
attitudes toward rewards and the definition of technology transfer. The
definition of technology transfer could play a pivotal role in the survey
because it might influence respondent answers.
Meeting Two
The focus group convened a second time to review the revised survey.
Members found that the revised survey resolved most issues identified in the
first draft. Additional modifications were few and mostly dealt with an
occasional change of wording. The revised survey from this meeting is
displayed in Appendix D.3.
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In survey question seven (7), the question response read: "Training on
performance of technology transfer." It was modified to read: "Training on
tools/mechanisms/processes for performance of technology transfer." This
wording change served to make the option clearer and differentiate it from
the option: "Education about the process."
The group further suggested removal of the phrase, "Stayed out of the
way" because the midrange answer on the nominal scale for question 15.
"Stayed out of the way" was deemed to be confusing, since it could be
considered to have both positive and negative connotations with respect to
management involvement. Another recommendation for question 15 was to
reverse the number scale so that the value 10 corresponded to the positive
answer (helped significantly) and the value 0 corresponded to the negative
answer (inhibited). Suggested rewording for question 17 changed the nature
of the question. The group felt that identification of mechanisms was not a
responsibility of researchers but of the Technology Applications Group. The
phrase "are you aware of" was changed to "would you use."
One additional recommendation regarded the implementation of the
survey. A member of the group pointed out that some questions differed
from others only by the replacement of the word "is" with "should be." In
order to ensure that the question was answered correctly, it was advised that
those words be emphasized when reading the question.
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Most concern during this second meeting centered on wording in the
informed consent introduction and the definition of the term "technology
transfer". The focus group felt that it should be expressed clearly that Center
management would receive these results. In addition, the definition of
technology transfer was determined to be too vague. Suggestions to rectify
the definition of technology transfer included a reference to research results
as the object to be transferred and inference that the concern was with the
transfer from NASA to a customer.
The group suggested that the first survey question determine whether
or not the respondent was doing research. This would serve as an extra
verification that the appropriate sample population was being surveyed.
Finally, the group also felt that all researcher personnel below the level of
branch head could be considered "non-management" and could, therefore,
include section and group leaders.
Following the meeting, a new definition for technology transfer was
drafted and circulated via email to the focus group. Through a series of
emails, three of the four members agreed completely on the final wording.
The final wording for the technology transfer definition can be viewed in
Appendix D.4.
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Pilot Study
The population for the pilot study consisted of nine researchers at
NASA Langley Research Center. These respondents were selected randomly
from a database of all researchers at the Center. The database of researchers
was obtained from the Human Resources Division and included the names,
job title, position classification, phone number, and organizational codes for
each researcher. This database is titled "NASA Personnel/Payroll System."
Individuals in the database who had an administrative code, which
designated a management position, were removed from the database.
Personnel left on the database were categorized by ten different groups
(denoted by a 100, 200, etc.) identified by the NASA Position Classification
Handbook (NASA Position Classification Handbook 1987). Those individuals
identified as professional scientific, engineering, other technical positions,
and life sciences positions were retained (200, 700, 900 groups). Individuals
were then filtered again by the position classification standards code (NASA
Position Classification Handbook 1987). Those individuals with position
classification standards codes of 92, 94, 99, 91, (support personnel) and student
trainees were removed from the database. In addition, those individuals
associated with the Technology Applications Group and the Office of the
Director were also eliminated. It is likely that the sampling frame (database)
very closely represented the targeted population. The remaining sample
population contained 1017 individuals.
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The nine respondents were telephoned by the author in their offices.
Respondents were read the informed consent paragraph, the definition of
technology transfer, and then the questions. The surveying was performed in
accordance with established interviewer techniques (Fink 1985; Fowler 1993;
Fowler & Mangione 1990; Interviewer's Manual 1976).
With the exception of two questions, the survey mechanism was found
to be unambiguous and clear to the respondents. During the survey, it was
found that respondents preferred to answer question 7 (the only multiple
choice question on the survey) with a letter response even though they had
not been read one. In addition, it was not clear to them that they could
choose more than one response. For the final survey, question 7 was revised
to include letter responses and a statement that more than one response
could be selected.
Question 11 ("Technology transfer should be a consideration only
during my performance appraisal and not necessarily a planned task") was
interpreted in two different ways by respondents. The first interpretation (the
intended one) was that technology transfer, like inventing, was hard to
predict. Respondents felt more comfortable not being pressured to plan
technology transfer, but being rewarded for technology transfer when it
occurred. The second interpretation was that the researcher would be held,
unfairly, accountable for technology transfer when it was not a agreed upon
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planned task. To alleviate what might be confusing results, question 11 was
rewritten to obtain the information that was originally intended. The
question was reworded to read:
Given that the performance appraisal allows for a researcher to bring
up positive accomplishments that may not have been planned for,
technology transfer should be a consideration only during my
performance appraisal and not necessarily a planned task.
Although the actual results of the pilot showed some interesting
cultural trends, the sample was too small to draw any statistical significance
and the results were discarded.
Main Study
The strategy was to survey 100 of the researchers at NASA Langley on
their attitudes, awareness, and perceptions toward technology transfer. The
survey was performed by the author over the telephone to the researchers.
Procedural Strategy
Respondents were called in the order they were selected from the
database. The surveying was targeted to take approximately ten working days
with an average of ten respondents surveyed per day. Respondents who were
unavailable on a given day were recalled first on subsequent days. This
approach was intended to minimize the non-response rate.
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Statistical Sample Strategy
The sample for the main study was derived from the same database
described in the pilot study, with the exception that respondents from the
pilot study were removed. Two hundred researchers were randomly selected
from the population. From this 200, the goal was to attain 100 responses.
Respondents were contacted starting at the top of the list and after 100
responses were recorded the study was completed.
The demographics of the random sample were checked against those of
the sample population. The percentage of survey respondents within the
four groups (IOG, SASPG, APG, RTG) matched almost exactly with the
percentage of researchers residing within those groups (Figure 3.1).
There was a reasonable match between the percentages of the sample
population and the random sample for the three education levels (Figure 3.2).
There was a maximum difference of approximately 10%. Sandra Duncan of
the Human Resources Division, from whom the data was derived, stated that
these sample population numbers might be slightly inaccurate. Updating of
education level for an individual is dependent upon that individual
supplying the Human Resources Division with the data. Ms Duncan felt that
this responsibility was not being met by all employees.
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Comparison of Random Sample and Sample
Population by Groups
APG SASPG RTG lOG
Group
• Sample Population 1
!ll Random Sample J
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Sample Population and the Random Sample by
Group Affiliation
Level of Education for the Sample Population
and the Random Sample
Bachelors Masters Ph.D.'s
Education Level
• Random Sample
I• Sample Population I
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Level of Education for the Sample Population and
the Random Sample
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Age distribution for the sample population and the random sample
both show a bimodal distribution with significant portions of the employees
in either their 30s or 50s (Figure 3.3).
The distribution of the sample population and random sample by age
category are similar and differ by 9% at most for any one category (Figure 3.4).
The favorable comparisons of the sample population and random
sample demographics for group, age, and education level indicate that
construct validity was achieved (Figures 3.1 thru 3.4).
No contacted respondent declined to be interviewed and the non-
response rate (~5%) consisted entirely of individuals who could not be
reached. The non-response rate is defined as the quotient of the number of
individuals who were randomly selected and unavailable for survey to the
total number of randomly selected individuals for the study (5/105).
Shortcomings
The greatest potential for error in this study may be attributed to the
interviewer. NASA Langley Research Center is a relatively small community
with approximately 2,300 civil servants. The author, currently employed at
NASA Langley Research Center, has served eight years as a researcher at the
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Comparison of Sample Population and Random
Sample by Age Category
0
20's 30's 40's 50's 60's 70's
Age Category
Figure 3.4: Comparison of Sample Population and Random Sample by Age
Category
Center and is familiar with many of the researchers. Although a professional
interviewer demeanor and attitude was maintained throughout the survey,
several respondents may have given responses that were influenced by their
relationship to the interviewer.
A second potential for inaccurate results stems from external
influences on the researchers. Within the recent year, many changes
occurred at NASA Langley Research Center causing stress and anxiety among
the personnel. These changes included reorganization of the Center, shifting
of missions and goals to be customer-based, declining support from Congress,
96
federal budget impasse, and a perceived declining interest in NASA and space
ventures in general from the public perspective.
Data Analysis
Collected data from the survey was analyzed both on an individual
question basis and with respect to correlations between the questions. Most
questions lent themselves to a graphical representation either in the form of a
pie chart based on percentages or a bar chart on number of responses.
Answers to open-ended questions were categorized and then presented as bar
or pie chart forms.
Correlations (Pearson product moments) were calculated between all of
the questions. The correlation coefficients and the variables were reviewed to
determine which pairs of variables were correlated (Mendenhall 1993;
Minitab Handbook 1991).
Case Studies for Effectiveness of Technology Transfer
The question intended to be answered by the case studies was: "What
are the key critical elements that contribute to a successful technology transfer
from a federal laboratory to a private sector?" The case study approach was
selected over other study mechanisms because technology transfer is a
9"/
relatively contemporary issue that involves subjective issues and human
nature. Case studies are better tools than other research approaches (surveys,
laboratory tests, etc.) for this particular study because they allowed for study of
phenomena in its contextual environment.
Selection of the cases was guided by prior theories on the subject.
Previous studies and theories on the success of technology transfer are
presented in Chapter II. Essentially this research tested the measures of
technology transfer that were derived in many previous studies (see Chapter
II, Measures of Technology Transfer).
A multiple case approach was taken to achieve construct validity.
Selected cases were those that demonstrated economically successful
technology transfers from a federal laboratory to the private sector. The units
of analysis were the individuals involved with the transfer and success.
These individuals included the laboratory researchers, technology transfer
agents, and the private business personnel.
Procedure for Case Studies
Construct validity was established by interviewing all of the principals
involved within each technology transfer case. Principals were those
identified as playing a central role in the success of the case. Typically,
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principal individuals for a case included both an internal and external person
(e.g., president of company and researcher at laboratory). The multiple
sources of evidence helped create a clear picture from both sides of the issue,
including the private sector and the laboratory.
Although internal validity was much more difficult to achieve in a
case study of this nature, the testimony of several people all with differing
agendas and personal interests further substantiated the findings.
Although each federal laboratory has a different mission, perspective,
and general culture, the culture issues measured in this study were of such a
general nature as to assume that they would probably exist at other NASA
research laboratories and similar US federal laboratories with a science
orientation. Nevertheless, this study does not attempt to prove the external
validity to other NASA Centers and similar US federal laboratories through
additional surveying at other labs, but leaves that for future studies.
Along with the interviews of principals, the sources of evidence for the
case studies included archival records and documents. The archival records
included corporate information publications, such as yearly financial reports.
The documents included company historical accounts and Thomas Business
Register information (Thomas Business Register 1995). The interviews were
conducted in an open-ended way allowing for personal insights and other
unpredicted issues to arise. In the open-ended format the interview was
guided by responses of the interviewees. Responses helped guide the
interviewer to the next question as opposed to having a closed, structured
interview where all questions were predecided.
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In order to determine the key, critical elements of a successful
technology transfer effort, the case studies were constructed from interviews
with principals within the process of the technology transfer from the federal
laboratory and the technology's success in the commercial sector. Individuals
from the federal laboratory NASA Langley and the private company were
interviewed in each of the case studies. A snowball design, such as that used
in market research, was used to identify the key individuals in the transfer
process (Aaker and Day p. 368, 1990). In the snowball design each respondent,
after being interviewed, was asked to identify other appropriate people to be
interviewed.
One question was central to each interview. The following question
was asked of all interviewees:
What were the key critical items that contributed to the economic
success in terms of the transfer of the technology from the federal
laboratory to the private sector?
Following the response of the interviewee, each interview then proceeded in
an open format while the interviewer probed for the key critical elements and
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other principals involved with the technology transfer process (Fowler and
Mangione 1990; Interviewer's Manual 1976; Stake 1995; and Yin 1994).
Selection of Case Studies
The key criterion for selection of the three case studies was the presence
of a positive outcome metric, as shown in Figure 3.5. In order to consider a
technology transfer a success, a private company needed to show either
increased revenues, reduced costs, or some other significant economic
improvement. The key in selecting the cases for this research investigation
was a success for the company and not an input or intermediate success
measure that is typically used by federal laboratories. A brief description of
the three cases follows. A more detailed analysis of each case can be found in
Chapter Four.
MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation (NASTRAN)
The MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation (MSC) is an industry leader in
finite element modeling and analysis tools located in Los Angeles, California.
MSC's primary product, MSC/NASTRAN, was initially developed jointly by
NASA, MSC and a few other small companies through major funding by
NASA. MSC now has over $100M in annual sales (MacNeal-Schwendler
Corporation Annual Report 1995; Thomas Business Register 1995).
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Input Measures
Transfer Expenditures
Transfer Budgets
Time Spent
Requests for Help
Number of Site Visits
I
Immediate Outcomes
Tech Briefs/Papers Published
Tech Briefs/Papers Requested
Technical Presentations
Technical Problems Solved
Licenses Granted
Success Stories Published
Selection
Criteria
Figure 3.5: Outcome Metrics as Selection Criteria for Case Studies
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Pressure Systems Incorporated
Doug Juanarena, a NASA Langley researcher until 1978, played a key
role in developing a pressure sensor for use in wind tunnels. The
development of these sensors was necessary in order to construct new wind
tunnels being designed at that time. When NASA was left with no
manufacturer for the pressure sensor, Doug Juanarena left NASA in 1978 and
formed a private company (Pressure Systems Incorporated) to produce the
sensors. Pressure Systems Incorporated became a very successful commercial
entity, supplying pressure sensors worldwide. Doug Juanarena estimates his
company sales are now at the level of $10M per year.
T6cnico
T6cnico is a ship repair company located in Chesapeake, Virginia. Due
to the probability of a declining customer base, T6cnico started to look for
other potential markets to enter. This market scanning led the company to
visit a technology exhibit at NASA Langley in 1993. At this technology
exhibit, John Hildebrandt, a Group Manger with T6cnico, found a technology,
rubber expansion molding, that he believed could help give them an edge on
competitors in ship repair while allowing them to break into new markets at
a low initial investment. Since that time, T6cnico has created a new group
within the company, called the Advanced Materials Group. The technology
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transfer with NASA resulted in a new product, new commercial customers
and jobs created. Since May of 1995, T6cnico has hired eight skilled persons
(engineers, technicians) into the Advanced Materials Group and has received
over $800,000 in revenues.
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CHAFFER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSES
Introduction
Previous chapters served to introduce the metric work that has been
done to date in measuring technology transfer and culture of researcher
attitudes toward technology transfer. Methodologies for extending previous
knowledge in these areas were also outlined. These studies provided a
framework and a starting point for this study.
In this chapter, the analysis of and the results from the survey of the
researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are presented. Also the
analysis of successful technology transfer case studies are presented.
Survey of Researchers
The survey at NASA Langley Research Center included 100 researchers
with a non-response rate of approximately 5% (5/105). Respondents were
surveyed to determine their awareness, attitude, and perceptions regarding
technology transfer. The survey results are displayed and the results then
analyzed for correlative relationships between survey responses.
Statistical Relationships
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The survey questions can be divided into three basic categories:
awareness, attitude, and perceptions. Table 4.1 shows the categories and the
corresponding survey question for each category. (Refer to Appendix D.4 for
the survey questions themselves.)
Table 4.1: Survey Question Categories
Focus of Survey
Question
Awareness
Attitude
Perception
*Note: Question 9 is an objective measure
Question Number
1, 2, 16, 17, 18, 19
3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13
4,5,6,7,14,15
of the performance plan use.
Awareness
Six of the nineteen survey questions (questions 1, 2, 16, 17, 18 and 19)
were directed toward collecting data on the level of awareness which NASA
Langley researchers had toward the Agency's and Center's technology transfer
policy. The results to these questions are presented in this section in an order
which describes the culture (question 1, 2, 16, 19, 18, and 17) and not in the
order in the survey. Responses to questions 1 and 2 (Figures 4.1 and 4.2)
showed over ninety percent (90%) of the researchers were aware that
technology transfer was a mission for the NASA Agency and NASA Langley.
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Technology Transfer is one of NASA
LaRC's missions.
Disagree Don't Know
4% 1%
Agree
95%
Figure 4.1: Results of Survey Question One
Technology transfer is one of NASA's
missions.
Don't Know
Disagree 4 %
6%
Agree
90%
Figure 4.2: Results of Survey Question Two
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Question 16 responses (Figure 4.3) indicated that, although researchers
were aware of technology transfer as a mission statement, they did not know
to what percentage or level that either the agency or Center
supported technology transfer as a mission. Less than twenty percent (20%) of
the researchers answered correctly for the more specific figure quoted by
NASA Langley Research Center (10%-15%; see Appendix A.2). Less than
thirty-five percent (35%) of researchers answered correctly for NASA as an
NASA Langley has committed what percentage
of resources to technology transfer?
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Figure 4.3: Results of Survey Question 16
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agency (10%-20%; Agenda For Change 1994). Forty-three percent (43%)
responded "Don't know." The actual awareness may be even lower than the
responses reveal. Many of those who responded with the correct answer
usually prefaced their answer with the admission that they were guessing.
Results from question 19 (Figure 4.4) revealed that researchers were
aware, but at a disappointingly low level, of the organization at the Center to
contact for help in transferring technology. The correct response should have
been the "Technology Application Group." Although sixty percent (60%)
answered the item correctly, fourteen percent (14%) answered incorrectly, and
What group at NASA Langley Research
Center would you contact for help in
transferring technology?
Incorrect
14%
TAG
60%
Aware, but no
name
recognition
26%
Figure 4.4: Results of Survey Question 19
twenty-six percent (26%) were aware an organization existed, but could not
name the organization. It bears mentioning that this survey took place
approximately 18 months after a major reorganization at NASA Langley
Research Center. The reorganization might have had some impact on the
relatively low recognition rate of the Technology Applications Group as the
group to contact. At the same time, a higher level of recognition might have
been expected since the Technology Applications Group was specifically
created as a direct result of the Center placing increased emphasis on
technology transfer as one of its primary missions.
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Question 18 (Figure 4.5) asked the respondents to identify their
technology council member. Each division at NASA Langley has a
representative to the technology council. Each council member leads the
development and implementation of his or her division's Technology
Transfer Plan, which identifies promising new technology that can be
transferred to a US industry partner. Council members serve as division focal
points and advisors for transfer and commercialization efforts. The poverty
of the results may be indicative of more than just researcher awareness and
might be indicative of a lack of publicity. Eighty-eight percent (88%) either did
not know who their representative was or gave an incorrect answer. The
twelve percent (12%), representing those who did answer correctly, is
misleading, since four percent (4%) of that total were the council member.
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Figure 4.5: Results of Survey Question 18
Question 17 (Figure 4.6) was an open-ended question. Researchers
were to list the mechanisms which they would use to transfer their
technology to the private sector. Researchers could list any number of
mechanisms. Responses to question 17 (Figure 4.6) were the most revealing
about the level of awareness of researchers toward technology transfer.
Publications ranked first as the mechanism of choice. Memoranda of
Agreement and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs and MOAs) ranked
fifth, and were the highest ranked formal mechanisms. Other traditional
measures of technology transfer activities ranked much lower: patents 7th;
licensing 15th; problem statements 18th; and Small Business Innovative
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Research (SBIR) 19th. Most of these traditional measures placed beneath
"Don't know," which was 11th in listing.
Attitude
In this study, the measure of the researcher attitudes toward technology
transfer is best understood when viewing the results of the attitude questions
in totality. Questions three, eight, 10, and 12 probe the researchers personal
attitudes toward performing technology transfer. Each question progressively
requires more commitment, responsibility, and accountability from a
researcher. Question three requires no accountability or responsibility on the
part of the individual, while question 12 ties promotion status to the
technology transfer activities of the researcher. Results for each of these
questions are presented in the next four figures (Figures 4.7 - 4.10), followed by
Figure 4.11 which combines Figures 4.7 - 4.10, in order to visualize the shift in
attitude as responsibility and accountability increase.
The NASA Langley researchers strongly supported technology transfer
as a mission at the Center, with over ninety-four percent (94%) agreeing with
question three that the Center should be doing transfer (Figure 4.7). Over fifty
percent (50%) of the respondents strongly agreed.
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Figure 4.7: Results of Survey Question 3
Question eight (Figure 4.8) introduced the issue of technology transfer
as a personal responsibility of researchers. The question conveyed the
message that technology transfer activity was an element of the researchers
responsibilities. The contrast in answers from questions three and eight
indicated that there is an "It's someone else's responsibility" issue. Positive
responses (strongly agree and agree) dropped from ninety-four percent (94%)
in question three to sixty-four percent (64%) in question eight. Strongly agree
was the dominant response in question three. Agree was the dominant
response in question eight. A slight shift was noted in attitude as the
questions proceeded from more general (e.g., Center's duties) to more specific
(e.g., researcher duties).
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Figure 4.8: Results to Survey Question 8
Question 10 (Figure 4.9) became even more specific about the
technology transfer responsibility of the researcher. This question presented
the position that technology transfer should be a part of the researchers
performance plan and/or performance appraisal. Strongly agree answers
declined to eight (8%), and strongly disagree responses accounted for nine
percent (9%). More respondents strongly disagreed than strongly agreed.
Positive answers for the first time dipped below a majority level to forty-three
percent (43%).
Question 12 (Figure 4.10) quantified the personal reward and risk
implied by question 10 with its clear tie between technology transfer and
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Figure 4.10: Results of Survey Question 12
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promotions. This additional reward/risk issue shifted the majority of
opinion from positive responses thirty-one percent (31%) to negative
responses thirty-seven percent (37%).
Figure 4.11 combines the results from questions three, eight, 10, and 12
to graphically display the shift in attitudes towards technology transfer as
personal responsibility and accountability increased.
Results for question 11 are more relevant when viewed in conjunction
with the results of question 10. Question 11 was a lengthy statement intended
to determine if researchers would prefer that technology transfer not be a
planned activity on their performance plans, but an activity that they could
place on their performance appraisal and receive due credit for unplanned
successes. This question was included because it was expected that many
researchers perceived technology transfer and technological breakthroughs
similarly, in that both are very difficult and risky to predict. The majority of
those researchers who answered with either a negative (disagree, strongly
disagree) or neutral response on question 10, shifted responses to the positive
(agree and strongly agree) side on question 11 (these are represented by the
three lines on the right of Figure 4.12). This supported the hypothesis that the
researcher does not want to feel obligated to perform technology transfer, but
would like the option to receive credit when it is performed (a sort of "extra
credit").
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Figure 4.12: Change of Response from Question 10 to Question 11
An additional, unexpected result occurred in question 11. Many of
those individuals who strongly agreed with question 10, took strong
exception in question 11 (left most line, Figure 4.12). Recorded comments
during the survey indicate that these respondents felt technology transfer was
their job, and that it should not only be on the performance appraisal but
should be planned for and therefore be placed onto the performance plan.
Those who responded with an agree in question 10, split between the
attitude shared by those answering strongly agree to question 10 and taking a
new position. Given the new option in question 11, almost half of these
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respondents sided with those who felt it should be only on the performance
appraisal. Overall, fifty-three percent (53%) of the researchers were positive
about having technology transfer on their performance appraisal and not
necessarily a planned task. Seventy-five percent who gave negative results
(disagree) in question 11 had originally, in question 10, agreed with having
technology transfer as a component of the performance plan. If we assume
that those researchers who strongly agreed or agreed with question 10 and
disagreed with question 11 for "philosophical" reasons could be counted
toward agreeing to the concept of having technology transfer only on the
performance appraisal, then the percentage of researchers increases to an
astounding eighty-three percent (83%).
Responses to question 13 (Figure 4.13) were interesting due to the
expressed feeling which the respondents answered the question as if there
were but one reasonable. Yet, respondents fell into three general categories.
The first was those who answered positively and felt they had to act within
whatever guidelines were established. The second was those who answered
negatively because they would do technology transfer regardless of whether it
was a component of the promotion process. The third was respondents who
said their actions are independent of the reward structure. Overall, less than
thirty percent (30%) said they would not put more effort into technology
transfer if it were a component of the promotion process. Removing those
who disagreed with the statement on grounds that they would perform
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Figure 4.13: Results of Survey Question 13
technology transfer anyway, the percentage of researchers who objected to
performing technology transfer was closer to twenty percent (20%).
Perception
Questions four, five, six, seven, 14, and 15 measured researcher
perceptions of a potential to perform technology transfer. Specifically,
questions four through seven measured the researchers' perceptions of their
own technology transfer skills, while questions 14 and 15 measured their
perceptions of management support for the researcher doing technology
transfer.
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When asked (question 4) to judge whether their research had potential
for technology transfer, sixty-nine percent (69%) of the respondents felt their
research had potential, seventeen percent (17%) believed that their research
did not, and fourteen percent (14%) were unsure (Figure 4.14).
My research has potential for
technology transfer.
Disagree
17%
Don't Know
14%
Agree
69%
Figure 4.14: Results of Survey Question 4
When respondents were asked in question five to estimate the
percentage of their research applicable to technology transfer, responses
varied broadly (Figure 4.15). The median was twenty-five percent (25%) and
the mean was thirty-four percent (34%).
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Technology transfer cannot occur without some measured ability on
the part of the researcher. In survey question six, sixty percent (64%) of
researchers responded that they had not been adequately prepared to perform
technology transfer and thirty-six percent (36%) felt that they had been
adequately prepared (Figure 4.16).
As a follow-up to question 6, question 7 asked researchers to identify
ways (e.g., training) which would help them to perform technology transfer.
More than one answer could have been selected. The majority of
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I have been adequately prepared to
perform technology transfer.
Agree
36%
Disagree
64%
Figure 4.16: Results of Survey Question 6
respondents felt that education, training, or management support would help
them to better perform technology transfer (Figure 4.17). Education about the
process was selected most often by participants (57%) with an equal number
selecting tangible support by management and training on performance of
technology transfer (38%). Within the "other" category (20%), participants
identified a range of items mostly indicative of a lack of understanding of
technology transfer.
Question 14 picked up on the theme of management support, as
introduced in question seven. Researchers were asked whether their
immediate management provided tangible support (not just "lip service") to
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technology transfer efforts. The majority of responses fell within the range of
agree to disagree with the statement. Forty-eight percent (9% strongly agreed,
39% agreed) responded that their immediate management had provided
tangible support for technology transfer, twenty-eight percent (28%)
responded neutral, twenty-one percent (21%) disagreed, and three percent
(3%) strongly disagreed. Thus, the perception of over fifty percent (50%) of
those surveyed was that management did not provided tangible support to
technology transfer efforts (Figure 4.18).
Question 15 asked researchers to rate, on a scale from 0 (inhibits) to 10
(helped significantly), the level to which their managers participated in
technology transfer. Researchers gave generally good marks when rating
their managers participation in technology transfer (Figure 4.19). These
results are somewhat confusing considering that less than 50% of the
researchers perceived their managers as giving tangible support (question 14)
while 62% of the researchers gave a value of 6 or higher for their
management in question 15.
Correlations
A Pearson product moment (correlation coefficient) was calculated for
each pair of the survey results. The results are shown in Table 4.2. The table
was constructed to reflect the categorization of the questions by awareness,
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Figure 4.19: Results of Survey Question 15
attitude, and perception. Further correlations between the survey questions
and researcher ages and education levels were performed. Figures 4.20
through 4.23 present the age and education correlations.
Correlations showed positive attitudes toward technology transfer
(questions 3, 8, 10, and 12) related to both positive perceptions and more
awareness. Positive responses to the attitude questions (3, 8, 10 and 12)
seemed to be the common element in any significant correlation coefficient
between awareness, attitude, and perception (see shaded areas of Table 4.2).
Cause and effect cannot be extrapolated from this data.
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Age correlated strongly with one attitude measure and two perception
measures. A strong correlation existed between age and willingness to
perform technology transfer if it were part of the promotion process (question
13). The older the respondent, the less likely he or she was to agree to
performing technology transfer if it were a part of the promotion process.
Younger respondents were more apt to agree to perform technology transfer if
it were part of the promotion process. Both the researcher's own sense of
preparedness and his or her perception of management support correlated
negatively with age. Thus, as age increased there were less positive responses
to the perception of management support and researcher preparedness to
perform technology transfer.
One significant correlation (questions 4 and 5 combined) between
education and the survey responses was found. As the education level
increased, the respondent's belief that his or her research had technology
transfer potential increased (question 4, Figure 4.20 and Table 4.2). In
addition, their estimated percentage of research that had potential for
technology transfer increased with education level (question 5).
A bar chart of the responses to survey question six categorized by
education level was revealing (Figure 4.21). Clearly, the PhDs were more
likely to feel adequately prepared for technology transfer. Yet there is nothing
to substantiate this belief, since, to date, no specific technology transfer
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education or training courses had been performed for any employees by the
NASA Langley. There appears to be a linear relationship between the
education level of respondents and the confidence in their potential.
Reviewing question nine by education level revealed that a
significantly larger number of PhDs claimed that technology transfer was a
component of their performance plan and/or performance appraisal (Figure
4.22). This question did not result in a linear relationship between education
levels, but rather a distinct difference between the PhD respondents and all
others.
Technology transfer has been a component of my
performance plan and/or performance appraisal.
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Figure 4.22: Results of Survey Question 9 by Education Level
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Results to question 16 were interesting when contrasted with the
previous education correlations. Although, PhDs were more likely to believe
their research had technology transfer potential than other respondents, a
larger percentage of the PhDs were the least informed among those surveyed
about actual funding levels by NASA or NASA Langley for technology
transfer (Figure 4.23). The percentage of PhDs who responded incorrectly was
twice that of MS respondents and three times that of BS respondents. In
addition, PhDs had the smallest percentage admitting ignorance, while MS
researchers as a group had a majority admitting ignorance.
NASA Langley has committed what percentage of
resources to technology transfer?
MS
Level
PhD
Don't Know
Correct
Incorrect
Responses
Figure 4.23: Results of Survey Question 16 by Education Level
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Temporal Effect
At the time of the survey there were significant events affecting
employee attitude, including continuing budget impasses, low morale, and
announced work force reductions. Announcements of particular events
could cause volatility in attitudes toward specific programs (i.e., technology
transfer). The survey was performed over a two week period. During the
sampling timeframe rumors and announcements were made concerning
NASA's future. For each question a scatterplot of the responses versus the
day they were collected was created. There was no evidence in these scatter
plots that outside events significantly altered the responses. An observation
made by the interviewer was that the respondents tended to be either more or
less combative depending on the previous days work-related events (e.g.,
furloughed for one week).
Summary of Results for Survey
The survey of researchers at NASA Langley Research Center led to two
major conclusions:
. Researchers are aware of the technology transfer mission of the
NASA agency and NASA Langley Research Center, but are
minimally aware of the mechanisms to perform technology transfer
and the appropriate individuals or organizations to contact within
their Center to help them with technology transfer.
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. Although researchers feel that the Center should be performing
technology transfer, they do not want to be held responsible or
accountable for performing technology transfer.
Case Studies
Three cases of successful technology transfer from NASA Langley to
the private sector were identified for closer examination. Success was defined
by a positive economic impact on the partner. Potential measures for
successful economic impacts are outlined in Table 2.2 (see Chapter II). These
three cases were examined in an attempt to discover elements crucial to the
success of the projects. The goal was to identify linkages between the outcome
metrics, intermediate metrics, and input metrics. Each case was analyzed to
determine the crucial elements leading to success and metrics linking.
Quantitative data along with testimonials and historical documentation were
collected and are presented for each case.
The three case studies are presented in a chronological order, with the
oldest case first: MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation (1960s), Pressure Systems
Incorporated (late 1970s and 1980s), and T6cnico (1993-1996). This order,
coincidentally, is the order of economic impact, with MacNeal-Schwendler
Corporation in the $100M per year range, Pressure Systems Incorporated in
the $10M per year range, and T6cnico in the $1M per year range.
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MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation
The MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation (MSC) was selected as a case
based on its commercial success ($100M/annum) and on its cooperation with
NASA to develop the software code it markets. MSC's interaction with
NASA resulted primarily in a new software product line and new
commercial sales.
MSC had annual sales of over $100M in 1995 and $79M in 1994 (Table
4.3). It is the world leader in mechanical computer-aided engineering
software, as measured by annual sales, capturing over 30% of the global
market. The next largest competitor had sales less than one-third that of
MSC.
Table 4.3: MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation Annual Revenues, 1991-1995
(MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation Annual Report 1995)
Year I 1991Revenues 66,577
Annual Revenues $(000)
11992[ 199367,330 77,190
1994
79,574
1995
100,685
These annual revenues were primarily the result of the sales of
software code MSC/NASTRAN. Thomas Business Register contained an
excellent description of the MSC/NASTRAN product:
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MSC/NASTRAN is a large, sophisticated software program consisting
of over 900,000 source statements. It is based upon the finite element
method of analysis by which complex structures are divided into small
elements which form a finite element model. The model is then
subjected to computer analysis. MSC/NASTRAN is used to analyze
structures in order to determine among other things, their strength,
safety and performance characteristics (Thomas Business Register 1995).
MSC/NASTRAN is sold to aerospace, automotive, defense, and engineering
industries. A brief history of the cooperation between NASA and MSC, and
the ensuing development of MSC/NASTRAN follows. A comprehensive
history of the company and the technology's development can be found in
the book, The MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation: The First 20 Years.
MSC was incorporated in 1963 with $18,000 in private capital and three
employees, including the two principals Richard (Dick) MacNeal and Robert
(Bob) Schwendler. Originally MSC concentrated on consulting work utilizing
analog computers but later recognized the demise of analog computers and
became involved in the NASTRAN project.
In 1964 no finite-element programs were available to the public on a
regular basis through payment of fees. About this time a NASA committee
was formed to investigate the state of analysis in the aerospace industry
community. The funding for this study came from Mel Rosche and Doug
Michel at NASA headquarters. This committee was headed by Tom Butler of
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. The committee recommended that
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NASA sponsor development of its own finite-element program as a means to
upgrade the analytical capability of the entire aerospace industry. The
program eventually came to be known as NASTRAN. There were many
people within NASA who thought this was a bad idea and voiced their
displeasure toward the project. Against the voices of detractors, Rosche and
Michel agreed to fund development of the program, based on the committee
recommendation. An announcement of opportunity was released.
Although MSC was considered to be too small at the time of the
bidding for the large NASTRAN contract, Dick MacNeal sought out a
partnership with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) in order to have a
better chance of competing. According to Phil Raney, the eventual manager
of the NASTRAN office for NASA, CSC would not have gotten involved if it
were not for Dick MacNeal from MSC (Raney 1996). The strategy worked.
The CSC/MSC team won one of two Phase I bids for preparation of a
Technical Evaluation Report. The Phase I bid award was for $83,000.
Approximately $30,000 of this award was received by MSC (MacNeal p. 45,
1988).
Then in 1966 when the Phase II proposal was announced, the
CSC/MSC teams proposal was selected to develop the NASTRAN code. The
contract was worth $1,000,000, of which MSC eventually received $635,000.
During the project, MSC was able to develop strong in-house expertise with
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the code, and consequently, was able to secure other commercial contracts
relating to NASTRAN (MacNeal p. 56, 1988).
MSC's ability to secure both the Phase I and Phase II bids was incredible
considering the size and historical background of their competition. During
the Phase I proposal MSC had to compete against most of the large aerospace
corporations, including monolithic Boeing. During Phase II, MSC was able to
win by beating out Douglas, the other Phase I winner. Dick MacNeal's
tenacity and aggressive nature was the key to securing the contracts. He did
not let bigger, better equipped competition intimidate him.
Much of the development work for NASTRAN was performed outside
the gates of NASA Langley in Hampton, Virginia. Although the contract
monitor, Tom Butler, was located at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center,
agency expertise in structural analysis resided at NASA Langley. MSC and its
partner, CSC, set up an office outside the gates of NASA Langley in order to
work closer with Langley personnel. Eventually, the Goddard Space Flight
Center management decided not to support the program and guidance was
transferred to NASA Langley where Phil Raney was selected to head the
NASTRAN Systems Management Office.
In 1969 the development contract for NASTRAN ran out and in 1970
NASA decided to award a maintenance contract for NASTRAN. Phil Raney,
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as the NASTRAN Systems Management Office head, selected MSC as
contractor for the maintenance contract. Again, this was against the wishes of
some higher level managers. Phil Raney said that he awarded MSC the
contract because they saw it as their lifeblood and were committed to its
success even though they were still a small company with limited resources.
Phil Raney was impressed with the commitment of MSC. According to
Raney, Dick MacNeal believed in the commercial potential of NASTRAN so
much that he mortgaged his house and car for funds when the company was
having financial difficulty (Raney 1996).
At the same time the maintenance contract was released, NASA
released a contract for development of new elements to include in the
NASTRAN code. The contract for the element development was awarded to
Bell Aerospace, against the better judgment of Phil Raney. Phil Raney said
that MSC had better expertise in element development, but he gave into
upper management wishes and awarded the contract to Bell Aerospace.
According to Phil Raney and Dick MacNeal, much of Bell Aerospace's work
had to be redone because of the poor quality, and was redone by MacNeal at
no cost (Raney 1996; MacNeal 1988).
In a recent interview, Raney still recalled the problems he had with
upper management's support. Most upper managers were afraid that NASA
was marketing NASTRAN too hard and was treading in an area not fit for
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government agencies. When Raney received a letter from Grant Hedrick,
Vice President of Engineering at Grumman, stating that Grumman decided to
use NASTRAN for all of its engineering work as opposed to incurring the
cost of developing its own code, Raney's supervisor believed that Hendricks
had written the letter only of Raney's instigation. Raney stated this was
ludicrous, since no vice president of a multi-million dollar company would
do something like that simply at the behest of a government employee. In
another meeting, one of the upper managers stated flatly that no industry was
using NASTRAN. Phil Raney said he showed the manager and the rest of
the group a letter from GM and a letter from Ford stating their pleasure with
having received NASTRAN and their utilization of the product. According
to Raney, the manager continued the meeting as if he had never said a thing
(Raney 1996).
When the maintenance contract was eventually given to CSC in 1973,
MSC reached another watershed in its development. At this point, MSC felt
as if it had been the driving force behind NASTRAN and it were being treated
poorly. MSC saw no commitment from NASA and in turn decided it owed
no loyalty back. In order to maintain its revenue streams, MSC initiated
consultations with private industry for installation of NASTRAN, and
continued the development of the code by adding capabilities for other
commercial customers. By this time there were 18 employees in MSC. The
NASA-owned product, NASTRAN, was then available for public release
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through the COSMIC Distribution Center (a federally funded entity) located at
the University of Georgia for a price of $1750 (MacNeal 1995).
In 1971, Dick MacNeal decided to offer a MSC version of NASTRAN
called MSC/NASTRAN to the public on a lease basis. This was a bold move,
but one that MacNeal was willing to risk. The MSC/NASTRAN version was
based on the contract work that MSC had with NASA and modifications it
made. The gamble paid off and over the next several years income from the
leasing of MSC/NASTRAN grew at an annual rate of fifty percent (50%)
(Figure 4.24).
In the 1980s, NASA sued MSC over the intellectual property rights of
NASTRAN. MSC claimed its version, MSC/NASTRAN, was significantly
different from the original NASTRAN. Essentially, the result of the legal
actions ended in victory for MSC, and it was able to continue marketing its
version. Once the lawsuit was resolved, MSC was able to concentrate its full
energies on expanding its market base. MSC success grew so that on May 5,
1983, the company went public with an initial offering of stock at $23.00 per
share. The stock closed that same day at $36.75 per share (MacNeal p. 154,
1988). Since that time MSC/NASTRAN has become an industry standard for
finite-element analysis, and an economic success with sales revenues of over
$100M per annum.
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Tom Butler, the NASA contract monitor for many years was identified
by both NASA and MSC individuals as one of the "internal champions." He
attributed the technical and commercial success of MSC/NASTRAN to two
elements:
1. Fortuitousness that many of the key element were in the right place
at the right time.
2. A critical mass of individuals without whom success would never
have occurred.
With respect to fortuitousness, Tom Butler said:
Much of the success of NASTRAN depended on the necessary
ingredients. The times were right, the ability to get funding was right,
the research activity in aerospace was right, the computer technology
was right, and the finite-element theory was right (Butler 1971, via
MacNeal p. 123, 1988).
Butler recognized the value of both internal and external champions
and felt obligated to credit their work in a technical paper. Butler's
description of those individuals as "mavericks" is similar to that of the
champion. Butler wrote:
Seven people also created the critical mass, the absence of any one of
whom would have caused the whole enterprise to collapse. They are
Dr. Paul R. Peabody, for his fundamental system design; Dr. Richard H.
MacNeal, for the theoretical cohesiveness of the structural mechanics;
Prof. C. W. McCormack, for the melding of the disciplines into a
workable unity; Keith H. Redner, for the forging of a quality of
excellence into the programming; Thomas B. Butler, who kept things
moving; and Melvin Rosche and Douglas Michel, who were the
NASA Headquarters benefactors who sensed the timeliness and the
importance of the program. There was an uncanny uniformity about
all of these necessary people. Each had earned the label of maverick
from his individual peers. Yet when thrown together these mavericks
won each others' respect and solidified under this banner. Each
devoted his energies in unbelievably tireless fervor. Each succumbed
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to selfless involvement. Each became indelibly identified with
NASTRAN. This team was the crux of the management. They were
not the types to be managed; they managed the program in a bond of
mutual pride (Butler 1971 via MacNeal p. 124, 1988).
According to MacNeal the success of the company was attributable to
two key element:
1. The capital investment of NASA into the development of the
software code NASTRAN.
2. The key individuals who championed its cause.
Regarding the capital investment from NASA, MacNeal had this to say
in his book:
Viewed in retrospect, the company's success was a direct consequence
of NASA's decision to fund the development of NASTRAN." "....It
illustrates the legitimate role of government in providing seed money
for an infant industry (MacNeal p. iii, 1988; see also Figure 4.24).
MacNeal estimated the cost to develop NASTRAN at approximately
$3M dollars, of which $1M came from government contracts (MacNeal p. 57,
1988). Considering the $100M of annual sales in 1995 by MSC, this was a
successful commercialization, even if unintended by NASA.
MacNeal had much more to say about the role of the key individuals.
Although MSC had its problems with NASA, MacNeal still recognized the
valuable role of key individuals within the agency who championed the
cause. Tom Butler, the NASA contract monitor for so many years, was called
the "father of NASTRAN" by MacNeal. MacNeal said about Butler:
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Comparison of NASTRAN and
MSC/NASTRAN Development and
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Figure 4.24: Comparison of NASTRAN and MSC/NASTRAN Development
and Maintenance Costs with MSC/NASTRAN Revenues (MacNeal p. 161,
1988)
He possessed a dedicated determinism and a rare idealism, both of
which would be tested again and again in defense of the ideas
embodied in the project (MacNeal p. 40, 1988) ... In truth, many people
contributed mightily to the development of NASTRAN, but if I were
asked to say who contributed the most, I would select Tom Butler. It
was his vision that conceived the project and it was his strength of
character that guided it through difficult days to its public debut.
Others may have made greater technical contributions to NASTRAN,
but without him it never would have been (MacNeal p. 58, 1988).
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Phil Raney, head of the NASTRAN Systems Management Office, cited
the dedication, devotion, and single-mindedness of both the NASA people
involved and Dick MacNeal. He felt that without anyone of the following
people, that MSC/NASTRAN would not be the commercial success it is
today:
1. Mel Rosche and Doug Michel for their financial support.
2. Tom Butler for his helmsmanship.
3. Phil Raney for overcoming internal detractors and steering the
contracts and NASTRAN the right way.
4. Dick MacNeal for incredible determination.
Ronnie Gillian, a current NASA Langley employee who originally
helped develop NASTRAN as a former CSC employee during the 1960s and
later oversaw development of NASTRAN within NASA Langley, stressed
that one of the key elements to the commercialization of MSC/NASTRAN
was Dick MacNeal (Gillian 1996).
Summary of Findings for MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation
In this particular case, there was no initial foresight by the federal
laboratory (NASA Langley) to privately commercialize the product. The goal
was to provide the aerospace industry with a much needed tool. In fact, the
lawsuit that ensued might have stopped the commercialization. The efforts
of the champions or mavericks, as Butler referred to them, appeared to make
the difference.
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According to the testimony of MacNeal, the crucial element at the
input level was research dollars; and the crucial element at the intermediate
level was the internal champion. MacNeal implied that the crucial
contribution of NASA as an agency was the infusion of capital to fund the
project and the efforts of Tom Butler to champion the process.
Phil Raney and Ronnie Gillian also recognized the importance of the
individuals in the process.
I Input Metrics IResearch Dollars Invested
I
Interm ediate Metrics
Internal Champions
(Mel Rosche, Doug Michel, Tom Butler, Phil Raney)
External Champion
(Dick MacNeal)
Outcom e Metrics
New Product
New Commercial Sales
New Com m ercial Custom ers
Figure 4.25: MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation Case Study Key Critical
Elements as Metrics
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Pressure Systems Incorporated
Pressure Systems Incorporated (PSI) develops, manufactures, markets,
and services pressure measurement instrumentation for aerospace and
industrial measurement applications. The company is headquartered in
Hampton, Virginia, just outside the main gates of NASA Langley.
In the 1970s, NASA was designing a National Transonic Facility (NTF)
wind tunnel. This wind tunnel would have unique characteristics over the
existing wind tunnels. The Government Accounting Office (GAO), which
has oversight on the construction of any new facilities for federal agencies,
deemed the predicted operations cost for the NTF to be too high. Specifically,
the acquisition of pressure measurements was exorbitant in cost. The GAO
would only agree to approve the construction of the facility if the pressure
measurement issue could be solved.
The Instrumentation Research Division (IRD) at NASA Langley took
up the challenge of designing a new pressure measurement device. It was at
this time that Doug Juanarena was recruited by NASA Langley to work on the
project. Doug Juanarena graduated from Virginia Tech in 1975 in Electrical
Engineering and joined NASA Langley in the IRD to help develop the
pressure sensor. The IRD was able to develop a electron pressure scanner that
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was between 100 to 1000 times faster than conventional measuring techniques
at that time and met the cost requirements of the GAO.
During sensor development, NASA Langley had enough vision to
recognize that it would need a manufacturer for the pressure sensor and
worked cooperatively with a pressure sensor firm in California. NASA
Langley was prepared to give the firm licensing rights along with the manual
that it had developed. However, the firm decided not to take advantage of
the opportunity, feeling it was not a good financial decision.
When NASA was left with no manufacturer for the pressure sensor,
Doug Juanarena formed a private company (Pressure Systems Incorporated)
in 1977 to produce the sensors. NASA agreed to license the sensor technology
to Pressure Systems Incorporated on a nonexclusive basis. In 1978, Doug
Juanarena left NASA to work full time at Pressure Systems Incorporated.
Pressure Systems Incorporated became a very successful commercial entity,
supplying pressure sensors worldwide.
Doug Juanarena estimates his company sales are now at the level of
$10M per year. Pressure Systems Incorporated exports to over 20 foreign
nations. In one recent year, approximately 40 percent of the fiscal revenues
were derived from export sales. Pressure Systems Incorporated customers
include some of the largest manufacturing companies in the world (Table
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4.4). The companies range from aerospace, aeronautics, and automotive to
heavy machinery.
In 1984, the magazine Inc. selected Pressure Systems Incorporated as
one of the 500 fastest growing companies in America. In 1988, Pressure
Systems Incorporated was named Virginia's Exporter of the Year by the
United States Department of Commerce; and in 1991 was presented the US
Table 4.4: Customers of Pressure Systems Incorporated
Customers of PSI
Fisher Controls
Westinghouse
ABB
Pratt and Whitney
Teledyne
Honda
Garrett Turbines B M W
McDonnell Dou_;las
Toshiba
Nuovo Pi_none
Mercedes
Chrysler
General Electric
Caterpillar
Ford
General Motors
Cessna
Eastman Kodak
Volvo
ONERA Lockheed
Boeing; Schwitzer
Ferrari
Cooper Industries
DLR
Aerospatiale
Rolls Royce
ETW
NASA Union Carbide
President's "E" Award, designed to give special recognition to companies
which have excelled in exporting.
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In an interview with Doug Juanarena, he considered Pressure Systems
Incorporated to be a classical case of technology transfer and felt that the key
was the "combination of a technology and a champion." Doug Juanarena felt
that NASA Langley was instrumental in the process by recognizing a "real
world" need, funding the necessary research, and not stopping at theory but
forging on to a practical prototype and working model. In addition,
Juanarena saw NASA Langley's interest in grooming a manufacturer and
working closely with that manufacturer as a positive step.
Summary of Findings for Pressure Systems Incorporated
In the Pressure Systems Incorporated case the internal champion and
external champions were the same person. Doug Juanarena championed the
development of the device while at NASA Langley and then created Pressure
Systems Incorporated and championed commercial development of the
pressure sensor. NASA Langley eased the transition of the technology from
the laboratory by extending the research and creating practical prototypes.
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Input Metrics
Government Funding
I
Interm ediate Metrics
Internal Champions
External Champion
Equivalent Technology
License
I
Outcome Metrics
Jobs Created
New Product
New Commercial Sales
New Com m ercial Custom ers
Figure 4.26: Pressure Systems Incorporated Study Key Critical Elements as
Metrics
T4cnico
T6cnico is a privately-owned ship repair company located in
Chesapeake, Virginia. T6cnico was incorporated in 1991 and classified as a
small business (SBA 8(a)) in October 1992. This was an advantage for T6cnico,
since some US government contract work is restricted to companies classified
as small businesses or small, disadvantaged businesses. Most of T6cnico's
business was in the area of structural welding, piping, electrical, painting,
rigging, blasting and dry-dock work. In addition, T6cnico also offered
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shipboard furniture fabrication, sheet metal fabrications and extensive
welding capabilities. The company included approximately 225 employees
and was heavily dependent upon Department of Defense contracts for
military ship repair (Hildebrandt 1996).
In 1993, T6cnico was invited by Loral Vought, a company located in
Texas, to investigate the possibility of producing the mid-body section for a
PAC-3 missile. The PAC-3 missile is an extended-range interceptor which
was to be incorporated into the Patriot PAC-3 system. The initial contact
between T6cnico and Loral Vought was made by John Hildebrandt, a manager
at T6cnico, who was doing a market scan for other potential applications of
T6cnico's expertise. Due to the probability of Navy funding cutbacks, T6cnico
started to look for other potential markets to enter and diversify its services.
The alignment with Loral Vought made sense, but this required T6cnico to
produce composite material parts and the startup cost of getting into
composite material production was prohibitively high (Hildebrandt 1996).
Simultaneously, Hildebrandt performed a market scan that led him to
visit a technology exhibit at NASA Langley in 1993. At the technology
exhibit, John Hildebrandt was introduced to a technique to produce composite
materials with a small capital investment. The technique, called rubber
expansion molding, held several advantages over conventional approaches
to composite material production (Table 4.5). One of the most important
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Table 4.5: Comparison of Traditional Process and Rubber Expansion Molding
Process for Production of Composite Materials
Traditional Processes
Filament Windin_ Process
Voids will occur
Limited confi_uration of parts
Slow process
Computer controlled
Autoclave Process
Expensive to operate
Lon8 time to heat/pressurize
High material costs
Many inherent problems due to
induced pressurization and heat
Requires hishly trained personnel
Rubber Expansion Molding
Reduced manufacturin_ costs
Lower labor costs
No filament winding required
No autoclave required
Any furnace could work (300 deg. F)
Very easy to co-locate production
facilities
Far superior surface finish
More complex shapes possible
Much higher quality products
distinctions between traditional processes and the rubber expansion molding
process was the capital investment cost. Hildebrandt said his capital
investment requirement in equipment was cut from $2M to $20,000 by
selecting to utilize the rubber expansion molding process (Hildebrandt 1996).
T6cnico developed a close working relationship with NASA Langley to
better understand the process of rubber expansion molding. On August 8,
1994, T6cnico signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with NASA
Langley to jointly explore taking the technology from the laboratory situation
into a production facility. Based on the positive outcome of that cooperative
venture, T6cnico signed an exclusive licensing agreement. T6cnico felt that
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the combination of the MOA and the license created a long-term relationship
and allowed for joint effort on a variety of research and development
projects.
Using the rubber molding technique, T6cnico secured a contract from
Loral Vought. In addition, the technique lead to a contract with IMO, a
submarine outfitter. In the IMO contract, T6cnico was able to construct a
manway cover out of graphite using the rubber expansion molding
technique. This graphite manway cover (21.5 lbs) constituted a order of
magnitude of weight savings from the conventional titanium manway cover
(220 lbs). Weight savings on submarines are critical and the US Navy is
looking to utilize more of these types of creative solutions.
The new commercial activity created by the adoption of the rubber
expansion molding technique lead T6cnico to create a new group within the
company called the Advanced Materials Group. The technology transfer with
NASA resulted in a new production methodology and created new
commercial customers and jobs. Since May of 1995, T6cnico has hired eight
skilled persons (engineers, technicians) into the Advanced Materials Group
and has received over $800,000 in revenues (Hildebrandt 1996).
Greg Manuel, one of the two NASA Langley technology transfer agents
responsible for facilitating the transfer of the rubber expansion molding
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technique from NASA Langley to T6cnico, attributed the success of the project
to the "champions" (his word). Greg Manuel thought that the commercial
success never would have occurred without T6cnico manager John
Hildebrandt (Manuel 1996).
Barry Gibbens, the other NASA Langley technology transfer agent
involved in the T6cnico project, claimed that the success was due to the small
capital investment that was required to utilize the technology and, again, to
the effort of John Hildebrandt (Gibbens 1996).
Bob Baucom, the lead NASA researcher in developing the rubber
expansion molding technique, felt that there were two crucial reasons for the
success (Baucom 1996):
.
2.
The technology was easily transferable into a commercial product.
The technology showcase exhibit which NASA Langley held
resulted in bringing together the researcher (Bob Baucom) and the
private industry (John Hildebrandt of T6cnico).
In a lengthy interview with John Hildebrandt, he stated three crucial
reasons for the commercial success of this technology transfer:
1. T6cnico made a commitment to commercializing the technology.
2. The support of the NASA Langley researchers was critical. The
technical support by the NASA researchers was an emotional
support in addition to NASA's belief in the possible success of this
technology made believers of T6cnico and its customers.
3. Bob Baucom, was credited with being a catalyst with his excitement
toward performing technology transfer.
Summary of Findings for T6cnico
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Two of the principals in this case identified the ease of adaptability of
the technology from laboratory to production facility as a crucial element.
Also, two of the principals recognized the role of the champions, both
internal (Bob Baucom) and external (John Hildebrandt) to the success of the
technology transfer. In addition, a patent and a license agreement existed in
this technology transfer project and two NASA Langley technology transfer
agents worked to help pave through the legal ends of the transfer elements
between NASA and the private sector. The NASA Langley technology
showcase exhibit was recognized by several persons as the key mechanism for
creating awareness of the technology. T6cnico felt that the support from the
NASA researchers was crucial.
The evidence in this case suggests that there were two categories of
crucial elements: champions and technology transfer mechanisms (Figure
4.27). The mechanisms for technology transfer included the technology
showcase exhibit, the patent and the licensing agreement, and the two
technology transfer agents. All but the technology transfer agents could be
classified as intermediate metrics. The transfer agents could be classified as
input metrics.
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Input Metrics
Technology Transfer Agents
I
Interm ediate Metrics
Internal Champions
(Bob Baucom)
External Champion
(John Hildebrandt)
Technology exhibit
Research Support
Equivalent Technology
Patent
License
Figure 4.27:
Outcome Metrics
Jobs Created
New Production Technique
New Commercial Sales
New Commercial Customers
Tdcnico Case Study Key Critical Elements as Metrics
Summary of Results for Case Studies
In retrospect, the order of cases represents the changing approach to
technology transfer by NASA. In the MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation case
there was a reluctance by many individuals within the NASA to allow
MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation to commercialize the NASTRAN product.
Fortunately there were also a few individuals who had the vision to see the
commercial potential and broke through management barriers. In the
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Pressure Systems Incorporated case, an individual NASA researcher saw the
potential for commercialization and, with the concurrence of NASA, left his
position and created the successful Pressure Systems Incorporated. In the
final case, a technology exhibit sponsored by NASA Langley brought the
laboratory and private sector together. Then the actions of technology
transfer agents to reach agreements on cooperation and licensing, along with
the efforts of the NASA researcher and a T6cnico representative, made this
effort a success. The three cases thus illustrate a progression by NASA from
hindrance, to concurrence, to a proactive stance on technology transfer.
While each case was distinct from the perspective of the transfer
methodology, the common element contributing to the success in all three
cases was the presence of (internal and external) champions (Figure 4.28). In
two cases, government funding, equivalent technology and a license were
also mentioned as keys (Figure 4.28). A closer analysis of these cases reveals
that champions, early government funding, equivalent technology, and
licenses were the crucial elements to successful technology transfer (Figure
4.29).
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Input Metrics
Government Funding
I
Intermediate Metrics
Internal Champions
External Champion
Equivalent Technology
License
I
Outcom e Metrics
Jobs Created
New Product
New Production Technique
New Commercial Sales
New Commercial Custom ers
Figure 4.29: Common Key Critical Element for the Three Case Studies as
Metrics
Summary of Hypotheses
The findings of the survey and case studies were used to evaluate the
12 hypotheses. Each hypothesis with the conclusions, that the survey data or
case studies support, are presented below. The hypotheses have been
separated into two sections, Survey Hypotheses (H(1) to H(10)) and Case Study
Hypotheses (H(11) to H(12)). The boldface hypothesis in each null/alternative
hypothesis pairing is the hypothesis that was supported.
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Survey Hypotheses
According to survey respondents, only 36% had ever had technology
transfer on their performance plan or performance appraisal. This was not
considered to be widespread use of the performance plan and performance
appraisal for technology transfer. Null hypothesis one is rejected and
alternative hypothesis one is accepted.
H(1) ,un Technology transfer as a component of the performance plan
and performance appraisal was widespread at NASA Langley Research
Center.
H(1) Technology transfer as a component of the performance plan
and performance appraisal was minimal at NASA Langley Research
Center.
Over ninety percent (90%) of the 100 researchers surveyed were aware
that technology transfer was a mission objective of NASA and ninety-five
percent (95%) were aware that technology transfer was a mission of NASA
Langley. Null hypothesis two could not be rejected and was accepted.
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H(2)nu n Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are aware of the
technology transfer policies of the agency and the Center.
H(2) Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are not aware of
technology transfer policies of the agency and the Center.
The technology transfer mechanism identified by the most researchers
(42% of respondents) was publications. Less than thirteen (13%) identified
any of the formal mechanisms of technology transfer. Patents, as a
mechanism of technology transfer, were identified by only six percent (6%) of
the respondents. Licensing was mentioned by two percent (2%), which was a
smaller percentage than those who responded with "Don't know."
Sixty percent of the respondents could identify the name of the group
(Technology Applications Group) at NASA Langley Research Center
responsible for technology transfer. However, eighty-five percent (85%) could
not identify their division representative to the Technology Council which
interfaced on their behalf with the Technology Applications Group. Null
hypothesis three was rejected on the basis of these results and alternative
hypothesis three accepted.
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H(3) ._uResearchers at NASA Langley Research Center are aware of the
technology transfer points of contact and technology transfer
mechanisms.
H(3) Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center are minimally
aware of the technology transfer points of contact and technology
transfer mechanisms.
A series of questions aimed at measuring the researchers' attitude
towards performing technology transfer were included in the survey. Each
question progressively indicated more responsibility and accountability for
the researcher. The results of the questions clearly showed that the
researchers thought technology transfer should be performed, but they did
not want to be held personally accountable or responsible. The null
hypothesis is rejected based on the findings and the alternative hypothesis
accepted.
H(4),uu Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center want to be
responsible or accountable for technology transfer.
H(4) Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center do not want to be
responsible or accountable for technology transfer.
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Researchers at the highest education level (PhD) were, in general, less
aware of the technology transfer commitment of NASA and the Center. The
percentage of PhDs incorrectly estimating the resources allocated to
technology transfer was twice that of the MS respondents and three times that
of the BS respondents. Null hypothesis five is rejected and alternative
hypothesis five is accepted.
H(5)nu. Researcher awareness of technology transfer is not linked to
educational level.
H(5) Researcher awareness of technology transfer is linked to
educational level.
There is almost a linear progression from BS through MS to PhD in the
percentage of respondents who believe their research has potential for
technology transfer. The PhDs also significantly differed from the profile of
the BS and MS respondents when asked if they have been adequately
prepared. The results indicate that there were differences in perception. Null
hypothesis six is rejected and alternative hypothesis six is accepted.
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H(6)nuU Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is not linked
to educational levels.
H(6) Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is linked to
educational levels.
No significant relationships were found between education level and
attitude. Null hypothesis seven could not be rejected and is retained.
H(7)nu . Researcher attitudes about technology transfer is not linked to
educational levels.
H(7) Researcher attitudes about technology transfer is linked to
educational levels.
No significant correlations were found between researcher age and
awareness about technology transfer. Null hypothesis eight could not be
rejected and is retained.
H(8)n_. Researcher awareness about technology transfer is not linked to
age.
H(8) Researcher awareness about technology transfer is linked to age.
A strong correlation between age and attitude was found. The older
the respondent the less likely they were to agree to perform technology
transfer if it were part of the promotion process. Null hypothesis nine is
rejected and alternative hypothesis nine is accepted.
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H(9)nu_ _ Researcher attitudes about technology transfer is not linked to
age.
H(9) Researcher attitudes about technology transfer is linked to age.
Correlations between age and perception were found. As age of the
researcher increased, the researchers were less positive of management's
support and were less positive about their own ability to perform technology
transfer. Null hypothesis 10 is rejected and alternative hypothesis 10 is
accepted.
H(10)nun Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is not linked
to age.
H(10) Researcher perceptions about technology transfer is linked to
age,
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Case Study Hypotheses
Champions were recognized as a key critical component in each of the
three case studies. This was the single most crucial element identified in all
three cases. Based on this evidence, the null hypothesis was rejected and the
alternative hypothesis was accepted.
H(ll)nuH Success in technology transfer activities is not dependent upon
individuals who take responsibility for the process and act as
champions.
H(11) Success in technology transfer activities is dependent upon
individuals who take responsibility for the process and act as
champions.
In the case studies, four crucial elements were identified. These
elements aligned with the input and intermediate metric categories. The four
crucial elements were internal champions, external champion, government
funding, and equivalent technology. The identification of these elements
were different from those identified in previous studies on measures of
technology transfer (see Chapter II, Literature Review). Therefore, there
appears to be key elements which provide the linkage between the input and
intermediate metrics and contribute to the success of the technology transfer.
Based on these results, we can reject the null hypothesis and retain the
alternative hypothesis.
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H(12)nuu Successful technology transfer activities (i.e. positive economic
impacts) are not linked with input metrics ($ spent, etc.) and
intermediate metrics (activities).
H(12) Successful technology transfer activities (i.e. positive economic
impacts) are linked with input metrics ($ spent, etc.) and intermediate
metrics (activities) through some as yet unidentified common
elements.
Summary
This chapter has presented the results of the technology transfer
cultural survey of NASA Langley Research Center researchers and the results
from three case studies of successful technology transfer. The 100 researchers
surveyed were found to have a minimum awareness and a guarded attitude
toward performing technology transfer. In the case studies, internal
champions, external champion, government funding, equivalent technology,
and licenses were found to be crucial elements leading to the success of a
technology transfer. The integration of the findings of these two studies and
possible reasons for these findings are discussed in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Introduction
Changes in the domestic US economy resulting from global economic
competition are causing the public and Congress to examine the methods in
which US federal laboratories operate. The reason for this study was the
recent debates surrounding and interest in Congress and federal agencies to
transfer federal laboratory-developed technologies to the commercial sector.
As a result of Congressional legislation and federal agency directives there is
more emphasis on technology transfer and on showing the relevance of the
federal research to the commercial sector. Agencies and their laboratories are
struggling with the issue of measuring their activities and achievements in
technology transfer. In addition, this technology transfer mission is a cultural
change for many laboratories and their researchers.
In this study the technology transfer culture of the researchers at one
federal laboratory (NASA Langley Research Center) was measured through a
survey. Specifically, researcher attitudes, awareness, and perceptions toward
technology transfer were measured. Without the willing participation of the
researchers the attempt to transfer technology could become difficult. The
results of this survey were intended to serve as a primary data point for
federal laboratory directors to gauge the culture of the researchers toward
technology transfer.
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Further, the key critical elements contributing to successful technology
transfers from NASA Langley Research Center to the commercial sector were
examined by completing a case study on each of three successful transfers.
The cases chosen had to satisfy some of the outcome metrics (new
commercial sales, new jobs, etc.) identified by previous studies. The history of
each case and the key critical elements leading to the success were
documented through interviews with the principals involved and historical
documents. The key critical elements for each of the cases, in terms of input
and intermediate metrics, were identified to find the linkage between the
three categories (input, intermediate, outcome) of technology transfer metrics.
In this chapter, the findings obtained in the study are discussed and
interpreted. Implications and recommendations for future research are
presented. In the following sections, the culture survey and case study
findings are separately examined.
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Culture Survey
This was the first documented study performed on survey federal
laboratory researchers and their existent culture toward technology transfer.
The results should be of much interest to federal laboratory directors, federal
agency directors, and technology transfer policy makers and researchers, and
Congressional leaders. The potential customers of this research may use the
results to help guide future technology transfer policy. Specifically, the
research is useful in identifying areas of potential improvement, personnel
preparedness and measures.
Results indicate that although researchers concur with current mission
directives for technology transfer, on a personal level they do not want to be
held accountable or responsible for technology transfer. The results also
indicated that the researchers were minimally aware of the emphasis
(dedicated resources) being placed on technology transfer by the laboratory
and the mechanisms by which to perform technology transfer.
The results of this study revealed that the researchers of NASA Langley
Research Center believed technology transfer should be a mission. However,
on an individual level, they did not believe it to be their responsibility or
desire it to be. The federal laboratory researcher attitudes toward technology
transfer has long suspected to be less than enthusiastic.
that belief.
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This study confirmed
Although researchers realized that technology transfer was a mission
of the NASA agency and of the NASA Langley Research Center, they were
woefully uninformed of the mechanisms of technology transfer and only
minimally aware of the appropriate personnel to contact. When asked to
identify the mechanism they would use to transfer their technology, the
single largest response (40%) was publications. The second largest response
was to contact the Technology Applications Group (only 20%). Licensing,
which was identified in two out of the three case studies as a key critical
element, was identified by only 2% of the researchers.
A major interest in this study was the correlation of the researcher
perceptions and awareness to education levels. In comparing the three
education categories (BS, MS, PhD) those respondents with PhDs had the
highest percentage who believed they were prepared to perform technology
transfer. In contrast, the PhDs also had the lowest percentage of correct
responses to one measure of their awareness of technology transfer policies
(percent of resources spent on technology transfer).
In general, the conclusion to be drawn from the cultural survey of
researchers was that the culture to support widespread technology transfer
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from a federal laboratory (NASA Langley) to the commercial sector does not
currently exist. Further education, training, and cultural change must occur
before technology transfer can truly become a supported mission. Or,
alternately, technology transfer may be dropped as a explicit agency mission.
Case Studies
A review of previous studies of technology transfer metrics revealed a
common categorization of metrics, with most studies identifying three
categories: inputs, intermediates, and outcomes. Each category had particular
metrics associated with it. The case studies performed in this study revealed
that there were other variables with greater influence on the success of
technology transfer than those previously mentioned.
Three cases were selected based on successful commercialization
(outcome) metrics. Key individuals within each case were interviewed to
identify the crucial elements leading to the successful technology transfer.
These elements were then categorized as input/intermediate/outcome
metrics. Success in the three cases was attributed to four key critical elements:
champions (both internal and external), early government research funding,
equivalent technology, and licensing.
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Within all the quantifiable variables of the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM) study, licensing was the best predictor (highest
correlation) of royalties (Table 2.14). Results from the case studies and the
AUTM data indicated that the best quantifiable metric was the number of
licensing agreements. Since license agreements were the only intermediate
metric that was dependent upon a market interest, this stands to reason as a
good (quantitative) indicator of commercial success.
Other crucial elements that were identified in this study (champions,
equivalent technology, and early government research funding) were not
easily measured (qualitative) metrics. These elements may be better thought
of as goals for the federal laboratories to achieve, with successful technology
transfer to occur following their installment.
A study performed by Battelle Columbus Laboratories confirms the
findings of this study that champions and early government funding play a
major role in technology commercialization. In the Battelle study, the key
factors and decisive events in the course of ten major twentieth-century
technological innovations were identified. The following two quotes
summarize the major findings of the Battelle study:
The technical entrepreneur was important to nine of ten innovations.
In three cases this champion persisted despite unfavorable market
analysis (Battelle Columbus Laboratories p. 3-2, 1973).
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Government funding was instrumental in directly supporting seven of
these innovations (Battelle Columbus Laboratories p. 3-2, 1973).
Equivalent technology was found to be one of the crucial items in two
of the three case studies. An equivalent technology is one in which the
technology readiness level can be characterized as at a prototype stage or
greater. It is a technology in which the company receiving the technology
does not have to perform a significant amount of work to obtain a
functioning product. These results are supported by a study, performed by
Gibson and Smilor, in which low equivocality was determined to be one of
four variables central to technology transfer success within and between
organizations. Equivocality is defined by previous studies (Technology
Transfer in Consortia and Strategic Alliances 1992) as the level of concreteness
of the technology to be transferred. A low equivocality rating for a technology
indicates it is unambiguous, and is fairly easy to demonstrate and understand
(Gibson and Smilor 1991). Highly equivocal technology is characterized as
more ambiguous in its potential applications.
In this study, the only quantitative element identified as a crucial
element for technology transfer success was licensing (two of three cases).
Most federal agencies and laboratories currently measure the number of
licenses generated per year. This is an easily tracked metric and may be the
best quantifiable metric of all the intermediate metrics identified. A license
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agreement occurs only when a commercial entity is willing to pay in either
upfront feesor royalties or both for the right to use the intellectual property
protected by a patent. In short, a license agreement is a strictly free-market,
capitalistic tool. The commercial sector (buyer) believes he or she can make
money on this agreement.
Comparison of Culture Survey and Case Studies
The results of the cultural survey and the case studies taken together
revealed a disconnect in the elements of a success and the resources available
for success. The case studies revealed the internal champion as a key critical
element. The results of the survey revealed that although the researchers feel
technology transfer should be a mission of the NASA Agency and the NASA
Langley Research Center, they do not want to be held personally responsible
for technology transfer (Figure 5.1). There is a disconnect in these two results
and it would appear that enacting technology transfer with a majority of the
researchers may be problematic.
I Case Study Finding [__Internal Champion
Necessary
Surv ey Finding
Researchers Desire No
Personal Responsibility
Figure 5.1: Comparison of Findings Regarding Researcher Role in
Technology Transfer from the Case Studies and the Survey
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In addition, almost two thirds (62%) of researchers said they would put
more effort toward technology transfer if it were a component of the
promotional process. But this overwhelming response is based on the
reward system and not a personal interest, since only one third (31%) said
they thought technology transfer should be a component of the promotion
process. It is unclear whether those who would perform technology transfer
because it was mandatory for promotions would fit the characteristics (or
attributes) of being a champion or just an accomodator.
Currently, there is no formally stated policy on how to achieve a ten
percent (10%) expenditure for the technology transfer mission at NASA
Langley. One recommendation would be not to target the individual
researchers, but the entire research laboratory. However, to help ensure a ten
percent (10%) effort, education and training courses would, as a minimum,
need to be put into place. Under such an approach, some researchers will
have a natural affinity and interest in technology transfer and spend a large
amount of time and energy on it. Other researchers will have no interest and
spend little to no time on it. The end result may be an average research
laboratory expenditure of ten percent (10%) of its resources on technology
transfer. The key issue then becomes how to manage the funding of
technology transfer across a research center provided this is retained as an
explicit mission of the federal agency.
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Licensing was identified by only 2% of the researchers as a
mechanism they would use to transfer a technology. In two of the three case
studies of successful technology transfer, a license was involved and was a key
mechanism in the transfer of the technology. The case study results were
aligned with those of the AUTM data analysis. In the AUTM data analysis,
the strongest correlation to royalties came from licensing (Table 2.14). The
lack of connectiveness between the survey and case studies on what
mechanisms are necessary for instituting technology transfer raises concern
over the preparedness of researchers to engage in successful technology
transfer.
Conclusions and Recommendations
An awareness of the culture of federal laboratory researchers and the
crucial elements of technology transfer success can assist laboratory directors,
federal agency directors, and Congress in their technology transfer policy
decisions. In this study, the culture of federal laboratory researchers is
measured from three different aspects: awareness, attitude, and perception. In
addition, case studies were performed to identify key critical elements leading
to success. The practical implications of this study and recommendations for
future studies follows. Recommendations are presented at two levels:
1. Recommendations for furthering studies at NASA Langley, and
2. Recommendations for expanding the scope to other Federal
laboratories.
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Practical Implications
In the contemporary era of rhetoric and worries about global economic
competition, technology development and commercialization are commonly
asserted to play vital roles to the economic well-being of nation-states. The
US's dominant role in technology and economic wealth has diminished. The
challenge for the US and its policy makers is to optimize the utilization of
resources. With respect to federal laboratories, there is increasing interest in
showing or at least rhetorically affirming relevancy, and to move toward
purposive research and to ultimately realize economic windfalls from the
investment in federal laboratories. This equates to a cultural change in policy
for federal laboratories as well as for the individuals working there. The
results of this study suggest that there may be several issues that need to be
addressed if the federal laboratories generally and NASA Langley specifically
are to better perform technology transfer and are to play a more significant
role in economic successes.
Technology Transfer Awareness of Researchers
The level of researcher awareness of technology transfer mechanisms
as measured from this study raises concern. Results indicated that many of
the 100 surveyed researchers had minimal understanding of how to perform
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technology transfer or how to protect intellectual property and create
economic success.
Recommendations:
1) Conduct further needs analysis on this issue and define gaps
between actual and intended levels of knowledge. Establish
training and education courses that address the defined gaps.
2) Other federal laboratories that maintain technology transfer as a
mission should evaluate their researchers. If deficiencies in
technology transfer are found, education on the mechanisms of
technology transfer for researchers should be incorporated into
employee development functions.
Technology Transfer Attitudes of Researchers
Researchers surveyed in this study felt that technology transfer should
be a mission of the laboratory (94% of respondents), but did not desire to be
held responsible for performing technology transfer. Less than 35% of the
researchers felt technology transfer should be a component of the
performance plan and appraisal and only 31% wanted technology transfer to
be a contributing component during the promotion process. In 1980 the
Stevenson-Wydler Act was passed with a Congressional mandate that efforts
to transfer technology be stated positively in laboratory job descriptions,
employee promotion policies, and evaluation of the job performance of
scientists and researchers in a laboratory.
Recommendations:
la) Investigate what percentage of the job descriptions, employee
promotion policies, and evaluation that are currently in place at the
Federal laboratory (NASA Langley) are aligned with the 1980
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Stevenson-Wydler Act mandate. Compare this percentage to that
found in this study. Assess reasons for lack of alignment.
2b) Assess managers on their awareness of the Stevenson-Wydler Act
and ways in which they are trying to implement it.
3a) Survey researchers at other Federal laboratories and examine these
laboratories to find the percentage of researchers with technology
transfer appearing as a component of their performance plan and
performance appraisal. Compare results to the results found in this
original study.
4b) Future research should examine whether the culture of researchers
is modifiable. If the researcher attitudes are inherent in the
psychological or institutional makeup, there may be little reason to
try to change it. On the other hand, perhaps external stimuli
(reward system based on performance plan and appraisal) can
change the culture.
Technology Transfer Perception of Researchers
The measured perception of researchers were contradicted by other
responses of the researchers. But perceptions are difficult to measure and
highly dependent upon the survey mechanism and terminologies used.
Recommendations:
1) Future studies should focus questions more specifically to each
perception issue being addressed. For example, when asking the
researchers if they received tangible support from their
management, they should also be required to identify what that
support was to ensure an accurate understanding of the question.
Overall Culture
The results of the survey defined a researcher culture that is aware of
the technology transfer mission, feels the agency should perform the mission,
but does not want to be held personally responsible and is not currently
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knowledgeable about the mechanisms to perform it. These may be indicators
of a larger problem stemming from a lack of management support,
understanding or education.
Recommendations:
la) Measure the Center's managers on what they perceive as their
responsibility in technology transfer, and the researchers' culture.
This research should compare the difference between the
management's perception and the researchers actual culture.
2b) Assess managers understanding of how to ensure successful
technology transfer and mechanisms of technology transfer. This
study may find that changes need to occur at other levels of the
organization.
Internal Champions
Internal champions were identified as a key critical element of the
technology transfer success in the three case studies.
Recommendations:
1) The Technology Applications Group should document each of its
successful cases of technology transfer. The documentation could be
multipurpose, including verifying the champion theory and
identifying the characteristics of the champion.
2) Future studies may be performed to identify the characteristics, or
attributes, of an internal champion and how those characteristics
might be developed or further enhanced in individuals.
External Champions
An external champion was identified as a crucial element of the
technology transfer success in the three case studies. From the case studies
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performed in this study, it appears that the smaller companies were more
"hungry" than the larger ones, and more willing to take risks.
Recommendations:
1) The Technology Applications Group should keep statistics on the
sizes of the companies and success rates to see if there are stronger
correlations with smaller or larger companies and successful
technology transfer. If it can characterize the traits of their typical
external champion in successful technology transfers this could
help in selecting future partners.
2) Collecting many federal laboratory technology transfer success cases
or tracking licenses may help to better characterize the attributes of
the external champions. This study might focus on measuring the
difference in success rates between small and large commercial
partners.
Equivalent Technology
In two of the three case studies, equivalent technology was identified as
crucial elements of the technology transfer success.
Recommendations:
1) Currently, the Technology Applications Group evaluates the
technology readiness level when doing assessments of technology.
A formal study identifying the minimum level (see
recommendation 2) of technology readiness level could help the
group determine a cutoff for technologies.
2) A significantly larger sample size of federal laboratory case studies
could better determine the level of technology readiness that is a
minimum for technology transfer success. Future studies could
also identify the median or mean level of technology readiness
level that leads to success.
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Licensing
In two of the three case studies, licensing was identified as an element
of the technology transfer success. Although licensing played a role in two of
the three cases, the case with the largest economic impact ($100M/yr.) did not
involve a license. The lack of a license in the MacNeal-Schwendler
Corporation case study is problematic, since the license is one of the few
quantitative metrics available to the laboratory.
Recommendations:
1)
2)
The Technology Applications Group should attempt to document
those cases in which cooperative research led to economic success
but where a license did not occur.
A compilation of case studies from federal laboratories might
determine what percentage of successes come from licensing and
what percentage from other mechanisms. In addition, these future
studies could identify the relative level of success of those cases
where a license was present versus those in which a license was not
present.
Early Government Funding
In two of the three case studies, early government funding was
identified as a key critical element of the technology transfer success.
Although little attention was given to this in the study, results indicate that
more attention should be given in future studies. Often government
involvement is welcomed in "market-failure" situations, that is, instances
184
where market driven (private, commercial) enterprises can not afford to fund
development and stay competitive.
Recommendations:
1) NASA Langley should obtain private industry input into the
direction of technology development early in the process in order to
identify potential partnering opportunities for economic success.
2) Studies should be performed to identify the best mechanism for
determining which technologies hold the best promise for
commercialization.
Topics for Future Research
In addition to the recommendations made above, topics are suggested
that may be of interest for future research in this field.
1. A future study might follow the same approach used in studying
the three case studies, while expanding the number of case studies
to further test hypotheses 11 and 12. In this study, the three cases
allowed the researcher to implement the open-ended interview
method on a small model basis. Lessons learned from this study
can be used to improve the technique and apply it to the larger
sample of case studies.
2. Using the survey instrument from this study, a survey could be
conducted with researchers at a few high-ranked and low-ranked
federal laboratories in terms of their technology transfer success.
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Results could then be compared to determine whether the culture
of researchers differs between those laboratories successful in
technology transfer and those that are not successful. And if so,
where are the significant differences?
The question, "What are the characteristics of an internal
champions?" could be further investigated. This is important in
terms of education and training for technology transfer.
Similarly, the question, "What are characteristics of external
champions?" could be investigated. Understanding may be
important in better assessing potential private partners to invest
federal personnel, time, and money.
Concluding Remarks
This review and analysis of technology transfer in a national
government laboratory necessarily assumes as its background a particular
socio-cultural history. The United States has, for most of the 20th century,
emphasized a heritage of individualist liberty and restricted governmental
initiatives in the commercial development of technology, although it has
also been widely assumed that federal support for science and engineering has
a largely beneficial spin off effect on the economy as a whole. Within such a
context the strong support of science and engineering coupled with a laissez
faire approach toward technology transfer activities that has been most
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characteristic of the post-World War II period appears to be a natural and
rational policy.
However, stimulated by a variety of societal and economic factors --
from the end of the Cold War to rising federal deficits and worries about
global competitiveness -- the issue of technology transfer has recently become
a topic of debate within the federal government, with spill over implications
for policies at the national laboratories. Although not all the factors that have
stimulated this debate and attempts to make technology transfer policy more
proactive are equally sound, it is nevertheless reasonable to reconsider the
issue within this framework.
Perhaps the largest issue challenging the proactive federal laboratory
technology transfer effort is the culture of the federal laboratory researcher.
Although most federal laboratories are creating new organizations to perform
technology transfer that include technology transfer agents, a critical link in
the transfer chain is still the researcher. Without a committed effort from
researchers the chance of technology transfer success is likely to be zero.
Within this study, the culture of researchers has been evaluated through a
survey. The survey results indicate that researchers believe technology
transfer is a mission of the laboratory and agency, but do not necessarily feel it
is their responsibility to perform it or desire to be accountable for it. In
addition, researchers appear to be poorly informed on the mechanisms and
policies concerning technology transfer. If federal laboratories are serious
about performing technology transfer, researcher education must be
considered.
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This study also included development and utilization of a process for
defining meaningful metrics. The process utilizes a portfolio approach with
both quantitative and qualitative variables. Evidence suggests that pure
quantitative measurements will underestimate the true value of technology
transfer efforts. These measurements should be used in conjunction with
other qualitative measurements for a portfolio approach. Quantitative
variables identified in this study include licenses, and royalties per license.
Qualitative variables include case studies that are comprehensive and
probing.
More specifically, licenses appear to have the strongest correlation of all
quantitative measures to economic impact (royalties). This is to be expected,
since the stream of intellectual property activities (patent application, patent
disclosure, etc.), with the exception of licenses, is internally driven.
Alternatively, licenses are market driven. Licenses only occur when there is
reasonable belief by an external organization that profits are possible. Of
course, the sole use of licensing as a metric for technology transfer would be
disastrous. If NASA were to generate many licenses that did not result in
revenue streams for private industry then they would actually be a detriment
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to the US economy by creating opportunity costs. Licensing must be used in
conjunction with a royalties per licensing ratio to ensure a true economic
impact.
Even so, case studies show that there exist economically successful
technology transfers that do not include licenses. Case studies should be
selected based on their economic success or failure. Principal individuals
involved in the attempted technology transfer should be interviewed, and
historical documents and financial statements reviewed. The case study
should trace the transfer effort back through the intermediate and input
stages of the process to identify crucial elements leading to either success or
failure. Compilation of many case studies can lead to a richer understanding
of the transfer process. Thus the portfolio approach with quantitative
variables (licenses, royalties/license) and the qualitative approach (case
studies) are recommended as guiding metrics for NASA.
Currently NASA senior management has strongly urged the creation
of success stories. An internal competition between NASA centers has
erupted to generate the most success stories. These success stories are short
descriptions of attempted technology transfers. Success in these stories do not
necessarily include economic success, and in most cases do not. It appears
that NASA is still using technology transfer as a public relations tool to sway
congressional votes on the regional impact of technology transfer. This is an
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understandable approach in the political world of federal agencies, but NASA
should show higher integrity by not misrepresenting its activities and
overselling itself. NASA has plenty to be proud of already and should take a
more professional approach to technology transfer. In-depth case studies and
quantitative analysis should be utilized as measures of achievement, and as
guides for policy.
Lastly, the results of future research might further support and
enhance the creation and implementation of effective technology transfer
policies by federal laboratory directors, heads of federal agencies, and
Congress.
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APPENDIX A.1
NASA Langley Research Center Memo to Inform
Employees of the Technology Transfer Commitment
(July 22, 1994)
207
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, CA 23681-0001
"_'0 ^" _: 118 July 22, 1994
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
106/Director
118/Acting Director, Technology Applications Group
Langley Technology Transfer Policy
This document sets forth Langley Research Center's policy for Technology Transfer and the
functions of TAG. A Center goal is to commit 10 per cent of Langley resources, including
personnel and funding, to technology transfer activities with industry (including Small
Disadvantaged Businesses). Although TAG has the responsibility to facilitate and coordinate
this action, it is the responsibility of all Center organizations and people to implement
technology transfer. TAG also has the responsibility for the Center's technology transfer data
base to account for the costs and the tasks. Project procurements shall include dual-use
assessment and technology transfer in the development of RFPs.
TAG will facilitate technology transfer in APG and SASPG primaz,'y missions and will lead
technology transfer to secondary and non-aerospace sectors. A small Technology Transfer
Assistance Account (one or two per cent) will be established to assist the Center in meeting
these goals. This account, supported by APG and SASPG, will be managed by TAG. The
overall 10 percent must be linked to appropriate RTOPs to highlight program participation
and to leverage dual-use for the 10 per cent goal.
The basic planning document for managing nonptimat'y technology transfer will be developed
by TAG, concurred on by the Technology Council. and will include the Divisions'
Technolt_gy Transfer Plans. This plan includes individual ideas. TAG-identified
opportunities, industry pull. and technology push. Partnerships with industry early in the
process are es,_ntial for success. TAG and the appropriate RTOP manager will nurture,
accelerate, or terminate transfer projects based on their commercial potential and project
progress.
Joseph S. Heyman
46(1U5
cc:
1 ! 8/TAG
C°nc"rtPaulF:H Uo,,,ay" /}
Director
2O8
APPENDIX A.2
NASA Langley Research Center Memo Outlining
Procedures for Accounting for Technology Transfer
Expenditures (June 20, 1995)
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Langley Research CentM
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
,_N 2 0 19_5
1"O:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
All Employees
109/Comptroller
118/Director, Technology Applications Group
R&D Resources Expended for Technology Commercialization
The Center Director has established a goal of expending I0 to 15 percent of
R&D resources for technology commercialization. In order to measure the
Center efforts toward meeting this goal. the following procedure is
established.
I. l_&l') Resources Used for Technology Commercialization - Technology
commercialization activities that use R&D resources ($'s and labor
charges) from Aeronautics and Space RTR's/RTOP's shall be accounted for
by using a "1" Job order. A "F' Job order Is made by replacing the "R" or
*H" prefix on established R&D Job orders with _I". For example, a
technology commercialization activity associated with the work area
normally charged to R1234 would be charged to T1234. No additional
action has to be taken, no new Job orders have to be opened. The "r" job
orders can be used for labor charges, procurement actions, and fabrication
work.
2. Resources Set Aside for Technology Commercialization - Resources set
aside by the groups for technology commercialization will have separate
RTR's established for those resources.
3. Direct Funding - Resources received directly by the Technology Application
Group will be accounted for under the RTR's established for those
resources.
We ask for your help in Identifying and recording our efforts in technology
commercialization. If you have any questions concerning the application of
this new procedure, please call Jim Gardner at extension 46003.
/_/Jo_h R. Stanlhar Charles P. Blankenship
/_ 418084 46005
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APPENDIX B.1
Historical Perspective on the Effect of Science and
Technology Policies on Technology Cooperation Between
the Estates of Science
(Note: This Appendix relies heavily upon Hunter Dupree's Science
in the Federal Government and Bruce Smith's American Science
Policy Since World War II. As the preeminent texts on the history of
science and technology policy in the United States, these texts were
used extensively to construct a picture of technology transfer since
the framing of the Constitution. Apologies and gratitude to both
authors for my extensive use of their expertise.)
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The relatively young US has maintained a considerable share of
technology leadership in the global market over the past 50 years. Yet this
lead is slowly eroding. Since 1965, the US lead in share of exports in
technology intensive products has begun to diminish. Competitors such as
Japan, Germany, France, and the UK have increased their relative real gross
domestic product per employed person (a measure of productivity) from a
range of 20-50% to a range of 70-82% of that of the US (Figure B.1; Irwin 1993).
In particular technology industries, the US has lost the export/import lead
and this has left the nation pondering what it should do to stop the slide.
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Figure B.I: Real Gross Domestic Product per Employed Person, 1950-1989,
(Irwin 1993).
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The US has traditionally had a laissez-fare government policy toward
science and technology commercial development, leaving this concern to the
private industry. This stance fits the US culture of individualism, liberty, and
pioneer spirit. Yet cooperation between federal government, the private
sector, and universities has proven successful in some instances. Recent
global competition has spurred debate on the role of the estates of science,
government, private industries, and universities. The most recent economic
situation has deepened concerns about science and technology policy for the
US, and most of the debate centers not on whether there should be
government participation, but what that participation should be.
Policy is aimed at assembling, organizing, and directing national
resources to meet the needs or wants of a nation-state. Those needs and
wants are derived from the collective perspective of the nations' citizens and
their representatives. The creation of policy in a democracy should be tied
closely to the citizens' or societal belief systems. A nation-state and its citizens
evolve and experience changes in priorities according to external and internal
stimuli (wars, employment, wealth, etc.). The challenge of policy making is
to address current concerns and belief systems of the citizenry, for the
common good, and to allow enough flexibility for the future and its
uncertainty. Good policy-making must therefore be preceded by an
understanding of the contemporary issues facing a society and the lessons
learned from similar or analogous historical events. Within this appendix,
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the science and technology policies of the US relating to technology transfer
along with the prevailing circumstances surrounding such policies, are
presented and analyzed to serve as a contribution to more informed policy-
making in the future.
A review of previous policy decisions, circumstances and results is a
good way to acquire insight for new policies. It is thus the aim of this study to
bring a historical perspective to an understanding of contemporary issues so
as to contribute to a vision for future policies. Information on US science and
technology policy collected over the years creates a historical databank of
empirical information. During review and analysis of these policies and
consequential results, one must keep in mind that policy-making remains a
empirical science. The outcomes of policies are analogous to the results of
statistical hypothesis testing. In either method, a hypothesis or policy is never
fully proven, merely alternative hypotheses or policies can be rejected. Policy
analysis is especially difficult due to the extreme number of confounding
variables. With these difficulties in mind, this review and analysis takes on a
conservative stance especially with regard to extrapolating conclusions.
Circumstances of the day and realities have always driven science and
technology policies in the US and shaped them for the future. From the
framing of the Constitution to contemporary times, the role of science and
technology within the federal government has mostly been influenced by
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immediate issues of war, budget, and jobs and not so much by the visions of
public or politicians. As a result, US science and technology policy has
resembled more of a continuum of incremental changes even when viewed
within the framework of five distinct periods. Within this appendix, an
attempt is made to establish a cognitive framework, based on history, to guide
further policy making decisions.
Technology cooperation between the federal government and the
private sector is marked by five distinct eras representing the early
expansionist movement, the economic development period, the war period,
the cold war period and the economic competitiveness period (Table B.1).
Each of these eras is distinguishable by the defining needs, social
characteristics, and internal and external stimuli of the nation-state. Even
though there are five distinct time periods with one large break at the end of
the war period, the science and technology policies with regard to technology
cooperation can better be described as evolutionary and not revolutionary.
Viewing the five periods in their entirety, a clear vision evolves of a
nation that lost its way following World War II. Up until the war, most
science and technology activities in this country had been given their proper
perspective and performed within a systematic approach. Science and
technology were utilized as tools in conjunction with their applied functions.
Applications were the drivers for the system. The nation developed as a
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group of pioneers who saw science, technology, and other disciplines as
means to an end. The US has always been a competitive nation because of its
ability to blend basic scientific research, applied research, development,
financing, marketing, and management issues. Science and technology as a
means to an end has been the sentiment up until the end of World War II.
At the end of World War II, the scientist claimed savior stature based
on the development of the atomic bomb and the other wonders that "won
the war and saved the world." The future world was to be bright, atomic, and
clean. We would have an endless, clean supply of energy, a space station,
flying cars, and a trans-Atlantic metro. To make this all come true, the nation
was to invest in basic science that would spin-off these technologies. The idea
had so much appeal that spin-off was marketed as a reason for funding, and
slowly was ensconced as "truth" in the public and policymaker mind. Long
forgotten was the idea of collaboration and systematic thinking that had
developed to such success in the pre-war years. Now more than ever there is
a need for that systematic thinking as the US faces the harsh realities of global
economic competition. Technology can lead the way, but it must be through
government and private sector cooperation. The nation must find a way to
utilize all of its resources and use synergy between the estates of science to
achieve a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.
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Table B.I: Periods of Technology Transfer in US History
Period Timeframe Definition Activities
Expansion Framing of Constitution
1770s- 1890s
Technology development
and replication in support
of expansion and
exploration
• Various expeditions
• Coast Survey
• National Geographic
Survey
Economic
development
1890s-1930s Problem approach,
commercialization,
agency building
• Extension agents
• NACA
• Land Grant Act
War 1940s
Science and technology
support weapon
development and
conservation
• World War 17
• National Resource
Committee
Cold War 1950s-1980s
Return to basic
research, science held
as panacea for national
strength and defense
• Science: The Endless
Frontier
• NSF
Economic
competitveness
1980s-->
Small steps toward
commercialization,
management of
technology becomes a
component of activities
• Stevenson Wydler
Act
• FTTC Act
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Expansionism Period (1770s -1890s)
The expansionism period is distinguished by two activities: the
exploration and survey of the resources of the nation, and later the
harnessing and utilization of these resources. At the beginning of this period
science was more of an amateur practice included within the liberal arts. It
was, in today's language, an academic pursuit. In the expansionism period,
the nation came to appreciate the possible benefits of science and more
specifically technology.
Early in this period, the role of science and technology was debated to
no conclusion by the writers of the Constitution. They, along with
subsequent politicians, were unable to vocalize a clear vision of the role of
science and technology for this burgeoning nation. Concerns focused mainly
on taking stock of national resources through surveys and explorations and
developing an infrastructure. Once a certain amount of resource accounting
was accomplished, an interest emerged focused upon the utilization of these
resources. The expansionism period takes the nation from its colonial roots
to a realization of the relevance of science and technology to the private
individual and the birth of fruitful government/university/private
cooperation.
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One must recall that Washington DC, at that time, was little more than
a swampy area far removed from the accouterments and resources of
established cities. Working under difficult constraints of a national debt, slow
communications, and a very loose federation, the founding fathers tussled
with the question of the role of the government in scientific discipline as just
one of a plethora of many other issues, most of them seemingly more
pressing. Concerns of the time were dominated by exploration,
expansionism, and the development of basic infrastructure items.
One of the early champions for an active nation-state participation in
science and technology was Charles Pinckney, a signatory to the Constitution.
Pinckney laid forth plans granting charters for incorporation, patents for
useful inventions, seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and
science, public institutions, and rewards and immunities for the promotion
of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufacture. Pinckney's visions were
drowned out in the sea of more immediate and practical needs, such as roads
and canals. Universities and scientific societies were grouped along with the
roads and canals as issues of "internal improvements," but relegated to a
secondary status due to the countries more immediate need for
infrastructure.
time.
The US did not have a strong base of scientifically trained people at this
The nation was composed primarily of farmers and rugged individuals
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whose interest in science and technology was in the utilization of it to
improve the quality of life. The origin of the US as a nation of explorers
helped shape its scientific and technological identity. In the decades that
followed, the nation developed from its "hands-on" ingenuity (known to
some as "Yankee ingenuity") which consisted of product improvements and
process streamlines, marketing, and financing. American technological
innovation was a perfect match for the capitalist society, where the
concentration was on creating the product for profit. This capitalist attitude
created a ingenuity that spanned the entire product development with no
prejudices for basic or applied research or marketing, but focused on being
successful. Alexis de Toqueville, the French liberal politician and social
commentator who visited the United States during the 1830s found a worship
for practical inventions, a concern for utility, an enthusiasm for the material
consequences of applied sciences and documented them in his book
Democracy in America. Even in the infantile stages of development the US
had a natural bent toward economic development which blossomed in full a
little over a century after its birth.
During the early 1800s, science was left as an academic or artistic
pursuit of clergymen, amateurs, and America's new colleges. Technology was
the natural response for the colonials' practical demands in the rugged
environment. Thomas Jefferson had a great concern for applying science for
useful ends. Jefferson shared the belief that Benjamin Franklin wrote in a
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letter to one of his colleagues: "I would recommend it to you to employ your
time rather in making experiments, than in making hypotheses and forming
imaginary systems, which we are all apt to please ourselves with, till some
experiment comes and unluckily destroys them." The dedication of
ingenuity supported by a "practical" science to domestic purposes was
staunchly defended by Jefferson. It represented for him the democratic goal of
a useful science, however humble those uses. Jefferson's ideal of a technology
dedicated to the popular weal both reflected and enforced an attitude which
would increasingly dominate the American culture (Pursell 1994).
Government support for innovations was at a minimum, and ties
between basic research and technology development were weak during the
expansionist phase. In truth, this expansionist period most strongly
represents an applied science or technology development approach. L.J.
Henderson's dictum, as noted by Dupree (1987), was most likely true that
before 1850 science owed more to the steam engine than the steam engine
owed to science. Most inventions sprang from empirical observations.
Steamboats and Steam locomotives are products of the age of "cut and try"
and "rule of thumb". In addition, some technology development was in
reality technology transfer, both legal and illegal, from other nation-states.
Some foreigners even to this day, dispute that it was not so much technology
development that spumed the US on as it was the stealing of technology
from abroad. Specifically, the textile industry was imitated from its
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predecessorsin the United Kingdom and brought here by a few enterprising
persons.
It is interesting to note that technology development preceded basic
and applied science and that applied science came into play only later when
some of the steam engines started to explode, creating a public outcry for
government protection and intervention. The government supported
studies to try and understand at a basic level the scientific issues involved so
that it might better be regulated and standardized. The technology
development approach still occurs today in many fields: witness the
development of solid rocket propellants for space vehicles. Although the
performance and macro-characteristics of rockets has been well documented,
the thermo-chemical combustion at the micro-level have not yet been fully
characterized and is only loosely modeled by theories.
In the expansionist period the bulk of government scientific activities
and the focus of the science policies revolved around the Coastal Survey, and
geographical surveys and exploration parties like Lewis and Clark. Most
Congressional debates focused on the amount of money to be appropriated,
and determining the recipient of the funding to perform the research. These
efforts dominated most science policy debates and government activities for
the first hundred years. In retrospect, the sum of these activities can be
viewed as an infant nation-state examining itself and taking account of its
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belongings. Most government efforts had no focus on any type of commercial
end. The geographical surveys and explorations served more or less as
inventory activities from which the nation-state could eventually
springboard into commercial activities. These activities also contributed to
national security in securing lands that eventually became part of the nation.
A capitalist bent can be loosely associated with the Coastal Survey and its
interest in determining usable shipping ports and lanes.
During these formative years many internal improvements were
leveraged through the sale of federal lands (Spence 1995). Expansion and
growth in terms of geographic domain and culture, and more importantly in
terms of wealth, were based on the natural resources of the United States.
This is an important distinction from contemporary times, where the playing
field has leveled out a bit with the other developed nations. A large portion
of the natural resources of the US have already been leveraged, and
international competition occurs mostly through the abilities or productivity
of the citizenry. Irwin feels that the central issue in contemporary economics
is the productivity of a nation (Irwin 1993).
During the expansion period, the introduction of the first science
institute in the United States is a story filled with irony and humor,
displaying the unease at which the US entered the science policy arena. After
decades of debate about the introduction of a national institute of some sort,
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the impetus for the organization was the bequeathment of $500,000 by a
English citizen, James Smithson in 1829. Smithson's will requested that his
money be given to the United States "to found at Washington, under the
name of the Smithsonian Institution, an Establishment for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men." There were many stories of why
Smithson, an Englishman, wanted to bequeath his wealth to the "colonists."
These explanations ran from the simple, that he had no heir as a bachelor, to
the eccentric, that he was angered by the Royal Society for not inviting him to
join the prestigious group (Dupree 1987).
Even more bizarre than the bequest was the reaction of the US
Congress to this windfall. It took a 31 to 7 vote to accept the funds and
another 10 years to decide what to do with them, with the serious contention
of returning the funds being broached several times. There were many
Congressmen who felt the US was being belittled by accepting the gift and
others who thought it would be used to further centralize control (these being
mostly southern delegates). It is interesting to note the analogy between the
representatives in this time period and the current 104th congress. The
ordeal of the Smithsonian typifies the attitude of the majority of early
American politicos toward science: fear, and ignorance.
The activity which best symbolized the nation's movement toward
utilization of resources and technology cooperation, and is recognized as one
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of the most successful technology cooperation programs in US history, is the
Morrill Act, more commonly known as the Land Grant Act. An early
proponent from the University of Illinois, Jonathon Turner, envisioned
"Industrial Universities for the People" (Dupree 1987). His plan featured a
donation of land by the federal government instead of money, with the
universities placing an emphasis on practical agriculture & mechanics. This
is an example of how the US leveraged its natural resources in the early days
to create growth.
In 1857, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont introduced the bill for the land
grant colleges. This foundered for years largely due to opposition from the
southern states and again a concern of centralization. To be fair, there were
also opponents who broke along the debate lines of large vs. small state and
states rights vs. federalists. In retrospect, the Morrill Act has been considered
one of the best science policies ever enacted, and could be considered one of
the positive outcomes of the Civil War. One of the most noted federal
actions resulting in effective technology transfer, was a secondary result of the
Civil War. The Morrill Land Grant Act that had a difficult time succeeding
through the houses of Congress, finally passed easily on July 2, 1862, without
the presence of the southern states.
The Morrill Act represented a major departure from the typical beliefs
of the day. Pluralism ruled, as it does today, where there is a cacophony of
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voices representing the different perspectives of industry, government, and
university. In addition, most research was privately funded. In a sense, the
Morrill Act of 1862 was a watershed movement. It found its impetus in a
national belief in self-sufficiency. The nation needed to improve its crop
production and this led to the nation's first attempt to pursue both scientific
and commercial leadership. The results of the Morrill Act were a improved
crop production per acre and a positive balance of trade in agriculture. The
Morrill Act therefore became a stepping stone into the next period of
economic development.
Two features contributing to Morrill Act success were its geographical
equity and stable political constituency. By placing the land-grant colleges
under the control of the states, it created a sense of ownership and value
along with political support. The Morrill Act was a natural fit to the interest
of the nation as it was dominated by the agricultural profession and a boost
was needed in this arena.
The effectiveness of the Morrill Act was augmented by a series of
activities that led to what is still considered an exemplary model of
technology transfer. In the 1870s a entomological commission was tasked
with finding a solution for the locust-induced problem of blight. The
approach brought into line aspects of both basic research and applied research
and could be considered purposive basic research. The combination of
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laboratory research, communication, and field work brought solutions to the
locust problem. The success of this first act served as a model for subsequent
activities. Assistants were sent to the scene of outbreaks and had their first
dramatic victory over insect pests. This was a very important activity,
establishing the first utilization of the agent approach. Eventually, the
commission merged into the Department of Agriculture as the Division of
Entomology and the agent approach was recognized as an effective
mechanism.
These activities dovetailed into another watershed legislation passed in
1914, the Smith-Lever Act, which put extension service on a separate and
permanent basis. The Smith-Lever Act was a 50/50 plan in which each
federal dollar was matched by one from the states. This provided a sense of
ownership from the standpoint of both the nation and its states. The
combination of laboratory work complemented by a two-way communication
to and from the farmers produced a successful combination. The researchers
had data and experience supplemented by "real world" results and issues.
It was within this time frame that another excellent example of
government and industry cooperation was forged. Gifford Pinchot, took over
as head of the Division of Forestry with a pragmatic view of forest growth
management. He abandoned the complete documentation of the biology and
life history of a forest approach and instead wanted to measure the things a
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ranger needed to know to estimate what should be done to sustain the yield
in a given stand of trees. A key to his approach was to get support for the
division by making it useful to private timber owners. A publication called
"Circular 21" offered the division's assistance to anyone who wished to
harvest timber and still have a second crop. Working plans and full practical
directions were given by agents. Evidence of the interest in this service is the
willingness of owners of larger tracts to pay the expenses of the division's
parties. "Getting forestry into the woods" was the aim, and the division
supported research that was empirical and clinical. Requests for aid flooded
the division. Within a short time Pinchot forged an alliance between the
lumbermen and the division. Because the larger operators had a greater
margin with which to experiment on long-term methods, the Weyerhaeuser
Lumber Company and other giants were foremost in adopting the
recommendations and in praising Pinchot's work.
The assistant chief of the Division of Forestry, Henry S. Graves, left for
Yale to head a new forestry school and set the standard for education in this
specialty throughout the country. Graves consequently demonstrated
another industry to university connection by transferring the industry know-
how into the academic setting.
The economic development period was phased in and the expansion
period phased out by these attempts/efforts to relate activities to immediate
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problems. A shift of emphasis on research from basic to applied occurred for
many bureaus. The spirit was captured in the statement of Henry W.
Henshaw, who helped shape many early government bureaus: "pursuit of
science solely for its own sake, however commendable it may be, is not the
spirit that animates our government in its support of scientific research. In
its aims and ambitions this is a practical age" (Dupree p. 253, 1986).
Dr. John Shaw Billings, illustrious surgeon of the Army Medical Corps,
went on to say "We may not rest and eat lotus; we may not devote our lives
to our own pleasures, even though it be pleasure derived from scientific
investigation. No man lives for himself alone; the scientific man should do
so least of all" (Dupree p. 230, 1986).
During expansion period the US took stock of its resources through
various exploration and survey teams, while developing a technology base
through replication of skills from overseas. The idea of science and
technology as a cornerstone of societal well-being was undeveloped. The
nation at that time was primarily agricultural in nature. It is fitting then, that
the Morrill Act, the first example of the systematic use of science and
technology cooperation, was developed to aid the agricultural system. At the
beginning of the expansionism period the role of science and technology
appeared to be relegated to the realm of debate for future concerns. Yet,
toward the end of this period real progress had been made. Methods of
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cooperation between the government and private sector developed and a
appreciation of the potential emerged. The country with its pioneer roots
preferred the pragmatic technology development approach over one based on
unclear results from basic science.
This period of expansionism dovetailed into that of economic
development. Dupree refers to the early days of this economic development
as conservationism, where there was a realization that efficiency and synergy
of efforts could establish more benefits from natural resources. The
Department of Agriculture created a vision of government/industry
cooperation for others to improve upon, and the nation was just beginning to
realize its strengths with the advent of big oil companies and
industrialization.
Economic Development Period (1890s - 1930s)
The stimuli and national character of this period of economic
development were most like that of the current economic competitiveness
period. Motives and therefore actions were mainly employed for capitalistic
ends. This was the period of Thomas Alva Edison, in which private industry
harbored a genius for both scientific and technical research as well as a genius
for marketing and financing technology. Although the spirit of American
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entrepreneurship flourished, government participation also took place. The
government was asked to take an active role where the private sector could
not support research or standardization was necessary. It was during this
period that the nation created several bureaus to aid the capitalist movement.
These included National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the
National Bureau of Standards, the Bureau of Census, and the Bureau of
Mines.
Private sector research was strong during this time. The bureau
building of this period was a move toward government involvement.
Leading up to this period "much of the technological genius of America was a
genius for organization, for management, for either linking an invention to a
rapidly developing market or creating a new market for an invention"
(Smith p. 26, 1990). This was the early spirit of America which, following
World War II, was replaced by an emphasis on basic centralized science.
During this early period the innovators were good at both downstream and
upstream activities. It was during the following war period that a need for
national military strength caused a refocusing on upstream activities.
The industry oriented bureaus sought answers to those problems
industry needed to have solved but was unable or unwilling to answer for
itself. These activities are classified as market-failure, or those where a free
market cannot afford to support the activity. (In reality, there is no such thing
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as a market-failure sector: it is merely a matter of the definition of the market.
For example, it is stated that the government builds roads due to a market
failure. But in reality, this improves the national strength to compete in the
global market and the investment by a national entity is a market move,
albeit at a nation-state level market.) An additional benefit of these bureaus
was the creation of a large number of trained scientists and engineers. These
civil servants were subject to high turn-over rates, which created a direct
technology transfer through experts migration into the private industrial
sector.
In 1903 the Committee of Organization of Government Scientific Work
took a position emphasizing the organization of research around a problem,
and that "the individual sciences and arts should not be segregated in the
separate bureaus and offices" (Dupree p. 296, 1987). This position reflected a
concern toward addressing more immediate economic needs as opposed to
long term investments.
One of the best US organizations in terms of technology transfer was
created in this era. NACA, formed in 1915, was to determine the problems
plaguing the US aeronautics community, obtain practical solutions through
studies and disseminate the results. The impetus for creation of NACA was
the recognition of aeronautics as a strategic national venture and the
advances made by the European community (Roland p. 4, 1985). Alex
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Roland, NACA historian, associates NACAs success with the representation
of private industry on the committee. Private industry representation created
a direct communication link between industry and government activities and
helped guide NACA to purposeful research (Roland 1995). Arguments are
made now that NASA still has private industry influence through industry
and independent review committees. But there exists no real accountability
in the current arrangement. Compare the 1980s, when there seemed to be a
new advisory committee report to help steer NASA every three years
(Augustine Report 1990, Leadership and America's Future in Space 1987, etc.).
For the most part these reports were treated as academic exercises or at best
visions, but were not used to form policies or programs.
NACA serves even to this day as a learning model for technology
transfer organizations. Certainly NACA had its flaws, as pointed out by
Roland, but in general the organization was responsive to the needs of the
private sector. NACA held an annual technology exhibit for the benefit of the
private industry and the congressional staff. In the early NACA years
communication systems were still a bit slow, with the written word still
tending to dominate. Thus, the exhibit created an opportunity for a more
complete understanding and interchange between the NACA researchers and
the public. Although today the communication systems have improved
immensely with the advent of email, the web, and tele- and video-
conferencing, there is still a need for the interpersonal exchange. NASA
Langley Research Center, the former NACA site, reinstituted (although
somewhat unaware of the previous historical precedent) the technology
exhibit in 1993 calling it the TOPS or Technology Opportunity Showcase
(demonstrating the NASA tendency for acronyms).
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This economic development period was slightly interrupted by World
War I. The War and the needs placed on the country impacted science and
technology thinking. It did not significantly alter the policies at that time but
raised some technology and science cooperation issues that would be more
seriously addressed during World War II. In response to World War I, the
US recognized the importance of technological advances and attempted to
find solutions to military problems through technology. The war brought an
organizing committee under George Ellery Hale, a astronomer and member
of the National Academy, that recommended "there be formed a National
Research Council, whose purpose shall be to bring into cooperation existing
governmental, educational, industrial and other research organizations" to
strengthen the national defense (Dupree p. 309, 1987). This idea of pooling
research for the betterment of the entire nation-state, although not entirely
successful at the time, created a new paradigm in thinking that would be
addressed and readdressed over the following years.
One of the biggest impacts of World War I, and to a bigger extent World
War II was the infusion of research into production. The wars created a need
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to produce technological solutions in a rapid period of time. This need for
new product developments created a strong industrial research component
that has become one of the three "estates of science".
It was also during World War I that a Consulting Board was formed to
review over 110,000 suggestions in a effort to find technological solutions.
Only 110 inventions had enough merit for detailed examination by a
subcommittee, and only one went into actual production. As Dupree so
succinctly puts it, "No clearer proof is needed that in time of total war
random ingenuity is no alternative to the problem approach by teams of
highly trained men thoroughly aware of both scientific theory and the needs
of the services" (Dupree p. 308, 1986). His statement reflects the comments of
Dr. Barry Bozeman of Georgia Tech, who is inclined to believe that these
"shopping lists" approaches are ineffective (Bozeman 1995).
In the decade directly following World War I, there was a return to the
focus on business development. But even within this renewed focus on
economic activity and profits, there also sprang up a concern for the future.
Herbert Hoover, Secretary of the Department of Commerce at the time,
warned that we were spending too much of our effort on applied research and
too little on basic research. He felt that the floor would drop out of the
economy due to a lack of basic research, and tried to establish a National
Research Fund. This National Research Fund would support basic research
in universities with a large and continuous flow of money contributed by
industry. It stressed voluntary cooperation and eschewed any form of
government control, relying on enlightenment of business leaders. It failed
miserably and demonstrated the failure of industry to support a market-
failure venture.
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The economic development period also endured a depression, which
impacted science and technology policy thinking. In a 1932 presidential
campaign speech Herbert Hoover used the metaphor of science as the new
frontier and pushed for basic science and an investment in the future, but
people were in no mood for long range answers when the depression
demanded immediate action. Public opinion has always had strong
convictions about short-term issues and immediate concerns, making long-
term science policy a difficult political issue. In a perceived contrast to
Hoover, it was at this time that the New Deal Democrats promised to reduce
government spending.
At this same time, Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture
under Roosevelt, was also a champion of science, but from another
perspective. He differed from Hoover by knowing the role of other institutes
and disciplines. "Those who struggle beyond the new frontier will be those
who know how to obey the economic traffic lights, and drive social machines
on the right hand side of the road" (Dupree p. 349, 1986). Wallace was voicing
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a commitment not only to basic science but to other components of the new
technology continuum that produce a stream of benefits for humanity. His
idea was the embodiment of systematic thinking, that no one part of the
process should supersede the others, but instead a balance of upstream and
downstream activities should be integrated. The issue was, and still is, what
policies and activities should be implemented to activate this thinking.
Wallace was quoted as saying, "Actually, science has not given us the
means of plenty until it has solved the economic and social as well as the
technical difficulties involved" (Dupree p. 349, 1986). Here is a key idea, that
one must look at both the social and economic impacts of the science
decisions to make them effective. The very idea of looking at the intertwined
issues of science, technology, and society was not a new one, but Wallace was
bringing it to the forefront again. On this topic Albert Einstein said, "Concern
for people and their fate must always form the chief interest of all technical
endeavors in order that the creations of our mind shall be a blessing, not a
curse, to humanity. Never forget this amid your diagrams and equations."
Recognition of a system of "estates of science" occurred during this
period. These estates consist of the university, private industry, and the
federal government - along with an attempt to coordinate the efforts and
break down the barriers. One of the oft-cited methods of cooperation during
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this period was the contracts given to universities to perform basic research
for NACA.
The economic development period represented a strong period of
science and technology impact on the economy and quality of life. Many new
inventions sprang up at the turn of the century and the government found
ways of working with private industry. Yet during this period, the successes
stemming from science and technology led to an extrapolation of a system of
product development to an emphasis on only one of the links, basic science.
The idea of cooperation and deriving benefits from science and technology
was being replaced by isolated basic science. Hoover's speech in 1932 painting
a bright future based on basic research became the starting point for thinking
that has now permeated our culture and to some extent supplanted the
"Yankee ingenuity" paradigm. The roots of a belief system in basic science as
the source for quality life sprouted and took hold immediately following the
war period.
War Period (1940s)
The War period represents one of the more dramatic changes in the
predominantly evolutionary development of the nation's history. Funding
in research, particularly military, and depth of collective concern toward
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research made huge gains during this period. There was an effort to extract
the full potential from the estates of science and this consequentially led to
technology cooperation. The government funded private industry and
universities to support the military program and the interchanges of
information represented a technology transfer of information.
World War II had a dramatic effect on the activities and daily life of the
US. The war years created a new collective patriotism that resulted in a
fortified effort from all sectors and individuals to preserve their ideal of
democracy. The science and technology community was not an exception to
this spirit. In 1940 the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) was
created in an effort to bring all of the scientific resources of the country to bear
on weapons research. Roosevelt and Vannevar Bush led the charge for this
restructuring. Bush modeled the NDRC on the NACA by having a
committee with military representation and a predominance of independent
members. The committee was not so much interested in developing new
labs or performing its own research as in figuring how to use existing
resources by funding universities and industrial firms. The NDRC placed
contracts with those best suited for each project without regard to any state or
geographic politics. As in many war time activities, some of the political
wrangling was dropped.
239
The NDRC had a shortcoming in its narrow focus on weapons
development. Therefore with Vannevar Bush's direction, President
Roosevelt created the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The
OSRD was to bridge the gap between research and development and the
creation of an actual battlefield weapon. The need for a systematic approach
was recognized through the shortcomings of the original proposal. The
OSRD then became the central focus for all scientific and technical activities
in a country absorbed by the war. All estates of science were to be coordinated
through this agency.
The OSRD found reasonable success in employing the talents of the
scientific community for the war, but would be inappropriate for peace time
direction. Vannevar Bush realized the shortcomings of the OSRD as a
peacetime central science organization, and with his advice the OSRD was
slowly relieved of its powers. The resultant organizations and the lessons
learned during the war had a profound impact on the following Cold War
period.
The war changed the future of science and technology policies in the
US in permanent and lasting ways. Annual expenditures for research prior to
the war were approximately $100 million. The war years raised the amount
to $1.6 billion. There was a discontinuity in the funding spike that created a
new plateau, the old one never being revisited. Many practices of the war
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period carried over into the Cold War period including the predominance of
military research, wide spread use of research contracts to the universities,
growing support of mission-related research by government agencies, and
enhanced status for scientists and technical bureaus. During the war period a
partnership between science and the government proved to be beneficial and
struck up renewed and invigorated debate on the best approach to harness the
benefits during times of peace.
Cold War Period (1950s - 1980s)
The Cold War period started with revolutionary thinking stemming
from the World War II period and the end of the economic development
period, and a vision for a bright future but developed into an endless debate
with only evolutionary changes (Bush 1945). The Cold War brought with it a
proposed structure to increase the nation's wealth through science and
technology. Science as a panacea for national strength and defense was
developed, then softened, attacked, and eventually debated endlessly
resulting in no conclusive actions.
As the war effort wound down, Vannevar Bush pushed for the
dismantling of the OSRD since it had never been meant to be a permanent
organization and seemed an awkward one for the coming challenges. At this
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point Congress transitioned some of the activities into civilian charge with
the Atomic Energy Commission created in 1946. The scientific community
was busy touting itself as the saviors of humanity. For the first time in US
history, scientists had taken a center stage for their part in ending the war
through the wonders of the atomic bomb. The creation of an atomic bomb
was a Herculean and ingenious effort by many, including scientists,
engineers, technicians, and managers. But the bulk of the accolades were
placed with the scientists, who took the opportunity to raise the level of
importance and awareness of science to the public interest.
The public fascination with science as a solution to public ills, led to a
belief that we were on the verge of a new frontier that science would open up
(Fagen 1982). Basic science would be the driver of the system, providing the
advances to sustain a significant pace of inventions, and the costs would be
absorbed by the government. The government was viewed as the entity with
deep enough pockets to nurture the effort. And in the words of Smith,
"Commercialization was to occur almost automatically as a by-product from
the government's support of basic research and more applied research and
development operations" (Smith p. 37, 1990). The idea of "spin-offs" was
becoming a central part of the scientific and economic policy of the country.
The spin-off ideology brought about a policy of no policy towards
commercialization to allow the natural flow of scientific work into
commercialization.
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Science: The Endless Frontier was published in July 1945, eight months
after a request by President Roosevelt to his adviser Vannevar Bush. Bush
was to create a report outlining the utilization of science for the post war
period and respond to four concerns voiced in President Roosevelt's request:
diffusion of scientific knowledge developed during the war, organizing a war
on disease, how the government can aid in research activities both public and
private, and how to develop scientific talent in American youth. This report
has become one of the best known of all science policy reports in the United
States and a focal point for debate continuing even today, fifty years later.
President Roosevelt's first request on diffusion of scientific knowledge can be
interpreted as a formalization of military to civilian technology transfer.
Although Bush's report contained balanced statements in support of
basic research as just one of the components of success for the future of the
nation, it was believed to be of fundamental importance to achieving vital
national goals. This belief represented the paradigm of the day and the one
that would continue throughout the Cold War period. The belief that a
government investment in basic research and hands off approach to the
remainder of the process, was rebutted by many during the social rebellion of
the 1960s.
Bush's report recognized the absence of a national policy toward science
or any central organization responsible for science. The major conclusion of
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the report was its proposal for development of a National Science Foundation
(NSF) to direct the scientific resources of the nation. Five years later in 1950,
the NSF became a reality. But the NSF that resulted was one quite different
from that proposed. The teeth had been taken out of it, and the agency today
is nothing more than a peer-reviewed source for funding, not the policy-
setting agency that was envisioned.
Although Bush stands out in US science policy history, he was not
without a counterpart in his day. Almost equally as well known is Senator
Harley Kilgore of West Virginia and the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Science Legislation of the Military Affairs Committee during the early 1940s.
Kilgore also had an interest in a central science organization but for different
reasons. Bush wanted to raise science to a higher priority and support basic
research for the public good, while Kilgore saw a central organization creating
better communication and information diffusion for the public good. The
difference in philosophy about this structure caused long debate and tension
between the executive and legislative branches. Kilgore's vision was to
follow the successful model of the agricultural efforts, while Bush's was to
create basic research and let things fall into place. Bush and his colleagues
tried to revive the spirit of Herbert Hoover's effort in the 1920s to promote
basic research. But this time they would use public money, essentially
without public control. The NSF board approach takes the public influence
out of the loop and places direction into the hands of scientists. This meant
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that the issues of private industry were not directing the efforts, which were
to produce commercial results, but rather the peer-review process was used to
determine which research would be performed. The US taxpayers would pay
for the research and the scientists would control the funds and determine
how to use them.
At the time of the report, US manufacturing productivity was more
than twice that of its principal competitors and lent credibility to the idea of
basic science and no commercialization policy as valid and successful. A
continued growth would provide support to perpetuate the system. There
was widespread support because all people would share in the benefits of
expansion.
A political change caused the NSF to become a reality in the much
watered-down version of Bush's model. In 1946, the Republicans swept the
congressional elections and took control of the majority position in Congress.
This moved the debate away from Kilgore's concept since he was divested of
his chairmanship. Kilgore was replaced by H. Alexander Smith, who was
sympathetic to the views of his friends on the Princeton faculty. The faculty
stressed the importance of quality in scientific effort and the need to insulate
research as far as practicable from politics. The peer- or merit- review process
was bom.
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Originally Bush thought that basic research could not be administered
effectively or performed within an agency that had operational
responsibilities. This was one of the reasons behind his idea for centralized
control of basic research. Later he softened this stance and came to believe
that useful cross-fertilization can occur between development and basic
research, provided that basic research had some measure of administrative
independence from development activities. Therefore, basic research broadly
relevant to an agency's responsibilities came to be known as "mission-
oriented basic research."
This left some question about the role of the National Science
Foundation, if even basic research was supported primarily by mission
agencies. Smith poses the primary issue: "Whether it [NSF] would have
pursued the goal of promoting the rapid progress of science, as Bush and
other scientists wanted, or moved toward accommodating the goals of society
as set forth by nonscientist, as Kilgore's preference, is a further question"
(Smith p. 50, 1990).
The conclusion was that universities would perform most of the
important basic research and set the direction for the nation's scientific efforts.
Federal funds for development would make up the largest part of the R&D
budget and be allocated mostly to industry, and the government's in-house
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efforts would continue to center on applied research relevant to agency
missions.
The federal laboratories were left with those issues that were either
deemed market-failure or of insufficient theoretical interest or of a national
security nature. When industry saw no potential in the research (market-
failure) or the universities saw the problem as not having a theoretical
nature, the government laboratories were to respond. Yet there seemed to be
no established position for the estates of science to work together. There was
no conscious strategy to promote innovation. The idea of the automatic spin-
off approach was created.
With the debate came a need to react to the realities of the day.
Following on the heals of World War II, the nation was not blind to the
coming challenges as reported in the Steelman report. The Steelman report
posited that the nation was certain to confront "competition from other
national economies of a sort we have not hitherto had to meet." The report
also reasoned that wartime destruction would compel other nations to
rebuild their industrial plants with more modem technologies, and many
would pursue state-directed strategies. Yet, the Steelman report still looked 'to
the basic research ideology as the answer: "Only through research and more
research can we provide the basis for an expanding economy, and continued
high levels of employment" (President's Scientific Research Board, Science
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and Public Policy: Administration for Research "Steelman Report" 1947 via
Smith p. 59, 1986). No thought of downstream or system level thinking
occurred, or even about retooling the industrial base, here.
International politics also helped shape thinking about the science
policy of this period. The GATT regime would enforce trade rules and allay
the Steelman report's fears of government-assisted trade expansion. And the
Bretton Woods agreement would provide a stable currency framework for
international transactions.
Within this framework an international trade economics theory was
developed that was envisioned to be the model for the future (Vernon 1966).
In this theory, advanced products would be developed by companies
with strong research efforts (many of which would, of course, be
American). Those products would dominate markets until replaced by
the next generation of goods embodying a more advanced technology.
The earlier generation of products would then be marketed in third
world nations via license or other appropriate mechanisms. The
foreign company or government entering into the licensing
arrangement would acquire the technical skills to manufacture the
product. After a while these skills would diffuse though the local
economy. As the process was repeated with each new generation of
products, third world nations would gradually become more fully
integrated into the world economy. The implication was however,
that they would be integrated as secondary markets for the goods of the
industrial nations, not as serious competitors in the export of
manufactured goods (Smith p. 67, 1990).
But as we know, other countries did not "play according to these rules" and
overcame the US in many trade areas. The idea of relying on technological
development was proven fallible and eventually the US became aware of the
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issues of the management of technology and the other "'downstream" issues
of product development.
Amid this Cold War period, the US was experiencing a social
revolution and introspection beginning in the 1960s. The Vietnam War
raged, civil liberties became a polarizing issue, and even science and
technology were dragged into the fray. Science and technology were
associated with big business and the military, which were not in favor with
the ecology and peace movements of the time. Many demonstrations
occurred on college campuses to protest the support of science and technology
advances through the acceptance of research grants. This was not so much an
anti-science sentiment as a criticism of corporate interests misusing
technology for short-sighted economic gain. Intellectuals such as Jacques
Ellul and Ivan Illich developed more comprehensive critical views of
technology's effects on society.
Both the ideology of the leaders and the inherent downfall in the
thinking was best put by Harvey Brooks:
The implicit message of the Bush report seemed to be that technology
was essentially the application of leading-edge science and that, if the
country created and sustained a first class science establishment based
primarily in the universities, new technology for national security,
economic growth, job creation, and social welfare would be generated
almost automatically without explicit policy attention to all the other
complementary aspects of innovation (Brooks 1985).
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Yet there existed a few exceptions to this market-failure approach to
policy.
The few exceptions to reliance on the marketplace, such as agricultural
policy, simply underscored the nation's disregard for doctrinal purity.
And even here there was a semblance of a market philosophy: public
policies would support growing foodstuffs as commodities, but would
stop that support once food entered the processing chain and became
appropriable as a brand name product. Support for research in
commercial aviation, dating from Franklin D. Roosevelt's order as
assistant secretary of the navy in World War I to pool patents, and the
applied research undertaken after the war by the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics was also critical in the development of
commercial aviation. Such government support could be justified
because it improved the quality of a product it was purchasing. Much
the same was true of support for atomic energy research after World
War II (Smith p. 86, 1990).
The key issue identified by Smith is that government support is justified
because it improves the quality of a product it purchases. This is what is now
referred to as dual-use, mission-oriented technology transfer. Essentially, the
policies of NACA and the Agricultural Department were market driven just
like the philosophies of other disciplines or agencies, but in this case needs
were ascertained and support given appropriately to the private industry.
There is evidence that during this period the greatest benefit between
the sectors may have come when government was the customer of private
industry. During the early phases of computers and aeronautics, the
government was the primary purchaser, subsidizing development of those
technologies which later yielded huge private sector markets. In the case of
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the integrated circuit, the government represented a vast majority of the
market throughout the 1960s (Table B.2).
Table B.2: US Integrated Circuit Production and Prices and Importance of the
Space and Defense Market, 1962-68 (Tilton 1971, Hook 1990)
Year Total Production
(millions of dollars)
1962 4
1963 16
1964 41
1965 79
1966 148
1967 228
1968 312
Average price per
integrated circuit
(dollars)
50.00
31.60
18.50
8.33
5.05
3.32
2.33
Defense & Space
Production
(% of total production)
100
94
85
72
53
43
37
NASA and the DOD assumed much of the risk for long-term
research and development and encouraged close co-operation between
business and government. In 1962, the total production of semiconductors in
America was a mere $4 million and an integrated circuit cost $50. By 1968
NASA and DOD demand had swelled the semiconductor market to $312
million, in part by reducing the price of an integrated circuit to $2.33. This
made it profitable for companies to utilize semiconductors in new
applications like factory machines and calculators. Without the initial
investment of the governments funds, the market for integrated circuits
might have developed much slower.
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With the inception of NASA, came the first agency to be mandated to
technology transfer (P.L. 85-568). In 1962, Lyndon Johnson referred to funds
for space as:
investments which will yield dividends to our lives, our business,
our professions, many times greater than the initial costs (Rosenbloom
1965).
In this same year NASA was the first federal agency to formally establish a
technology transfer function.
Of the eight objectives stated in NASA's enabling legislation, two
related to technology transfer. The fourth objective was stated as: "...the
establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained
from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of
aeronautical and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes." The
Space Act's definition of functions included the words: "to provide for the
widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning
its activities and the results thereof." At this time, technology transfer had
been occurring informally at other government agencies, universities and
industries, with agricultural extension programs leading the way. A
mandated technology transfer task was relatively unprecedented (P.L. 85-568;
Milliken pp. 161-170, 1984).
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While NASA's motives remain complex even today due to a close tie
to political agendas, it is still clear that secondary applications of the
technology are at least fundamental even if not primary components. Even
in 1963 there was a realistic view of the role of federal agencies in technology
transfer. Then NASA administrator James Webb said:
We in the Space Agency do not seek to justify our program on the basis
of the industrial applications which will flow from it... since we are
committed to this great effort in space, however, a responsibility exists
to glean from it the maximum public benefits which can be obtained
(Rosenbloom 1965).
Thus, NASA established a cultural image that balanced its primary
motives with the responsibilities of benefiting mankind in a more direct
manner. In the early days of NASA, its efforts in technology transfer were
aided by its high visibility and image of perfection. Corporations sought out
the aid of this center of seemingly limitless talents.
Yet as the years proceeded, NASA became mired in bureaucracy and
self-consciousness of its mission and future. Cooperation with external
partners in both primary concerns and technology transfer concerns became
encumbered with paperwork. In essence, the technology transfer program
became an impersonal technology information distribution process until it
was reinvigorated in the 1990s.
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President Kennedy's economic advisors were concerned about the
sluggish performance of the economy in the early 1960s. The Presidents'
Office of Science and Technology report, Technology and Economic Prosperity
(1962) tried to address market imperfections. A Civilian Industrial
Technology Program (CITP) was proposed that would combine research,
extension services, and demonstrations for textile manufacturing, coal
mining, and the housing industry. The program was to be much like the
successful one in agriculture. But the bill was soundly defeated in Congress
because of strong opposition from those it was intended to help. All three
industries rejected the notion that the CITP would help them. In all fairness,
the industries' claim that much of their problems stemmed not merely from
technology but from downstream issues, was accurate. Private industries
more immediate concerns outweighed the government's long-term concerns.
The two needed to find a central ground of compromise, but the
misunderstandings continued (Smith 1990).
President Johnson and his staff also pushed for invigoration of the
civilian technology base. An act was drafted that stressed the exchange of
technical information and consultation among industry, the universities, and
state governments. This act avoided the controversial idea of the federal
laboratories providing research on industry's behalf. Technology transfer
would take on the form of information exchanges, and again this was
received with little fanfare by the private industry.
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Smith summarized the situation well:
Advanced technologies were assumed to be commercially feasible, an
assumption industry in general did not share. Industry saw public
assistance for R&D as contributing relatively little toward reducing the
total costs of innovation; most costs were downstream from research
and the early phases of development. The naive public belief that R&D
is all there is to innovation, in industry's view, simply increased the
political pressure to make huge investments in new technologies that
might not pay off (Smith p. 88, 1990).
Then in 1966 a White House panel found little evidence that the
private sector neglected innovation and no compelling justification for
government to provide technical assistance. The results of the study led the
government into a familiar position of no position. Following the panel
study, President Johnson's science and economic advisers remained split over
whether more public assistance was necessary to speed commercialization of
R&D. Science and technology policy remained stagnant.
With the Nixon administration came a similar approach to the issues.
A program entitled "New Technologies Opportunities" attempted to transfer
promising technologies to the private sector and then locate applications once
the feasibility had been demonstrated. Again the program was criticized as
the federal government intervention into the private industry realm. Nixon
backed away from this policy as it was deemed inappropriate for the
republican platform.
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In typical fashion, a new administration brings new ideas, and
President Ford preferred market mechanisms for support of research.
Therefore, the new strategy was focused on deregulation, market failure, and
federal support only in cases in which the government was the customer and
primary user of the R&D. Administration strategists believed that market
driven pricing and deregulation would help increase innovation. So the
pendulum was swinging back to a compartmentalized government role with
little interest in a synergistic effort.
With the Carter administration came a revisit to the cooperative idea
in an effort to restore productivity growth and encourage industrial
innovation. In a Presidential message to Congress in 1979, Carter advocated
increasing government R&D for particular technologies to support industry,
expanding the NSF to foster university-industry cooperative programs,
strengthening the patent system by establishing uniform government policy,
expanding the SBIR program, and establishing state and regional corporations
for industrial development to assist high risk innovation. The results were
similar to those of earlier attempts at cooperation, the industries balked and
government blinked.
A Cooperative Automobile Research program to support research on
combustion, structural mechanics, materials, and catalysis to help the auto
industry was reluctantly agreed to by the five major US auto makers and died
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with the Carter administration. Likewise, the Ocean Margin Drilling program
intended to support the oil industry, failed when oil companies reneged on
support to the effort due to a drop in oil prices.
During the Carter administration, industries were more interested in
federal tax policy than in any cooperative initiatives. Yet the best interest of
the entire US economy is not necessarily served by the individual interest or
belief of the private industry.
During the Cold War period the focus of international policies were
aimed at stopping the spread of communism and containing the influence of
the Soviet Union. Economic competitiveness was assumed to occur naturally
from the systems established after World War II. The hands off approach to
technology commercialization was the norm. The pre-occupation with the
Soviet Union led to a general ignorance of the slow slide into economic
equality with other nations. Many of the Presidents tried to gingerly address
the issue but relinquished their stances rather easily in the face of politics.
There was no central voice for the nation's science and technology concerns.
The cacophony of voices returned that had been present in the expansionist
period.
The predictions of the Steelman report were becoming true, but the
proposed cures did not seem to be the answer. As predicted, the rebuilt
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industries of Japan and Germany were thriving, but these international
markets did not remain as secondary markets but became primary players.
As evidence of this, within the high-tech industries, the largest US firms held
seventy-nine percent (79%) of world markets (including the domestic US
market) in 1959. This share was reduced to only forty-seven percent (47%) by
1978. Within the same time period the market share of Japanese firms in
some high technology industries had increased by a factor of four (Smith pp.
103-104, 1990).
As Smith so succinctly put it, "What remains unmistakable is that the
United States no longer monopolizes advanced technology" (Smith p. 105,
1990). The gains made through the strong investment in technology during
the war period were not able to be sustained on a basic science with spin-off
approach to commercialization. Short product cycles, rapid diffusion of
process technologies and global technological cooperation created a new
economic global competitiveness. For these reasons, the limitless
opportunities envisioned in Science: The Endless Frontier did not come true.
The Economic Competitiveness Period (1980s --> )
Recognition of strong international economic activity and the
emergence of Japan and Germany as competitors to the once unchallenged
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US, led to a reevaluation of science and technology policies. The 1980s
brought about a flurry of debate and activity focusing on the economic
outcome of science and technology policy. Congress passed two acts in 1980
(Stevenson-Wydler Act, Patent and Trademarks Amendment) that gave great
latitude and direction for achieving technology cooperation between the
estates of science. The impetus of global competition stirred the country to
action much as it had during World War II. The difference was that this
would be a economic war that required mobilization and implementation of
a different sort. The leadership for science and technology policies passed
from the executive branch to the legislative branch. Bills were drafted and
acts passed to address the issues of concern. Yet it is hard to change the
momentum inherent in the estates of science and the actual changes are slow
in forming.
An important step in establishing the federal technology transfer
framework was the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980
(P.L. 96-480). This legislation made technology transfer an integral part of the
research and development responsibilities of federal laboratories and their
employees. It required technology transfer officers to be placed in each of the
major federal laboratories and established the Center for the Utilization of
Federal Technology as a clearinghouse for information on federally owned or
originated technologies.
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Following the Stevenson-Wydler Act was Public Law 96-517,
commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act. The Bayh-Dole Act was a result of
Congressional hearings in which it was established that the private sector
would not invest the time and money necessary to commercialize technology
without title or an exclusive license to an invention, and that the federal
government had assembled a huge portfolio of patents that were not being
licensed. This legislation allowed government contractors the right to title
patents resulting from government research. Those government contractors
benefiting from this law were small businesses, universities, and not-for-
profit institutions.
By the mid 1980s there still remained serious displeasure with the state
of technology transfer from government agencies and labs to the private
sector. In 1984 and 1985, the House of Representatives Committee on Science
and Technology took testimony to understand the state of affairs.
("Technology Transfer From Federal Laboratories and Universities" 1992)
Representatives from the private sector found it difficult to understand how
to do business with the laboratories and federal laboratory employees
involved in technology transfer did not feel their work was taken seriously by
their management.
In response to these concerns the Federal Technology Transfer Act of
1986 (Public Law 99-502) was introduced as an amendment to the Stevenson-
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Wydler Technology Innovation Act to permit government owned,
government-operated laboratories to enter into Cooperative Research And
Development Agreements (CRADAs) with entities in both the public and
private sector (P.L. 99-502). The law authorized agencies to grant collaborating
partners licenses to inventions made under CRADAs and mandated that
agencies pay at least fifteen percent (15%) of royalties from inventions made
at laboratories to the inventors.
Then in 1987, Executive Order 12591, Facilitating Access to Science and
Technology, directed executive departments and agencies to encourage and
facilitate collaboration among federal laboratories, state and local
governments, universities, and the private sector, to assist in the transfer of
technology to the marketplace (Codification of Presidential Proclamations and
Executive Orders 1987). Together, Public Law 99-502 and E.O. 12591 made
technology transfer the responsibility of all federal scientists and engineers,
and mandated that this responsibility be considered in employee performance
evaluations.
Even with the new legislation, the process of technology transfer
remained encumbered and a level of dissatisfaction by many in the
technology transfer field persisted. A 1991 survey by the General Accounting
Office showed that early implementation of the Federal Technology Transfer
Act by federal agencies and their headquarter offices were slow and uneven
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(Diffusing Innovation 1991). The survey also revealed some legislative
barriers to technology transfer remained, with the largest perceived legislative
barrier being the inability of the federal government to copyright software.
Legislative barriers were most quoted by private industry as impediments to
technology transfer while cultural barriers were identified by federal agencies
and employees. In response to the results of the GAO survey the Committee
on Science and Technology held four more hearings in 1991 to understand
the current views of industry representatives, review the results of the
survey, and establish a legislative record to address the copyright of federal
software.
Witnesses at the hearings also concluded that much more needed to be
accomplished by agencies and laboratories in making technology transfer a
priority mission and in addressing the cultural barriers between federal
laboratories and industry. Results of the GAO survey found that almost one-
third of the federal laboratories had not received guidance on
implementation of the Act from their parent agency. Only forty-four percent
(44%) of laboratory directors had received authority to enter into CRADAs.
Less than one-half of the laboratories had established royalty-sharing
programs and most had not established an awards program for technology
transfer activities as required by the Act. This study came nine years after the
enactment of the Stevenson-Wydler Bill (Diffusing Innovation 1991).
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Resolution of the legal issues can lead to more effective technology
transfer from the federal agencies and labs to the private industry. With the
current public concern and emphasis on the political issue of economy, there
appears to be ample momentum to overcome these obstacles. While
legislation was able to address most of the structural roadblocks, it could not
address the cultural roadblocks. Agencies have long been recognized as
having lengthy institution times with regard to cultural changes. The
legislative acts gave the agencies and laboratories the opportunity to perform
technology transfer, the burden lies with those organizations to overcome
cultural issues and perform technology transfer effectively.
Also in 1980, the Patent and Trademarks Amendments consolidated
twenty-six policies, executive orders, and statutory guidelines covering patent
rights for those performing R&D for the government. The act created a
coherent framework providing for easier utilization and ownership of
technical discoveries. This was an evolutionary step in that public and
private funds were able to be mingled freely within a project, breaking down
at least a financing barrier between the estates of science.
Once again, a new presidential administration did not necessarily
mean a new science and technology policy direction. Under Reagan, the
reliance on traditional market mechanisms, basic science as creator, and
deregulation were the guiding philosophies. Early in Reagan's first term he
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embraced technology as the solution to major problems of national security
and economic progress. His beliefs became tempered with time and reflected
the entire postwar experience: optimistic faith followed by some
disillusionment and then by a more realistic appreciation of what science
could contribute to the solution of the nation's problems.
In the early days of the Reagan administration there was a return to the
heady visions of Vannevar Bush of a bright future based on basic science.
Reagan strongly supported big government programs in defense and space,
like the Space Defense Initiative, the National Aerospace Plane and the Space
Station. Yet, Reagan took a typically Republican stand and attempted to
separate the estates of science. The administrations initial belief was to
minimize government's role in economy, so they slashed budgets for the
Carter energy demonstration projects and to stimulate industrial R&D looked
to antitrust policies, patent laws, regulation and tax incentives.
There was a collision course charted between the ideology and reality.
George A. Keyworth, Reagan's science adviser, convened a panel to look at
phasing out aeronautic research programs at NASA. The aeronautics
research at NASA directly supports the US aircraft industry (translation:
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas). US companies have long held a positive
balance of trade in aircraft and the technology support of NACA and NASA
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are major contributors to that success. The panel recommended that the
program be maintained and even strengthened
In January 1985, a President's Commission on Industrial
Competitiveness, headed by John A. Young, CEO of Hewlett-Packard, was
created and developed a volume of supporting studies tilted toward a strategy
of greater intervention in trade, technology development, and sectoral
policies. The White House was not receptive to the ideas of the commission
and it evolved into the privately funded Council on Competitiveness. The
Council on Competitiveness report, "Industry as a Customer of the Federal
Laboratories," called for cooperation between federal government and
industry, even going so far as to suggest that ten to twenty percent (10-20%) of
the federal laboratory budgets be spent on technology transfer ("industry as a
Customer of the Federal Laboratories" 1992). The report also called for more
latitude for laboratories to work joint ventures with private industry, and
other state and federal institutions.
In Reagan's second term he moved closer to a model of government
support for fostering innovation, but did not give up on his basic science
philosophy. Congress created the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 to
expand the commercial transfer of R&D conducted in federal laboratories.
This act has become one of the strongest in support of cooperation. The act
amended the 1980 Stevenson-Wydler Act, giving federal laboratories the
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authority to engage in cooperative R&D agreements (CRADA) with firms and
consortia. The CRADA is now a widely used, standard form of cooperation.
As the threat of Japanese competition deepened, the government
became more desperate to act. The government helped start Sematech, by
matching $100 million in funds with private industry and state and local
governments. Final judgment on this investment is still being debated.
The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 gave National Institute of Standards and
Technology broadened powers to assist industry to develop technology, to
modernize the manufacturing base and improve product quality, and to
commercialize new technology rapidly.
The economic competitiveness period has found limited support in
Congress and little interest by the executive branch. Presidents Reagan and
Bush maintained the status quo of basic science, spin-off ideology. President
Clinton has a strong advocate for technology development in Vice President
Gore but has really not addressed the issue. Congress throughout this period
has incrementally made strides with legislation and appeared to be a positive
influence. Recent political issues may again make science and technology
policy a casualty in the America. The 104th session of Congress has taken the
basic-science-is-best approach and combined it with a budget slashing policy.
As promised by the Republican leadership last January, the proposed
seven-year spending plans laid out by House and Senate Budget
Committees set the country on a course toward a balanced federal
266
budget by the year 2002. One major difference between the two
resolutions is the inclusion of a $340 billion tax cut in the House
version and the absence of any such cut in the Senate plan--so far. As a
result, the House resolution, shepherded through the Budget
Committee by Chairman John R. Kasich (R-OH), calls for $1.4 trillion
in savings between 1996 and 2002, while the Senate document maps
out plans for only $961 billion in savings (Lubell 1995).
Highlighting an ignorance of concern for the future, the current budget
bills for the Senate and House call for elimination of the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA). Serving a science and technology advisory role to
Congress, the OTA has been widely recognized as a highly reputable source
for non-partisan science and technology analysis. The OTA is only one of two
organizations to fall beneath the legislative branchs' control and serves as
both a balance to the science advisers of the executive and the source of
science and technology information on which the lawmakers base policy
decisions. The mere idea of abolishing the OTA without a proposal for a
replacement system speaks volumes. Where is a unbiased analysis of issues
to come from? Will science and technology policies be based upon purely
political issues or mere opinions?
The economic competitiveness period resulted in a few laws to address
global economic competitiveness and renewed interest in commercialization
as the focus of science and technology. The laws have centered on making
federal laboratories more responsible for cooperation through rewards and
performance measures. This produced a technology push mechanism. There
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still remains no overall science and technology policy in the way of directing
and utilizing the full capabilities of the estates of science and creating true
cooperation between them. In short, the economic competitiveness period
has created an awareness and concern for new methodologies to meet this
new challenge but has left much undone.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that the activities of federal laboratories can play a
positive role in the development of the United States. The question that has
remained with the nation throughout its history is how to organize the
policies and institutes of the government to best benefit the nation. With the
exception of the economic development period, the nation has maintained a
near strict belief in the pluralistic approach, with little latitude. This ideology
calls for a separate and independent activity by the estates of science while
expecting a maximum benefit from the whole of the system. Little has been
done by politicians to mold a system that utilizes synergy to satisfy each of the
estates and customers. Recently some legislation has made positive strides in
that direction but in the almost 220 years since the nation's founding, the fear
and ignorance of science and technology issues still pervades our federal
politicians. The nation is left with a laissez-faire policy that may lead to a
reduced position in the global economic competition.
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Harvey Averch best summarizes the US science and technology policy:
At no time in the history discussed here has there been tough, critical,
systematic third-party analysis of the proposed policies and the means
of implementation. And at no time has there been consistent
comparison of alternative strategies and their cost. The US search for
an innovation strategy has been marred by faulty design or, more
accurately, by no design. Analysis has usually been placed in the hands
of those with something to gain or lose. Alternative strategies have
not been articulated or debated clearly, and values, facts, and
predictions have never been clearly distinguished (Averch p. 71, 1985).
These words ring especially true in the haphazard policy making of the 104th
Congress.
Bruce Smith goes on to implore a sensible examination of the issue.
Answers to some of the most fundamental questions have remained elusive.
What effect does the climate of government activity have on the pace and
direction of innovation in the private sector? Does direct support from the
government displace or induce additional private industrial research? Do
industry and universities cooperate more effectively with, or without,
government as a third partner? (Smith 1990).
In retrospect, the focus of the US government actions like its science
and technology policies are a reflection of the challenges and desires of the
day. As the periods of challenges and needs changed in the US (expansion,
war, etc.) the emphasis changed from knowledge gathering to expand borders
and exploit land, to creation of defensive tools to protect democracy, to an
economic tool to compete in a global economy. The estates of science all
contain talented and valuable people and programs, but they must find a way
to communicate and operate in the challenges of the day. US history is rich
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with successful science and technology development, yet has not resolved the
issues of cooperation.
The most sound advice came from an MIT Commission on Industrial
Productivity which urged that "the federal government's support of research
and development should be extended to include a greater emphasis on
policies to encourage the downstream phases of product and process
engineering" (Dertouzos et al. p. 154, 1989).
Therefore the answer is pragmatic and clear, that we as a people do not
support science purely for science's sake. Science is not like art which is
almost wholly embodied in intrinsic value. In our society science is
supported for its extrinsic value (Mitcham 1995). That is, science and
technology are utilized to outwardly add value. Basic and applied research do
need to co-exist but they must be purposive. There can be a balance, but
essentially the basic research should be guided by social needs. And the
solution to the needs should utilize the combined efforts of all of the US
science and technology community resources in a synergistic manner.
In closing, the nation needs to address at least the following issues:
• With regard to science and technology policies, establish a
methodology and implement that methodology to perform critical,
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objective, third party evaluations of proposals that include cost
effectiveness. (The demise of the OTA would create an even greater
need for this assessment capability.)
• Balance federal guidelines between basic research, applied research,
development, and other downstream activities.
Find cooperative methods between the estates of science to create
synergy for the best utilization of national resources. Create policies
that create strong technology innovation and do not rely merely on a
laissez faire approach and the current legislation that essentially creates
government technology push.
Find methods to link the upstream activities (research, development,
etc.) with downstream activities (market research, financing,
management, etc.).
Notes on Technology Transfer
Technology transfer and commercialization is but one of several issues
supporting the US welfare through science and technology policy and should
be placed within context and be given a proper sense of significance. The total
US R&D budget for 1994 was approximately $160 billion or three percent (3%)
of the GNP. Of that R&D budget, approximately half of it is federal and half
industrial. But this distribution is a bit misleading, since the federal funds are
distributed to universities, state institutions, and private entities. The federal
government laboratories account for approximately eleven and one-tenth
percent (11.1%) of the total US R&D expenditures or approximately three-
tenths percent (0.3%) of the annual GNP (National Science Board 1989). In
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contrast the US defense budget is approximately $300 billion or five percent
(5%) of the GNP. Technology transfer is but one aspect of R&D and a small
one at that. Only recently have there been any suggested guidelines for
funding levels of technology transfer ("Industry as a Customer of the Federal
Laboratories" 1992, Gore 1993, Agenda for Change 1994) Most of the policies
aim for a minimum of ten percent (10%) of federal laboratory budgets to be
allocated to technology transfer and where appropriate, up to twenty percent
(20%). Assuming the ten percent (10%) level, technology transfer efforts from
federal laboratories to the private sector, would compose a mere three-
hundredths percent (0.03%) of the GNP.
Although this issue of technology transfer is relatively small in
comparison to other national policy issues in terms of both resources and
efforts expended, it has the potential for great returns through a synergistic
use of resources. Both the minuscule size of this effort and its potential
benefits should be kept in mind for a fair but tempered analysis.
Addendum on a Proposed Department of Science
Recently Representative RobertWalker (R, PA), Chair of the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, has called for the
formation of a Department of Science. Walker's argument for a Department
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of Science is based on a belief that it would raise science and technology to a
higher priority within the government framework. Neither a Department of
Science nor the belief that it could raise the priority of science and technology
are new ideas. Throughout US history efforts have been made to establish
national institutes of science, departments of science, and other centralized
forms of science government. These attempts were always dashed in the face
of pragmatic needs. Perhaps, the best evidence for a problem-based approach
of federal government involvement lies in the failure to establish a discipline
based approach over the past 220 years.
In addition to discussions of an institute of science during the framing
of the Constitution, the idea of a Department of Science was thoroughly
analyzed and debated by academics and politicians at the end of the 19th
century and even more so in the early 1950s. The voice of plurality won out
in both instances. According to Smith,
The reasons the nation did not create one large science department are
still relevant. Those who would be affected are unwilling to trust a
single overriding vision on the proper goals of science policy,
preferring the deeper rationality of multiple and partial visions of the
common good. There is also fear that a large department would
embrace too exclusively either Vannevar Bush's goal of generating
knowledge or Harley Kilgore's goal of diffusing it (Smith p. 162, 1990).
No evidence exists to prove that a central scientific organization would
raise the priority of science and technology. Even the reasoning is curious,
since the priority of science (i.e. funding) is set by Congress, and its members
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opinions about scientific endeavors would not likely be affected by a mere
change of structure. Hunter Dupree criticizes this idea even further,
The concentration of all science in the government into one
department, representing a special professional interest, might make
control by Congress and the executive harder instead of easier. And the
full potentiality of science in the government could be achieved only if
it permeated the whole structure (Dupree p. 231, 1986).
Regardless of management and control issues, the real issue is whether
a discipline-based agency (Department of Science) or several mission-oriented
agencies (NASA, Department of Energy, etc.), or some other option, is most
beneficial to the nation. The discipline-based agency is easily criticized by a
simple analogy. Imagine the creation of a Department of Law. How would
all of the legal issues within the federal government scope be separated from
the missions they serve and placed within one central organization? The
same is true for science and technology. The US culture is one of inventors,
explorers, and capitalists who use science and technology as tools with
extrinsic values. The tools should remain aligned with the mission. The
benefit of creating a Department of Science is questionable at best, while the
negative consequences could be devastating.
The idea for a Department of Science was strongly put forward in 1851
by Alexander Dallas Bache, an accomplished scientist who championed many
science causes. Bache stated "an institution of science, supplementary to
existing ones, is much needed in our country, to guide public action in
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scientific matters." He was ready for the inevitable states rights argument,
going on to say, "the idea of a necessary connexion between centralization and
institution [does not] strike me as a valid one" (Dupree p. 117, 1986). His
proposal would have members residing in their own State and meeting
periodically to discuss issues or results of studies. Research could be called for
by both the executive or the legislative and would be funded by those two.
Baches' idea received no open support then but seemed to serve as a seed for
the future.
The question remained that plagued the framers of the Constitution:
Where and how does science fit into the government structure? And how
does the nation secure efficient and non duplicative science? In order to
study the issue, a committee comprised of three members from each the
House and the Senate was formed with Senator W. B. Allison acting as the
chairman. Testifying before the commission, Secretary of the Navy William
E. Chandler vocalized the need for the mission oriented approach. Chandler
stated that all scientific or art work for the government "should be conducted
within and under the direction of that Department which needs the scientific
assistance.., and that it would be a most anomalous proceeding to erect as a
governmental department a department of science or of art." He felt that
scientific activities should come under "that department with which it has
the most natural relation" (Dupree p. 219, 1986).
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The Allison Commission studied the problem over a period of two
years with input from scientific leaders like Bache and Powell. Scientists such
as Powell who wanted the Department only succeeded in debating the issue to
inconclusive ends and in turn failing to support their own cause. The
Commission finally pronounced that they felt that "no such duplication of
work or necessary connection of these bureaus with each other.., makes
such an establishment essential to their efficiency" (Dupree p. 229, 1986). The
inaction of the Commission affirmed both the current value of the science
organization in place and denied the validity of a Department of Science.
Dr. John Shaw Billings, the famous Army medical doctor, voiced his
disdain for a Department of Science: "As to the desirability of centralization
and consolidation of scientific interests and scientific work into one
department under a single head, I confess I have serious doubts" (Dupree p.
230, 1986). A department organized along the lines of the branches of science
denies the problem approach. While taking advantage of every opportunity
to increase knowledge, every scientific branch of the government should be
tied to the "practical results" the legislators are trying to achieve.
The debate was rekindled again at the end of World War II by
Vannevar Bush. Bush wrote Science: The Endless Frontier, in response to
President Roosevelt's request for a plan to transition science and technology
to peacetime efforts. Bush's report was insightful and to this day stands as a
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key document in the science and technology policy arena. A plethora of
recommendations were filed within the report along with a call for the
creation of a central scientific organization to coordinate all of the activities.
Bush essentially called for both a mission-aligned and discipline-oriented
approach. He realized the value of mission-aligned research being conducted
within specific agencies and the danger in separating the research from the
mission. But he also felt the need for a separate institute dedicated solely to
basic research. He was concerned that basic research could not be
administered unfettered within an organization that has a mission
orientation. Therefor Bush called for the creation of a National Research
Foundation that would be the bastion of basic research.
Standing on the other side of the debate from Vannevar Bush was
Senator Harley Kilgore. Kilgore also wanted a central organization but had a
different vision of its structure and objective. He believed that centralization
would create better diffusion of knowledge and practical applications of that
knowledge. The debate between the Kilgore camp and the Bush camp
continued, a bill was passed by Congress, vetoed by President Truman, and
after significant restructuring finally became a reality in 1947. A watered-
down version of the NSF passed which left it neither making policy nor being
the central focus of research but as a mere clearinghouse for funds based on
the peer-review process.
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Vannevar Bush and Harley Kilgore set the initial terms of the debate,
and their allies and descendants have carried on the argument about the
kinds of policies that would best promote scientific and technological progress
and about the essential purpose of support for science programs.
Recently the issue of a Department of Science was examined by both
professional scientists (National Academy of Science) and private industry
(Council on Competitiveness). Interestingly, the privately funded Council on
Competitiveness concluded that a Department of Science would create high
visibility for science and technology issues and a consolidated front in order
to establish a non-fragmented science and technology policy. Immediate
opposition stated a concern that this approach would create a large
bureaucracy built up of program elements torn out of the context of the user
agency and would therefore be likely to impede rather than hasten
technological implications. Furthermore there was a concern that any effort
to centralize funding would create endless jurisdictional disputes.
Just as interesting is the response of the scientific community. The
National Academy of Science's white paper "Federal Science and Technology
Budget Priorities" concludes that existing agencies generally do a good job of
deciding which technologies and research programs help them achieve their
own program goals. The report also suggests that close coupling of R&D
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funding and agency missions should remain a prominent feature of the
research system. (National Research Council 1989)
Smith feels that the issue has had a long examination period and
concludes that, "The nation, in effect, decided finally by means of political
compromise, without ever explicitly debating the matter, that generating and
diffusing knowledge were both desirable and that one controlling vision was
to be eschewed in favor of a plurality of approaches" (Smith p. 160, 1990).
Therefore, Americans do believe in diffusion of knowledge but also favor
plurality, and ironically the one thought that unites us is that we are against
centralization. Representative Robert Walker certainly will have a challenge
in taking on the scientific community and a Congress that is interested in
decentralization to embrace a Department of Science.
279
APPENDIX C.1
NASA Langley Research Center Organizational Structure
Prior to the Creation of the Technology Applications
Group
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APPENDIX C.2
NASA Langley Research Center Organizational Structure
After the Creation of the Technology Applications Group
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APPENDIX D.1
Survey After Revisions by the Focus Group
284
NASA Langley Research Center
Technology Transfer Survey
,
.
,
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
3. My research has potential for technology transfer.
.
Technology Transfer is one of NASA Langley's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
Technology Transfer is one of NASA's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
NASA Langley Research Center should be doing technology transfer.
Strongly Disagree
Agree Don't Know Disagree
What percentage of your research has potential for technology transfer?
.
.
I have been adequately prepared to perform technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
Which of the following would help you to better perform technology
transfer?
Education about the process
Training on performance of technology transfer
Not interested
Other
. In addition to my research, technology transfer should be one of my
responsibilities.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
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.
°
Strongly Agree
Technology transfer has been a component of my performance plan
and/or performance appraisal.
Agree Disagree
Technology Transfer should be a component of my performance plan &
performance appraisal.
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
. Technology Transfer should be a consideration only during my
performance appraisal and not necessarily a planned task.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
.
.
.
Royalties would serve as an incentive for me to perform technology
transfer.
Agree Disagree
Promotions would serve as an incentive for me to perform technology
transfer.
Agree Disagree
Promotions and royalties would serve as an incentive for me to perform
technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
10. My immediate management has provided tangible support for technology
transfer efforts.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
11. Please rate your managements participation in technology transfer on
the following scale.
helped significantly Stayed out of the way inhibited
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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12. NASA Langley has committed what percentage of resources to
technology transfer?
13. If you were so inclined or felt your work was transferable, what
mechanisms are you aware of to transfer your technology to the private
sector.
My technology council member is
What group at NASA Langley Research Center would you contact for
help in transferring technology?
Demographics:
Age
Level of Education Achieved
Group
Division
BS MS PhD
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APPENDIX D.2
Survey After Review by the Deputy Director of the
Technology Applications Group
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Hello, my name is Lance Bush. rm an employee of NASA Langley Research
Center and am conducting a survey of the research staff here. This survey was
designed to measure the attitudes, awareness and perceptions of researchers
like yourself towards technology transfer. My hope is that the results of this
survey will create a clear picture of the culture of the researchers towards
technology transfer and in turn provide information that could shape the
Center's stance toward technology transfer. This survey is also part of a Ph.D.
dissertation study that I am completing. You were randomly selected from a
database of all researchers at the center. Your participation in this research is
confidential. Only I will have access to your identity and to information that can
be associated with your identity. In the event of publication of this research, no
personally identifying information will be disclosed. Results will be published
only in aggregate form. Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free
to stop participating in the survey at any time, or decline to answer any specific
question. Having said all that, the survey should take no more than 10 minutes
over the phone (probably less than time than this statement in fact). May I have
your permission to proceed.
Before we start, I would like to read to you a definition of the term technology
transfer that will be used throughout this survey. Technology transfer denotes
the activities by NASA, private industry and universities that lead to cooperative
partnerships resulting in an improved economy and quality of life. Although we
practice technology transfer with our traditional customers in aerospace, for this
study we are interested in only non-aerospace technology transfer.
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NASA Langley Research Center
Technology Transfer Culture
.
.
.
Strongly Agree
4.
Technology Transfer is one of NASA Langley's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
Technology Transfer is one of NASA's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
NASA Langley Research Center should be doing technology transfer.
.
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
My research has potential for technology transfer.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
What percentage of your research has potential for technology transfer?
.
.
I have been adequately prepared to perform technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
Which of the following would help you to better perform technology
transfer?
Tangible Support by Management
Education about the process
Training on performance of technology transfer
Not interested
Other
. In addition to my research, technology transfer should be one of my
responsibilities.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
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g.
10.
Technology transfer has been a component of my performance plan
and/or performance appraisal.
Agree Disagree
Technology Transfer should be a component of my performance plan &
performance appraisal.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
11. Technology Transfer should be a consideration only during my
performance appraisal and not necessarily a planned task.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
12. I would like to have technology transfer as a contributing component of
my promotion process.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
13. If technology transfer were a component of the promotion process, I
would put more effort toward technology transfer.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
14. My immediate management has provided tangible support for technology
transfer efforts.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
15. Please rate your managements participation in technology transfer on
the following scale.
helps significantly Stays out of the way inhibits
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
16. NASA Langley has committed what percentage of resources to
technology transfer?
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17. If you were so inclined or felt your work was transferable, what
mechanisms are you aware of to transfer your technology to the private
sector.
My technology council member is
What group at NASA Langley Research Center would you contact for
help in transferring technology?
Demographics:
In order to perform aggregate correlations of the results with age, I need to ask
you your age.
Again, in order to perform aggregate correlations of the results with education, I
need to ask your highest completed degree.
BS MS/ME/etc. PhD/Ed.D/etc.
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APPENDIX D.3
Survey After Second Revisions by the Focus Group
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Hello, my name is Lance Bush. I'm an employee of NASA Langley Research
Center and am conducting a survey of the research staff here. This survey was
designed to measure the attitudes, awareness and perceptions of researchers
like yourself towards technology transfer. The results of this survey will create a
clear picture of the culture of the researchers towards technology transfer and in
turn provide information to senior management. This survey is also part of a
Ph.D. dissertation study that I am completing. You were randomly selected from
a database of all researchers at the center. Your participation in this research is
confidential. Only I will have access to your identity and to information that can
be associated with your identity. In the event of publication of this research, no
personally identifying information will be disclosed. Results will be published
only in aggregate form. Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free
to stop participating in the survey at any time, or decline to answer any specific
question. Having said all that, the survey should take no more than 10 minutes
over the phone (probably less than time than this statement in fact). May I have
your permission to proceed.
Before we start, I would like to read to you a definition of the term technology
transfer that will be used throughout this survey. Technology transfer denotes
the active participation by NASA to transfer research results to private industry
and universities via formal or informal cooperative partnerships with the
intention of improving (the) economy and quality of life. Although we practice
technology transfer with our traditional customers in aerospace, for this study
we are interested in only non-aerospace technology transfer.
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NASA Langley Research Center
Technology Transfer Culture
•
•
,
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
4. My research has potential for technology transfer.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
°
Technology Transfer is one of NASA Langley's Missions•
Agree Don't Know Disagree
Technology Transfer is one of NASA's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
NASA Langley Research Center should be doing technology transfer•
Strongly Disagree
What percentage of your research has potential for technology transfer?
,
t
I have been adequately prepared to perform technology transfer•
Agree Disagree
Which of the following would help you to better perform technology
transfer?
Tangible Support by Management
Education about the process
Training on performance of technology transfer
Not interested
Other
• In addition to my research, technology transfer should be one of my
responsibilities.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
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g.
10.
Strongly Agree
Technology transfer has been a component of my performance plan
and/or performance appraisal.
Agree Disagree
Technology Transfer should be a component of my performance plan &
performance appraisal.
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
11. Technology Transfer should be a consideration only during my
performance appraisal and not necessarily a planned task.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
12. I would like to have technology transfer as a contributing component of
my promotion process.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
13. If technology transfer were a component of the promotion process, I
would put more effort toward technology transfer.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
14. My immediate management has provided tangible support for technology
transfer efforts.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
15. Please rate your managements participation in technology transfer on
the following scale.
Inhibits helped significantly
16.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NASA Langley has committed what percentage of resources to
technology transfer?
10
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17. If you felt your work was transferable, what mechanisms would you use to
transfer your technology to the private sector.
My technology council member is
What group at NASA Langley Research Center would you contact for
help in transferring technology?
Demographics:
In order to perform aggregate correlations of the results with age, I need to ask
you your age.
Again, in order to perform aggregate correlations of the results with education, I
need to ask your highest completed degree.
BS MS/ME/etc. PhD/Ed.D/etc.
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APPENDIX D.4
Final Survey
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Hello, my name is Lance Bush. I'm an employee of NASA Langley
Research Center and am conducting a survey of the research staff
here.
This survey was designed to measure the attitudes, awareness and
perceptions of researchers like yourself towards technology transfer.
The results of this survey will create a clear picture of the culture of
the researchers towards technology transfer and in turn provide
information to senior management. This survey is also part of a
Ph.D. dissertation study that I am completing at Penn State
University. You were randomly selected from a database of all
researchers at the center. Your participation in this research is
confidential. Only I will have access to your identity and to
information that can be associated with your identity. In the event of
publication of this research, no personally identifying information
will be disclosed. Results will be published only in aggregate form.
Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free to stop
participating in the survey at any time, or decline to answer any
specific question. Regarding this survey, you may contact me at my
office number of 864-4514. Having said all that, the survey should
take no more than 10 minutes over the phone (probably less time
than this statement in fact). May I have your permission to proceed.
Before we start, I would like to read to you a definition of the term
technology transfer that will be used throughout this survey.
Technology transfer denotes the active participation by NASA to
transfer research results to private industry and universities via
formal or informal cooperative partnerships with the intention of
improving (the) economy and quality of life. Although we practice
technology transfer with our traditional customers in aerospace, for
this study we are interested in only non-aerospace technology
transfer.
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NASA Langley Research Center
Technology Transfer Culture
•
o
6
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
4. My research has potential for technology transfer.
Technology Transfer is one of NASA Langley's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
Technology Transfer is one of NASA's Missions.
Agree Don't Know Disagree
NASA Langley Research Center should be doing technology transfer.
Strongly Disagree
•
Agree Don't Know Disagree
What percentage of your research has potential for technology transfer?
.
.
I have been adequately prepared to perform technology transfer.
Agree Disagree
Which of the following would help you to better perform technology
transfer? (You may answer with more than one choice.)
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Tangible Support by Management
Education about the process
Training on performance of technology transfer
Not interested
Other
. In addition to my research, technology transfer should be one of my
responsibilities.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
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g° Technology transfer has been a component of my performance plan
and/or performance appraisal.
Agree Disagree
10. Technology Transfer should be a component of my performance plan &
performance appraisal.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
11. Given that the performance appraisal allows for a researcher to bring up
positive accomplishments that may not have been planned for,
technology transfer should be a consideration only during my
performance appraisal and not necessarily a planned task.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
12. I would like to have technology transfer as a contributing component of
my promotion process.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
13. If technology transfer were a component of the promotion process, I
would put more effort toward technology transfer.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
14. My immediate management has provided tangible support for technology
transfer efforts.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
15. Please rate your managements participation in technology transfer on
the following scale.
Inhibits helped signifiCantly
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
16. NASA Langley has committed what percentage of resources to
technology transfer?
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17. If you felt your work was transferable, what mechanisms would you use to
transfer your technology to the private sector.
My technology council member is
What group at NASA Langley Research Center would you contact for
help in transferring technology?
Demographics:
In order to perform aggregate correlations of the results with age, I need to ask
you your age.
Again, in order to perform aggregate correlations of the results with education, I
need to ask your highest completed degree.
BS MS/ME/etc. PhD/Ed.D/etc.
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